Perception of visual variance is mediated by subcortical mechanisms.

Variance characterizes the structure of the environment. This statistical concept plays a critical role in evaluating the reliability of evidence for human decision-making. The present study examined the involvement of subcortical structures in the processing of visual variance. To this end, we used a stereoscope to sequentially present two circle arrays in a dichoptic or monocular fashion while participants compared the perceived variance of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, two arrays were presented monocularly to the same eye, dichopticly to different eyes, or binocularly to both eyes. The variance judgment was less accurate in different-eye condition than the other conditions. In Experiment 2, the first circle array was split into a large-variance and a small-variance set, with either the large-variance or small-variance set preceding the presentation of the second circle array in the same eye. The variance of the first array was judged larger when the second array was preceded by the large-variance set in the same eye, showing that the perception of variance was modulated by the visual variance processed in the same eye. Taken together, these findings provide evidence for monocular processing of visual variance, suggesting that subcortical structures capture the statistical structure of the visual world.

Stronger spatial bias induced more by numbers in mind than numbers in eye: Evidence from event-related potentials.

The relationship between number and space is an important issue in numerical cognition. The spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is a classic example of the association between numbers and spaces. It refers to the phenomenon whereby left-handed responses occur faster to small number and right-handed responses occur faster to large number. The current study explored the shared and distinct neural correlates of the SNARC effect considering numbers in eye and numbers in mind, by using event-related potentials (ERPs) technology. In each trial of the task, participants were asked to press freely one of two keys as a response to a number presented visually (numbers in eye) or via imagination (numbers in mind). The behavioral results indicated that the free-choice key presses were affected by the magnitudes of the numbers either in eye or in mind. Electrophysiological results observed that the SNARC effect appeared only in the 110-140 ms time window for numbers in eye. In contrast, for numbers in mind, the SNARC effect appeared during a longer time window (110-330 ms). These results suggest that both, numbers in eye and numbers in mind, can induce spatial bias at the early stimulus-representation stage, but the time duration of the spatial bias is longer for numbers in mind than numbers in eye. This may reflect a closer connection between numbers in mind and mental number line.

Do after "not to do": Deinhibition in cognitive control.

In daily life, we often need to inhibit a certain behavior or thought; however, sometimes we need to remove inhibition (deinhibition). Numerous studies have examined inhibition control, but it is unclear how deinhibition functions. In Experiment 1, we adopted a modified stop-signal task in which participants were instructed to immediately stop the prepared response to a stimulus appended by an accidental signal. The results showed that when the preceding trial was a stop-signal trial and participants successfully inhibited the action to the stimulus, the reaction time (RT) for the repeated stimuli in the current trial was significantly longer than that of the switched stimuli, reflecting the cost of deinhibition. Deinhibition ability is correlated with inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. In Experiment 2, we manipulated stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between presentation of the stimuli and the stopping signals to exclude the interference of the signal preparation effect on the deinhibition cost. These findings suggest that an individual's deinhibition ability, as a previously ignored subcomponent of cognitive control, may play an important role in human adaptive behavior.

Reconfiguration of response-set in task switching: Event-related potential evidence.

In task switching, an interaction between task and response is often observed, with response repetition (RR) benefits in task-repeat trials and RR costs in task-switch trials. The theoretical accounts of the RR effect remain controversial, and neuroscience evidence is scarce. The present study utilized the event-related potentials (ERPs) method to explore the neural mechanism underlying the RR effect by adopting a cued task-switching paradigm. The ERP results revealed the interaction between task and response in the P3b time window, with a response switch positivity under task-repetition conditions and an RR positivity under task-switching conditions. In addition, there were RR positivity in the N2 irrespective of task transition and in the late component (LC, 550-600 ms) that only under the task repetition condition. On the individual level, the RR benefit positively correlated with the RR positivity in the LC, while the RR costs negatively correlated with RR positivity in the N2/P3 component. These results suggest that both response reconfiguration and episodic-retrieval make contributions to the RR effects, which were also discussed in terms of predictive model for a domain-general inference and learning of perceptual categories.

Electrophysiological correlates of the effect of set size on object switching in working memory.

Previous studies have revealed the effect of set size (the number of activated items) on object switching in working memory, but the underlying neural mechanism remains unclear. In this study, participants were asked to first remember two (small size) or three (large size) two-digit numbers and the corresponding geometrical figures as different references for numerical comparison and then compare a series of numbers (10-99) to the reference numbers cued by different geometrical figures. The cue repeated or switched across trials. Behavioral results revealed that the switch cost was greater in the large-size condition than in the small-size condition. Event-related potential results showed that in the N2 component, an interaction was observed between set size and transition, with a significant transition effect (switch minus repeat) in the large-size condition and a non-significant transition effect in the small-size condition. The same interaction was observed in the P3 component, with a larger amplitude difference (switch minus repeat) in the large-size condition than in the small-size condition. These results suggested that when set size is increased, the effort to inhibit the irrelevant items increases, resulting in large cost of object switching in working memory.

The role of cognitive control in the SNARC effect: A review.

The spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect, in which people respond to small numbers faster with the left hand and to large numbers faster with the right hand, is a popular topic in cognitive psychology. Some well-known theoretical accounts explaining this effect include the mental number line model, polarity correspondence principle, dual-route model, and working memory account. However, these fail to explain the finding that the size of the SNARC effect is modulated by cognitive control. Here, we propose a new account-a cognitive control-based view of the SNARC effect. This view argues that the SNARC effect is fundamentally determined by cognitive control in resolving conflicts during stimulus-response mapping. Several subcomponents of cognitive control, such as working memory, mental or task set shifting, inhibition control, and conflict adaptation, can easily modulate the SNARC effect. The cognitive control-based view can account for the flexible SNARC effect observed in diverse task situations while providing new insight into its mechanism.

Proactive and reactive control differ between task switching and response rule switching: Event-related potential evidence.

The distinction between task-switching (T-switch) and response-rule switching (RR-switch) has been reported in previous studies. However, it is unclear whether the neural correlates of proactive and reactive control differ between T-switch and RR-switch. In this study, a modified cue-target task was adopted. When the cue in the current trial differed from that in the preceding trial in shape (or color), the participants had to perform a T-switch (or RR-switch). Otherwise, they performed the same task following the same response rule. The behavioral results showed that the switch cost was greater for the RR-switch than for the T-switch. The event-related potential results indicated that (1) for cues, the switch-positivity in the late positive component (LPC) (500-800 ms) was more enhanced for the RR-switch than for the T-switch over the central to parietal regions, reflecting increased proactive control for the RR-switch compared with the T-switch; (2) for targets, the P3 amplitude was more attenuated in the RR-switch than the T-switch over the central and parietal regions, reflecting increased reactive control for the RR-switch; and (3) under the T-switch, the switch-positivity in the cue-LPC was negatively correlated with accuracy cost, while under the RR-switch, the switch negativity in the target-P3 was positively correlated with the reaction time cost. These findings suggest that similar proactive and reactive control are recruited in the T-switch and RR-switch, whereas cognitive control efforts clearly differ between them, perhaps due to different sub-processes.

Response variations can promote the efficiency of task switching: Electrophysiological evidence.

Previous studies have investigated sequence effect on task switching and found that increased cognitive control in preceding trials would transfer to the current trial. However, it remains unclear whether response variations during task repetition can enhance cognitive control and promote task switching. In the present study, we designed two sequence contexts, the response-change (r-change) and response-repeat (r-repeat) contexts, by adopting a classical task-switching paradigm in which participants were asked to make an odd-even or large-small judgment of the presented digit. The only difference between the two sequence contexts was whether responses varied frequently during task repetition. Behavioral results showed that the r-change context induced smaller switch costs and higher accuracy for task switching than the r-repeat context. Event-related potential (ERP) results revealed (1) the effect of context on N2 amplitudes, with greater N2 in the r-change context than the r-repeat context at frontal-central regions; (2) the interaction between context and transition type during the stimulus-locked P3 component, with a marked context effect for the task-switch trials; (3) non-significant context effect on task switching during the response-locked P3 component. These findings suggest that response variations during a sequence of task-repeat trials can trigger the increase in cognitive control that promotes the efficiency of followed task switching.

More change in task repetition, less cost in task switching: Behavioral and event-related potential evidence.

Previous studies have shown that the probability of task switching can vary the level of cognitive control and modulate the size of switch costs. However, it is unclear whether switch costs would be affected by a task-repetition context formed by varying the degree of response (and task-relevant stimulus property) change within the task repetition sequences while the probability of task switching remains constant. In the present study, participants were presented with a string of digits (e.g., ②②②). Basing on stimulus color, they were required to indicate either the presented digit, or the number of presented digits. Before task switching, stimulus and response in consecutive task-repeat trials varied more or less frequently. Behavioral results showed that the frequent-change context elicited smaller switch costs than the rare-change context. Event-related potential (ERP) results indicated that: (1) the frequent-change context evoked greater fronto-central N2 amplitudes for both task-repeat and task-switch trials, implying that cognitive control increased due to the variation of stimulus and response associations; (2) for the task switch trials, smaller P300 amplitudes were evoked in the frequent-change context than the rare-change context, reflecting the promoted task-set reconfiguration. These findings suggest that, the more change in stimulus and response during task repetition, the higher the overall level of cognitive control and the higher efficiency of task-switching.

SNARC effect modulated by central executive control: revealed in a cue-based trisection task.

People respond to small numbers faster with the left hand and respond to large numbers faster with the right hand, a phenomenon known as the Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect. Whether the SNARC effect originates from culturally determined long-term experience or the task-set-influenced temporary associations among spaces, locations, and numerical magnitudes in working memory (WM) is still controversial. In the present study, we used a trisection paradigm in which numbers were divided into three categories (small: 1, 2; middle: 4, 5, 6; and large: 8, 9) to explore whether the central executive control can modulate the SNARC effect. Participants were serially presented with a cue and a target number. The cue denoted a task rule, which informed participants to compare the target number with either 3 or 7. The cue was either switched or repeated across trials. We found that the SNARC effects were observed in the cue-switching condition. In the cue-repeat condition, the SNARC effect disappeared. These findings suggest that the SNARC effect is modulated by set-shifting-related central executive control in WM, supporting the view that the SNARC effect is WM-dependent.

Children prefer pattern over shape during complex categorization.

Numerous studies have shown that children tend to view objects with similar shapes as having the same category. However, these studies often adopt simple categorization tasks and ignore the perceptual dimension (e.g., surface pattern of objects) that likely attract children's attention. The purpose of this study was to test how children categorize when pattern competes against shape. In Experiment 1a children were presented with a target and several testing objects that shared the same shape, color, or texture as the target. The results indicated that children preferentially selected the shape-sharing objects. However, when the texture was replaced by pattern (Experiment 1b), there was no significant difference between shape and pattern choices. When shared features were intricately overlapped between different pairs of stimuli (Experiment 2), children preferentially chose objects that shared patterns over those that shared shapes. These findings are the first to reveal children's pattern preference in categorization, supporting the view that children's categorization is flexible.

Neural Dynamics of Cognitive Control in Various Types of Incongruence.

Conflict-control is a core function of cognitive control. Although numerous studies have considered cognitive control to be domain-general, the shared and distinct brain responses to different types of incongruence or conflict remain unclear. Using a hybrid flanker task, the present study explored the temporal dynamics of brain activation to three types of incongruence: flanker interference, rule-based response switch (rule-switch), and action-based response switch (response-alternation). The results showed that: (1) all three types of incongruence evoked larger N2 amplitudes than the congruent condition in the frontal region, with the N2 amplitudes and topographical distribution of the N2 effect differing between the different types of incongruence; and (2) in the P300 time window, the flanker interference condition yielded the most delayed P300 latency, whereas the rule-switch and response-alternation conditions yielded smaller P300 amplitudes with a longer interval from P300 peak to a keypress. These findings suggest that different types of incongruence are first monitored similarly by the cognitive control system and then resolved differently.

Distinct brain activation in response to negative feedback at different stages in a variant of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.

Positive or negative feedback is usually used to maintain or shift a sorting rule in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). Previous studies have demonstrated that negative feedback evokes a larger P3 than positive feedback. However, it is unclear whether the neural response is different for negative feedback appearing at different stages of the WCST. We compared ERPs evoked by the negative feedback appearing at the rule-switching stage (switch-NF) with those appearing at the rule-learning stage (learn-NF) in a modified WCST. Results indicated that: 1) switch-NF evoked a longer N1 latency than learn-NF, 2) switch-NF evoked a delayed and larger N2 component than learn-NF, particularly at the frontal and central electrodes, 3) P3 latency was shorter and the P3 amplitude was larger in learn-NF than in switch-NF. These findings suggest that in the different stages of the WCST, negative feedback implied different involvement of attention, inhibition control, and context updating.

Not inertia but reconfiguration: Asymmetric switch cost in a hierarchical task.

Numerous studies have investigated asymmetric switch cost between different types of tasks. However, the underlying neural mechanism of asymmetric switch cost in a hierarchical task remains unknown. In the present study, we used a representation-nested paradigm and defined three hierarchical levels of number comparison. Participants were required to switch between different levels according to the color of the stimuli. Behavioral result showed a longer response time in the upward switch (from the lower level to the middle level) than in the downward switch (from the higher level to the middle level). The event related potential results showed that (1) a larger N2 was elicited by the upward switch, which reflects the response inhibition process; and (2) the sustained potential component was most negative for the upward switch and least negative for the repeat condition, thereby reflecting the different degrees of reconfiguration of task set. The reverse asymmetric switch cost in the hierarchical task was explained using task-set reconfiguration theory and related to the activation of the left frontal region.

Identification and transformation difficulty in problem solving: Electrophysiological evidence from chunk decomposition.

A wealth of studies have investigated how to overcome experience-based constraints in creative problem solving. One such experience-based constraint is the tendency for people to view tightly organized visual stimuli as single, unified percepts, even when decomposition of those stimuli into component parts (termed chunk decomposition) would facilitate problem solving. The current study investigates the neural underpinnings of chunk decomposition in creative problem solving by analyzing event-related potentials. In two experiments, participants decomposed Chinese characters into the character's component elements and then used the base elements to form a new valid character. The action could require decomposing a "tight" chunk, meaning that the component elements intersected spatially, or a "loose" chunk, in which the component elements did not overlap in space. Behaviorally, individuals made more errors and responded slower to trials involving tight chunks relative to loose chunks. Analysis of the ERPs revealed that relative to loose chunks, the electrophysiological response to tight chunks contained an increased N2, an increased N400, and a decreased late positive complex. Taken together, these results suggest that chunk tightness is a principle determinant of the difficulty of chunk decomposition, and that chunk tightness provokes neural conflict and semantic violations, factors known to influence the N2 and N400 ERP components.

More abstract, more difficult to shift: Behavior and electrophysiological evidence.

Previous studies on task or rule shifting have shown that the switch cost is affected by the hierarchical level of abstraction. The present study aimed to explore the neural correlates of hierarchical modulation in rule shifting. Participants were required to respond to number stimuli (1-9, excluding 5) while adhering to alternative rules cued by different perceptual features of the stimuli. Across trials, the rules might repeat or shift at either high or low hierarchical levels. Behavioral results indicated that the reaction times were significantly slower in the high-shift than in the low-shift condition. The electrophysiological results revealed (1) significant difference in P300 between high- and low-shift conditions, with larger P300 in the high-shift condition; and (2) increased amplitude of the late positive component (LPC) elicited by the high-shift condition as compared to that by the low-shift condition. These findings demonstrate that the task-set reconfiguration and rule selection is more difficult for higher hierarchical level of rule shifting as compared with lower level.

Both Rewards and Moral Praise Can Increase the Prosocial Decisions: Revealed in a Modified Ultimatum Game Task.

Unlike other creatures, humans developed the ability to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers and a tendency to comply with social norms. However, humans deviate from social norms in various situations. This study used the modified ultimatum game to explore why humans deviate from social norms and how their prosocial behavior can be promoted. In Study 1, participants were asked to imagine working with an anonymous counterpart to complete a task and obtain a certain amount of money (e.g., ¥10). The computer divided the money randomly in favor of the participant (e.g., 9:1 or 8:2). Participants should decide whether to accept or reject such a self-benefiting division. In the non-risk condition, an absolutely fair redivision of money would take place if participants reject self-benefiting division (e.g., 5:5 or 6:4). By contrast, in the risk condition, other-benefiting redivision of money (e.g., 1:9 or 2:8) would take place if participants rejected the self-benefiting division. Results involving 40 college students showed the main effect of condition. The frequency of accepting self-benefiting division in the risk condition was higher than that in the non-risk condition. As such, compliance with social norms is based on the preservation of material resources. In Study 2, we used economic or moral rewards to compensate for economic loss following compliance with the norm. Results involving 28 college students revealed a significant effect of compensation. The rewards, including moral praise, effectively decreased selfish choices. These findings extend previous studies on social norm compliance by emphasizing the importance of internal, fairness-based balance between material and moral needs, as well as the role of moral praise in promoting prosocial behavior.

Different Electrophysiological Responses to Informative Value of Feedback Between Children and Adults.

The ability to learn from feedback is important for children's adaptive behavior and school learning. Feedback has two main components, informative value and valence. How to disentangle these two components and what is the developmental neural correlates of using the informative value of feedback is still an open question. In this study, 23 children (7-10 years old) and 19 adults (19-22 years old) were asked to perform a rule induction task, in which they were required to find a rule, based on the informative value of feedback. Behavioral results indicated that the likelihood of correct searching behavior under negative feedback was low for children. Event-related potentials showed that (1) the effect of valence was processed in a wide time window, particularly in the N2 component; (2) the encoding process of the informative value of negative feedback began later for children than for adults; (3) a clear P300 was observed for adults; for children, however, P300 was absent in the frontal region; and (4) children processed the informative value of feedback chiefly in the left sites during the P300 time window, whereas adults did not show this laterality. These results suggested that children were less sensitive to the informative value of negative feedback possibly because of the immature brain.

Electrophysiological Response to the Informative Value of Feedback Revealed in a Segmented Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.

Feedback has two main components. One is valence that indicates the wrong or correct behavior, and the other is the informative value that refers to what we can learn from feedback. Aimed to explore the neural distinction of these two components, we provided participants with a segmented Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, in which they received either positive or negative feedback at different steps. The informative value was manipulated in terms of the order of feedback presentation. The results of event-related potentials time-locked to the feedback presentation confirmed that valence of feedback was processed in a broad epoch, especially in the time window of feedback-related negativity (FRN), reflecting detection of correct or wrong card sorting behavior. In contrast, the informative value of positive and negative feedback was mainly processed in the P300, possibly reflecting information updating or hypothesis revision. These findings provide new evidence that informative values of feedback are processed by cognitive systems that differ from those of feedback valence.

Distinct brain responses to different inhibitions: Evidence from a modified Flanker Task.

Whether inhibition is a unitary or multifaceted construct is still an open question. To clarify the electrophysiological distinction among the different types of inhibition, we used a modified flanker paradigm, in which interference inhibition, rule inhibition, and response inhibition were compared to non-inhibition condition. The results indicated that, compared to the non-inhibition condition (1) the interference inhibition condition induced larger negativities during N2 epoch at the frontal region, (2) the rule inhibition condition elicited a larger N1 at the posterior region, followed by a larger P3a at the frontal region, reflecting the function of proactive cognitive control in the new stimulus-reaction (S-R) association, and (3) the response inhibition condition evoked a larger P3b at the posterior region, reflecting the process of suppressing the old response and reprogramming the new action. These findings provide new evidence that distinct neural mechanisms underlie different types of inhibition.