A review of contemporary ideomotor theory.

A framework for action planning, called ideomotor theory, suggests that actions are represented by their perceivable effects. Thus, any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action. We review contemporary studies relating to ideomotor theory in which researchers have investigated various manipulations of action effects and how those effects acquire discriminative control over the actions. Evidence indicates that the knowledge about the relation between response and effect is still a critical component even when other factors, such as stimulus-response or response-response relations, are controlled. When consistent tone effects are provided after responses are made, performance in serial-reaction tasks is better than when the effects are random. Methodology in which acquisition and test stages are used with choice-reaction tasks shows that an action is automatically associated with its effect bilaterally and that anticipation of the effect facilitates action. Ideomotor phenomena include stimulus-response compatibility, in which the perceptual feature of the stimulus activates its corresponding action code when the stimulus itself resembles the effect codes. For this reason, other stimulus-driven action facilitation such as ideomotor action and imitation are treated as ideomotor phenomena and are reviewed. Ideomotor theory also implies that ongoing action affects perception of concurrent events, a topic which we review briefly. Issues concerning ideomotor theory are identified and evaluated. We categorize the range of ideomotor explanations into several groups by whether intermediate steps are assumed to complete sensorimotor transformation or not and by whether a general theoretical framework or a more restricted one is provided by the account.

Are theories to be evaluated in isolation or relative to alternatives? An abductive view.

Although it is distinct from induction and deduction, abduction is often mistaken for them. The initial stage of abduction, or novel hypothesis abduction, has 2 components. The first concerns providing novel hypotheses that explain the pattern of data; the second suggests that the novel hypothesis should be accepted to the extent that it is the best available hypothesis. The second component is known as inference to the best explanation. Others have shown how novel hypothesis abduction provides an important type of reasoning for generating novel hypotheses. Our concern is with evaluating already formed abductions to determine which is best, using inference to the best explanation in connection with theories. We call this competing theories abduction. Competing theories abduction suggests that theories should be evaluated in relation to other theories rather than in isolation, as suggested by some philosophers and psychologists. In psychology this is demonstrated in connection with 2 widely accepted forms of relativism: the logical possibilities view and unique standards relativism.

Memories and anticipations control responding by rats (Rattus norvegicus) in a Pavlovian procedure.

In Experiment 1 each rat received two different fixed series of three trials each. The unconditioned stimulus occurred on Trial 1 of one series and on Trial 3 of the other series, all other trials being nonreinforced. Previous Pavlovian investigations have shown that rats can remember the immediately prior reward outcome and anticipate the immediately subsequent reward outcome. Experiment 1 demonstrated that rats could remember and anticipate even more remote reward outcomes. In Experiment 2 two groups received a series of two nonrewarded trials followed by a rewarded trial. It was demonstrated that a change in the conditioned stimulus (CS) from Trial 2 to Trial 3, which occurred in one group, produced weaker responding than in the other group that did not experience such CS change. On the basis of these findings it was suggested that the rats organized the trials of a series into a unit or chunk. This was concluded for two reasons. First, remembering and anticipating remote reward outcomes strongly suggests that responding is being controlled by events extending beyond the current trial. Secondly, the experimental manipulations employed in the Pavlovian situation here are similar to those used in prior human learning and animal instrumental learning investigations concerned with chunking. Thus, it would appear that chunking is a ubiquitous phenomenon appearing in human serial learning (e.g., Bower and Winzenz 1969; Crowder 1976), in animal instrumental learning (e.g., Capaldi 1992; Hulse and Dorsky 1977; Terrace 1987), and now in Pavlovian learning.

Is the worldview of qualitative inquiry a proper guide for psychological research?

Qualitative methods are becoming increasingly popular in psychology. Although the distinction between qualitative and quantitative often is stated in terms of methods, the real distinction is between worldviews: that favored by most qualitative methodologists, which emphasizes subjective experience and multiple realities, and that commonly accepted in science. The worldview accepted by most adherents of qualitative inquiry suggests the exclusive use of methods that include verbal reports of lived experience. Qualitative methods serve an important function in psychology, but their use as recommended by their adherents is limited in 2 respects: The adherents use a narrow and unconventional approach to qualitative methods that differs from that normally understood, and they favor use of a restricted range of qualitative methods over other qualitative methods and quantitative methods. If qualitative inquiry is to make a greater contribution to psychology, researchers in that tradition must acquire a better understanding of contemporary science, correct their misunderstandings of the rationale for quantitative methods, and address the apparent limitations of their methods emphasizing reported experience.

Empirical evaluation and justification of methodologies in psychological science.

The purpose of this article is to describe a relatively new movement in the history and philosophy of science, naturalism, a form of pragmatism emphasizing that methodological principles are empirical statements. Thus, methodological principles must be evaluated and justified on the same basis as other empirical statements. On this view, methodological statements may be less secure than the specific scientific theories to which they give rise. The authors examined the feasibility of a naturalistic approach to methodology using logical and historical analysis and by contrasting theories that predict new facts versus theories that explain already known facts. They provide examples of how differences over methodological issues in psychology and in science generally may be resolved using a naturalistic, or empirical, approach.

Laudan's normative naturalism: a useful philosophy of science for psychology.

Logical positivism, widely regarded as the received epistemology of psychology in the first half of the 20th century, was supplanted in the 1960s by various postpositivistic, relativistic philosophies of science, most notably that of Kuhn. Recently, Laudan, a major figure in the philosophy of science, developed a novel approach called normative naturalism that provides an alternative to positivism and relativism. His central thesis is that the two are not always on opposite ends of a continuum but rather have many assumptions in common. This article brings Laudan's important views to the attention of psychologists and describes some of the unique implications of these views for the conduct of research and theory in psychology. These implications, which follow from a number of closely reasoned pragmatic arguments, include more realistic and appropriate evaluation of theory and methodology than has been suggested by logical positivism or relativism.

Ontogeny of orientation flight in the honeybee revealed by harmonic radar.

Cognitive ethology focuses on the study of animals under natural conditions to reveal ecologically adapted modes of learning. But biologists can more easily study what an animal learns than how it learns. For example, honeybees take repeated 'orientation' flights before becoming foragers at about three weeks of age. These flights are a prerequisite for successful homing. Little is known about these flights because orienting bees rapidly fly out of the range of human observation. Using harmonic radar, we show for the first time a striking ontogeny to honeybee orientation flights. With increased experience, bees hold trip duration constant but fly faster, so later trips cover a larger area than earlier trips. In addition, each flight is typically restricted to a narrow sector around the hive. Orientation flights provide honeybees with repeated opportunities to view the hive and landscape features from different viewpoints, suggesting that bees learn the local landscape in a progressive fashion. We also show that these changes in orientation flight are related to the number of previous flights taken instead of chronological age, suggesting a learning process adapted to changes in weather conditions, flower availability and the needs of bee colonies.

The role of orientation flights on homing performance in honeybees.

Honeybees have long served as a model organism for investigating insect navigation. Bees, like many other nesting animals, primarily use learned visual features of the environment to guide their movement between the nest and foraging sites. Although much is known about the spatial information encoded in memory by experienced bees, the development of large-scale spatial memory in naive bees is not clearly understood. Past studies suggest that learning occurs during orientation flights taken before the start of foraging. We investigated what honeybees learn during their initial experience in a new landscape by examining the homing of bees displaced after a single orientation flight lasting only 5-10 min. Homing ability was assessed using vanishing bearings and homing speed. At release sites with a view of the landmarks immediately surrounding the hive, 'first-flight' bees, tested after their very first orientation flight, had faster homing rates than 'reorienting foragers', which had previous experience in a different site prior to their orientation flight in the test landscape. First-flight bees also had faster homing rates from these sites than did 'resident' bees with full experience of the terrain. At distant sites, resident bees returned to the hive more rapidly than reorienting or first-flight bees; however, in some cases, the reorienting bees were as successful as the resident bees. Vanishing bearings indicated that all three types of bees were oriented homewards when in the vicinity of landmarks near the hive. When bees were released out of sight of these landmarks, hence forcing them to rely on a route memory, the 'first-flight' bees were confused, the 'reorienting' bees chose the homeward direction except at the most distant site and the 'resident' bees were consistently oriented homewards.

Neuroethology of spatial learning: the birds and the bees.

The discipline of neuroethology integrates perspectives from neuroscience, ethology, and evolutionary biology to investigate the mechanisms underlying the behavior of animals performing ecologically relevant tasks. One goal is to determine if common organizational principles are shared between nervous systems in diverse taxa. This chapter selectively reviews the evidence that particular brain regions subserve behaviors that require spatial learning in nature. Recent evidence suggests that the insect brain regions known as the mushroom bodies may function similarly to the avian and mammalian hippocampus. Volume changes in these brain regions during the life of an individual may reflect both developmental and phylogenetic trends. These patterns may reveal important structure-function relationships in the nervous system.

Reward-produced memories regulate memory-discrimination learning, extinction, and other forms of discrimination learning.

In memory-discrimination learning, reward-produced memories are differentially rewarded such that they are the only stimuli available to support discriminative responding. Memory-discrimination learning was used in this study as follows: Reward-produced memories that were assumed to regulate instrumental performance in previously reported extinction and discrimination learning investigations were isolated and explicitly differentially reinforced (prior to a shift to extinction) in each of 4 runway investigations with rats. Results obtained here in the explicit discrimination learning stage and in the subsequent extinction stage were consistent with the prediction of the memory view and with prior discrimination learning and extinction findings. The memory interpretation was applied to memory-discrimination learning, to extinction, and to 2 other types of discrimination learning. It appears that a theory must use reward-produced memories to explain all 4 types of discrimination learning.

Experience-expectant plasticity in the mushroom bodies of the honeybee.

Worker honeybees (Apis mellifera) were reared in social isolation in complete darkness to assess the effects of experience on growth of the neuropil of the mushroom bodies (MBs) during adult life. Comparison of the volume of the MBs of 1-day-old and 7-day-old bees showed that a significant increase in volume in the MB neuropil occurred during the first week of life in bees reared under these highly deprived conditions. All regions of the MB neuropil experienced a significant increase in volume with the exception of the basal ring. Measurement of titers of juvenile hormone JH) in a subset of bees indicated that, as in previous studies, these rearing conditions induced in some bees the endocrine state of high JH associated with foraging, but there was no correlation between JH titer and volume of MB neuropil. Treatment of another subset of dark-reared bees with the JH analog, methoprene, also had no effect of the growth of the MB neuropil. These results demonstrate that there is a phase of MB neuropil growth early in the adult life of bees that occurs independent of light or any form of social interaction. Together with previous findings showing that an increase in MB neuropil volume begins around the time that orientation flights occur and then continues throughout the phase of life devoted to foraging, these results suggest that growth of the MB neuropil in adult bees may have both experience-expectant and experience-dependent components.

Remembering and forgetting as context discrimination.

In 1929, H.C. Blodgett reported the results of a seminal maze learning experiment using rats. In that experiment, hungry rats ran in a complex maze but were not rewarded on reaching the goal box. Not surprisingly, the performance of the hungry rats did not improve over trials. However, with the introduction of reward, the error scores of the rats suddenly dropped to the level of the control rats that were rewarded from the outset. This finding indicates that the experimental group had learned the maze despite the absence of reward but that the learning was latent rather than manifest. With Blodgett's findings, the distinction between learning and performance became firmly established, if not as widely appreciated as it might be. Blodgett's (1929) early experimental finding of latent learning could well serve as a paradigm for the approach taken here. That is, we have emphasized the principle that a lack of performance does not necessarily indicate a lack of either learning or memory. This principle is much more than an empty admonition: We have shown it can have a firm theoretical basis, one that has been confirmed repeatedly by experiments cited throughout this paper. That is, it has been shown numerous times that a failure to perform either in a Pavlovian or instrumental learning task or to remember in an animal or human memory task under one set of conditions could be alleviated under another set of conditions. Forgetting was viewed here as a failure of performance resulting from the cues at test retrieving a memory other than the target memory or retrieving no memory at all. According to this view, memory involves discrimination learning. Essentially, memories are stored in the presence of an elaborate set of interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli, a context. Whether at test the target memory is retrieved depends on how well the cues at test discriminate between the target memory and other memories. This approach suggests that forgetting does not occur: There is only a failure to perform because of a difference between the stimulus conditions prevailing at encoding and at test. It was demonstrated that this approach is at least as reasonable as that which suggests that true forgetting occurs, but certainly more useful. At least three advantages adhere to our view that memory is a discrimination problem. First, in almost numberless cases, it has been shown that failure of performance under one set of stimulus conditions can be alleviated under some other set of stimulus conditions. Second, the proposition that altered stimulus conditions are responsible for forgetting is one of wide generality. Thus, the altered stimulus conditions approach can serve as an explanation not only for various human memory findings but also for various animal memory and learning findings. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the present approach provides investigators with a powerful and proven working hypothesis. It tells us not to accept failures of performance as indicating an absence of learning or a loss of memory but rather to seek conditions favorable to improving performance, a strategy that should lead to a better fundamental understanding of memory and learning. This position is obviously a type of optimality theory, of which evolutionary theory is one of the more outstanding examples. In optimality theory, any deviation from some ideal state or condition prompts the investigator to seek the reasons for deviation. This approach may prove as successful when applied to learning and memory as it has to other areas of science.

The sequential view: From rapidly fading stimulus traces to the organization of memory and the abstract concept of number.

The development of the sequential approach to instrumental learning from about 1958 to the present is described. The sequential model began as an attempt to explain a particular class of neglected partial reward phenomena, those in which performance in acquisition and extinction is influenced by the particular sequence in which rewarded and nonrewarded trials occur in acquisition, and it was subsequently applied to a variety of other phenomena. Over time, the sequential model grew, sometimes through the replacement of older assumptions by novel ones, as when retrieved memories replaced stimulus traces, and sometimes simply through the addition of novel assumptions, such as that animals are capable of remembering retrospectively one, two, three or more prior nonrewarded outcomes-the N-length assumption. The most recent assumption added to the sequential model is that on a given trial the animal may utilize its memory of prior reward outcomes to anticipate both the current reward outcome and one or more subsequent reward outcomes. One way to view the sequential model is to say that it is a specific theory in various degrees of competition with other specific theories. Several examples of this are provided. Another way to view the sequential model, a more important way in my opinion, is to see it as a representative of a general theoretical approach, intertrial theory, which differs in fundamental respects from another much more generally utilized theoretical approach, intra-trial theory. I suggest that there is a substantial body of data that can be explained by inter-trial mechanisms but not by intratrial mechanisms. The future may well reveal that the inter-trial mechanisms have greater explanatory potential than the currently more popular intratrial mechanisms.

Contextualism: Is the act in context the adequate metaphor for scientific psychology?

According to some, psychology as it has been practiced is based on a world view known as mechanism. Individuals from a number of different areas of psychology, most recently within the behavior-analytic community, have strongly argued that psychology should be based on a different world view, contextualism. They emphasize a variety of characteristics that, in their view, differentiate a contextualistically based psychology from one based on mechanism. We examine these characteristics and find them to be of dubious value for differentiating a contextualistic approach to psychology from others. One proposal of some advocates of contextualism is that contextualistic approaches should develop independently from most of the remainder of psychology, which they regard as mechanistic. This proposal is said to be derived from the metaphilosophy of Pepper (1942). We evaluate this proposal and reject it. We go on to suggest that the mechanis-tic/contextualistic dichotomy is too constraining to realistically describe various approaches to psychology.

The relation between memory and expectancy as revealed by percentage and sequence of reward investigations.

There is growing agreement that to explain instrumental learning properly, one should emphasize memory as well as expectancy. I call this approachmemory-expectancy theory. Amsel's (1992) frustration theory is one variety of memory-expectancy theory. Capaldi's (1994) sequential theory is another. In this report, I examine in considerable detail the effects of percentage and sequence of reward on extinction following different levels of acquisition training. These extinction findings, taken together with certain serial learning acquisition findings, seem to support a novel version of memory-expectancy theory, one that in some respects is similar to and in some respects is different from that suggested by Amsel. First, on the basis of this analysis, we may reject two ideas: that animals remember only the prior reward event and that animals anticipate only the reward event contingent upon the current response. Second, the analysis supports three salient propositions of the present memory-expectancy approach. Memories of reward events may serve as conditioned stimuli for expectancies of reward events. On any current trial, the animal may remember each of the reward events associated with one or more prior trials. On any current trial, the animal may anticipate not only the current reward event, but also reward events contingent upon subsequent trials. Essentially, according to this model, the stimuli that elicit expectancies, as well as the expectancies themselves, may change progressively over a series of learning trials.

Robust conditioned flavor preferences with a sensory preconditioning procedure.

During sensory preconditioning, rats were given two distinct flavors (saccharin and coffee) in sequence with 0, 9, or 27 sec between the two flavors. A control group received the flavors unpaired. In subsequent training, the second flavor preceded sucrose by 5 min. Later, the subjects that had had 0- or 9-sec delays between the two flavors showed a significant preference for the flavor not directly reinforced, whereas those that had had a 27-sec delay showed only a marginally significant preference. Although taste aversions have been produced using these methods, this is the first demonstration of conditioned preferences for flavors not directly associated with the reinforcers. These results offer an alternative way to study flavor-flavor learning.

[Sexuality. Cultural, social and clinical aspects]. / Sessualità. Aspetti culturali, sociali e clinici.

The deep changes in values, beliefs and behaviour, both individual and group, have been examined, referred to the sexuality, by various methods and prospects. Sexual differentiation, typical of the plast, has been rediscussed and modified. As a result of these changes we can talk about old myths, concerning the conception of sexuality in the past, and new myths that concern the present. In this work we have reviewed the different aspects of male and female roles: masturbation, the obsession abort performance, the orgasm and, not last, the sexuality in old age condition.

The role of instrumental responses in memory retrieval in a T-maze.

Retrieval of the memory of non-reward on a rewarded trial was investigated here employing rats in a T-maze. A forced choice procedure was used. The daily rewarded (R) and non-rewarded (N) trials always occurred in a fixed order, two R, four N, and finally two R, i.e. the series was R1-R2-N1-N2-N3-N4-R3-R4. In an original acquisition phase. Trial N4 of the series having occurred in a particular spatial alternative, e.g. left, it was followed by R3 either in the same alternative, Groups C and T, or in the opposite alternative, Group R. Group T, unlike Groups C and R, received a relatively long intertrial interval between N4 and R3. In a shift phase, groups were treated as in original acquisition except that the long intertrial interval (Group T) and the change in response (Group R) now occurred between R3 and R4 rather than N4 and R3. The major finding in original acquisition was slower running by Groups T and R than by Group C on Trials N2, N3, and N4. In shift, differences between the groups disappeared. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that response-produced cues contribute to memory retrieval.