RESUMO
In this paper, we present a theory of health investment when there are multiple causes of death. We analyze the optimal investment rules and the comparative statics. In particular, we examine the conditions under which a cause-specific intervention has a spillover effect. By spillover effect, we mean a price reduction in one cause-specific health investment would increase all other investments. We also study the strength of the spillover effect, which is measured in terms of cross price elasticities. We find that, while a cause-specific intervention might not be wasteful, the spillover effect would not be large either.
Assuntos
Mortalidade , Serviços Preventivos de Saúde/economia , Humanos , Qualidade de Vida , Medição de Risco , Estados Unidos/epidemiologiaRESUMO
A pervasive phenomenon in developing countries is that self-prescribed medications are purchased from drug vendors without professional supervision. In this article we develop a model of self-medicating behavior of a utility-maximizing consumer who balances the benefits and risks of self-medication. The empirical investigation focuses on the role of income and health insurance on the use of self-medication. Our data are from the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Survey of Vietnam, 1997-1998. The results show that self-medication is an inferior good at high income levels and a normal good at low income levels, and it shows a strong and robust negative insurance effect.