Analysis method for revealing human and organisational factors of occupational accidents with movement disturbance (OAMDs).

Slips, trips and other movement disturbances account for 20 to 30% of recorded occupational accidents (OAs). The causal representations of these accidents hamper their prevention. An analysis method dedicated to occupational accidents with movement disturbance (OAMDs) has been developed to change these representations. In France, the causal tree method (CTM) is very commonly used for analysing OAs. An initial version of an OAMD analysis method, which overcomes the problems encountered when analysing these accidents using the CTM, has been developed. This OAMD analysis method was reviewed by six targeted prevention officers and as a result some proposals have been discarded and this initial version has been transformed into three additional CTM modules. The purpose of these modules is to identify human and organisational factors and provide a formal representation of damage caused, beyond bodily injuries. Practitioner summary: A method for analysing occupational accidents triggered by a slip, a trip or any other movement disturbance has been developed in consideration of the practices and constraints in companies. In particular, this method allows us to highlight the human and organisational factors involved in the accident situation. Abbreviations: OA: occupational accident; OAMD: occupational accident with movement disturbance; CTM: causal tree method.

Analysis of occupational injuries in the sea fishing industry according to the type of fishery and the fishing activity.

BACKGROUND: Sea fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations. Numerous studies have already sought to evaluate the risk level of this occupation through the analysis of the frequency and seriousness of occupational injuries. The purpose of the present study is to analyse these accidents in terms of two main characteristics of the vessels involved: the fishery type (high seas, offshore, coastal, or inshore fishery) and the fishing activity (use of passive or active gears). MATERIALS AND METHODS: Injury rates were calculated for the Brittany region and for the year 2012. A second analysis was carried out on 8,286 reported injuries that occurred in France from 2002 to 2012, while vessels were in the process of fishing. RESULTS: This first analysis shows that the incidence rate is very high (103 per 1,000 full-time equivalent fishermen) and that it depends more on the fishery type than on the fishing activity; the highest rates concern the offshore and the coastal fleets. Results of the second analysis show that the nature of accidents depends more on the fishing activity than on the type of fishery. CONCLUSIONS: These findings lead to a discussion of the causes of the highest incidence rate values and the causes of the observed variations. The discussion also involves the methodological difficulties related to the incidence rate calculations.

Correlates of team effectiveness: An exploratory study of firefighter's operations during emergency situations.

This paper examines elements contributing to the effectiveness of firefighting teams carrying out typical tasks. Fourteen firefighter crews were filmed during nineteen real operations and answered questionnaires relating to psychosocial dimensions. Results have shown that "enriched closed-loops" of communication, positive emotional interactions and a "gamma" type of adaptation are positively related to team effectiveness. Conversely, open and incomplete loops of communication, negative emotional interactions, "beta" and "alpha" types of adaptation are negatively related to team effectiveness. Furthermore, there is a mediated link between organisational trust and motivation on the one hand and team effectiveness on the other. These findings highlight the necessity to consider both cognitive and psychosocial variables to account for team effectiveness in the firefighting profession. They also emphasize the need to expand firefighter training to the "non-technical" aspects of the competence.

Human and organisational factors in maritime accidents: analysis of collisions at sea using the HFACS.

Over the last decade, the shipping industry has implemented a number of measures aimed at improving its safety level (such as new regulations or new forms of team training). Despite this evolution, shipping accidents, and particularly collisions, remain a major concern. This paper presents a modified version of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, which has been adapted to the maritime context and used to analyse human and organisational factors in collisions reported by the Marine Accident and Investigation Branch (UK) and the Transportation Safety Board (Canada). The analysis shows that most collisions are due to decision errors. At the precondition level, it highlights the importance of the following factors: poor visibility and misuse of instruments (environmental factors), loss of situation awareness or deficit of attention (conditions of operators), deficits in inter-ship communications or Bridge Resource Management (personnel factors). At the leadership level, the analysis reveals the frequent planning of inappropriate operations and non-compliance with the Safety Management System (SMS). The Multiple Accident Analysis provides an important finding concerning three classes of accidents. Inter-ship communications problems and Bridge Resource Management deficiencies are closely linked to collisions occurring in restricted waters and involving pilot-carrying vessels. Another class of collisions is associated with situations of poor visibility, in open sea, and shows deficiencies at every level of the socio-technical system (technical environment, condition of operators, leadership level, and organisational level). The third class is characterised by non-compliance with the SMS. This study shows the importance of Bridge Resource Management for situations of navigation with a pilot on board in restricted waters. It also points out the necessity to investigate, for situations of navigation in open sea, the masters' decisions in critical conditions as well as the causes of non-compliance with SMS.

Articulating the differences between safety and resilience: the decision-making process of professional sea-fishing skippers.

OBJECTIVE: As the world's most dangerous profession, sea fishing enables discussion of the concept of resilience and its articulation to the notion of safety in complex systems. BACKGROUND: In the small, emerging community working on this concept, the prevailing idea to improve safety is that resilience must be reinjected into the know-how of complex systems. METHOD: Thirty-four male skippers, divided into two groups, took part in an interactive simulation of a fishing campaign. They had to make decisions in situations of trade-off between safety and production goals. RESULTS: From the time they left the harbor, the fishermen never gave up on fishing, even in extreme conditions, and regardless of whether or not the catch was good. Not being suicidal, however, they used multiple expert strategies to reduce risk without giving up on their fishing activity. CONCLUSION: Systems run by craftspeople are very resilient because they rely on a high level of adaptability, based on the actors' expertise, linked to an exposure to frequent and considerable risk. Each actor is responsible for his or her own safety. The final discussion bears on the question of knowing whether or not it is possible to design a safe system while preserving its craftsmanship and therefore its native resilience. APPLICATION: The results of these studies suggest potential adverse effects of classic safety interventions in complex sociotechnical systems either in terms of professional reluctance to accept new recommendations or through the emergence of new sources of risk.

Occupational injury in the French sea fishing industry: a comparative study between the 1980s and today.

This study aims at comparing two data bases related to occupational injuries in the French sea fishing industry: a data base created between 1977 and 1980, a data base created between 1996 and 2001. These bases were made from report forms filled out by fishermen after an accident. The study focuses on the accidents occurring when the vessel is in the process of fishing. In the 1980s, as well as today, the processing of fishing gear seems to be a very dangerous task, correlated with the risk of being "struck by, swept along, pinned" by the elements of the rigging and the risk of serious injuries. The processing and handling of the catch also cause a large amount of accidents; during these tasks, fishermen have to cope with two main risks: being "cut or pricked" and making an "excessive effort, awkward movement". Rate and features of occupational accidents do not show notable evolution. These findings lead us to question the different prevention measures implemented in France during the last few decades and to propose new prevention direction.

An analysis of the risk in the French sea fishing industry. Example of the dockside accident risk.

In many maritime countries, the work of sea fishermen is one of the most hazardous of occupations. The number of accidents is much greater than in other occupations on land or at sea, and the accidents themselves are often more serious. When considering the risks and hazards of fishing, one initially thinks of major risks like collisions or vessels running aground, as well as the work related injuries which are mainly caused by the fishing equipment (otter boards, ropes) and by the motions of the vessel. These accidents and, in a more general sense, the dangers met by fishermen at sea have already been studied. But little research has been undertaken on the problem of accidents of fishermen while the vessel is in port; and in France, these accidents account for about 30 % of all registered injuries for the sea fishing industry. The presented report takes a look at this category of accidents, on the basis of data on 5074 accidents registered between 1996 and 2005. An examination of statistics therefore points to certain types of risks and dangerous situations, but it also leaves a number of questions pending. One of these is the number of "unknown" causes. Falls, in particular, are usually linked to an outside factor which is not listed on the form the sailors must fill out. To compensate for the limitations of the epidemiological analysis, on-site observation seemed to be the best way of understanding the risks of the activities of fishermen in the port.