RESUMO
At the end of May, 194 member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) will meet for the World Health Assembly. Negotiations underway now will determine whether they vote then to adopt a pandemic agreement. For the past 2 years, discussions have focused on articulating essential components of a robust and equitable architecture for pandemic preparedness and response. Despite this, talks have failed to produce sufficient consensus on a detailed draft, prompting the intergovernmental negotiating body to propose a "streamlined" version. The new text, released on 16 April, consolidates provisions for research and development, technology transfer, pathogen access and benefit sharing (including pandemic products such as medicines and vaccines), with many particulars deferred to future procedures. Ultimately, success of the agreement will depend on these details and implementation. Nevertheless, member states shouldn't bypass the consensus reached to date, but continue progress to adopt this agreement.
Assuntos
Cooperação Internacional , Pandemias , Organização Mundial da Saúde , Humanos , Consenso , Negociação , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Transferência de TecnologiaRESUMO
Policy reset and convergence on governance are needed.
Assuntos
Disciplinas das Ciências Biológicas , Biosseguridade , Políticas , Estados Unidos , Disciplinas das Ciências Biológicas/organização & administração , HumanosRESUMO
The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists are a set of ten principles designed to promote responsible science and strengthen biosecurity governance. They should be broadly adopted, including being endorsed by the Biological Weapons Convention at its 9th Review Conference in November 2022.
Assuntos
Armas Biológicas , BiosseguridadeRESUMO
INTRODUCTION: Nine events have been assessed for potential declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). A PHEIC is defined as an extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk to other states through international spread and requires a coordinated international response. The WHO Director-General convenes Emergency Committees (ECs) to provide their advice on whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. The EC rationales have been criticised for being non-transparent and contradictory to the International Health Regulations (IHR). This first comprehensive analysis of EC rationale provides recommendations to increase clarity of EC decisions which will strengthen the IHR and WHO's legitimacy in future outbreaks. METHODS: 66 EC statements were reviewed from nine public health outbreaks of influenza A, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, polio, Ebola virus disease, Zika, yellow fever and coronavirus disease-2019. Statements were analysed to determine which of the three IHR criteria were noted as contributing towards the EC's justification on whether to declare a PHEIC and what language was used to explain the decision. RESULTS: Interpretation of the criteria were often vague and applied inconsistently. ECs often failed to describe and justify which criteria had been satisfied. DISCUSSION: Guidelines must be developed for the standardised interpretation of IHR core criteria. The ECs must clearly identify and justify which criteria have contributed to their rationale for or against PHEIC declaration. CONCLUSION: Striving for more consistency and transparency in EC justifications would benefit future deliberations and provide more understanding and support for the process.
Assuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus , Planejamento em Desastres , Emergências , Regulamento Sanitário Internacional , Pandemias , Pneumonia Viral , Saúde Pública/legislação & jurisprudência , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Saúde Global , Humanos , Cooperação Internacional , SARS-CoV-2 , VirosesAssuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Instalações Industriais e de Manufatura/tendências , Vacinação em Massa/organização & administração , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , Vacinas Virais/administração & dosagem , Vacinas Virais/provisão & distribuição , COVID-19 , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Humanos , Instalações Industriais e de Manufatura/normas , Vacinação em Massa/normas , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Vacinas Virais/normasAssuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus , Saúde Pública , Comportamento Social , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Saúde Global , Humanos , Controle de Infecções , Pandemias , Pneumonia Viral , SARS-CoV-2RESUMO
Clade X was a day-long pandemic tabletop exercise conducted by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security on May 15, 2018, in Washington, DC. In this report, we briefly describe the exercise development process and focus principally on the findings and recommendations that arose from this project.
Assuntos
Planejamento em Desastres/métodos , Planejamento em Desastres/organização & administração , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Gestão de Riscos , Treinamento por Simulação , District of Columbia , Governo Federal , Feminino , Humanos , Masculino , Papel (figurativo)RESUMO
Predicting which pathogen will confer the highest global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR) of a pandemic is a difficult task. Many approaches are retrospective and premised on prior pandemics; however, such an approach may fail to appreciate novel threats that do not have exact historical precedent. In this paper, based on a study and project we undertook, a new paradigm for pandemic preparedness is presented. This paradigm seeks to root pandemic risk in actual attributes possessed by specific classes of microbial organisms and leads to specific recommendations to augment preparedness activities.
Assuntos
Planejamento em Desastres/métodos , Monitoramento Epidemiológico , Microbiologia , Pandemias , Humanos , Medição de RiscoRESUMO
A strategic multilateral dialogue related to biosecurity risks in Southeast Asia, established in 2014, now includes participants from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and the United States. This dialogue is conducted at the nonministerial level, enabling participants to engage without the constraints of operating in their official capacities. Participants reflect on mechanisms to detect, mitigate, and respond to biosecurity risks and highlight biosecurity issues for national leadership. Participants have also identified factors to improve regional and global biosecurity, including improved engagement and collaboration across relevant ministries and agencies, sustainable funding for biosecurity programs, enhanced information sharing for communicable diseases, and increased engagement in international biosecurity forums.
Assuntos
Contenção de Riscos Biológicos , Medidas de Segurança , Sudeste Asiático , Contenção de Riscos Biológicos/economia , Saúde Global , Cooperação Internacional , Medidas de Segurança/economiaAssuntos
Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Apoio Financeiro , Saúde Global/economia , Medidas de Segurança/organização & administração , Controle de Doenças Transmissíveis/organização & administração , Humanos , Cooperação Internacional , Desenvolvimento de Programas , Estados Unidos , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
A team of experts from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security conducted an independent external assessment of Taiwan's capabilities under the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR), using the IHR Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool adopted by the World Health Organization and the Global Health Security Agenda. In this article we describe the methods and process of the assessment, identify lessons learned, and make recommendations for the government of Taiwan, the JEE process, and the JEE tool.