Wired for society? From ego-logy to eco-logy.

Somewhat questioning Elizabeth Spelke's attempt to account for infants' social knowledge, our commentary argues that social cognition might be divided into several specialized systems. In addition to the core system dedicated to the intersubjective dimension of close relationships, infants could be prewired to process social relationships, such as dominance, characterized by their impersonal, normative dimension.

Developmental changes in category-based inductions: The effects of labels and statistical evidence on children's inferences about novel social categories.

The psychological mechanisms that subserve inductions about novel social categories in childhood are hotly debated. While research demonstrated that language, and in particular generic statements, plays a major role in how children learn to attribute properties to social categories, developmental theories propose other mechanisms. One theoretical account holds that the mere act of labeling social categories is sufficient for children to generalize properties to category members, because labels are considered as referring to significant, homogeneous kinds of people. A second theoretical account proposes that children generalize properties to category members from statistical evidence, that is, by directly observing regularities in their environment. The present study assessed those two hypotheses, by testing (via an online experiment) the effects of simple category labels and observation of statistical evidence on European 4- to 6-year-olds (N = 88) and 7- to 9-year-olds' (N = 92) predictions about novel social categories. From around 7 to 9 years, children generalized properties to category members based on simple category labels or on their observation of a majority of unlabeled category members having the same property. Four- to 6-year-old children, however, made similarity inferences only when both labels and statistical evidence were combined. Overall, the present study highlights a developmental shift from an early limited tendency to make similarity inferences to a later propensity to infer similarity from small evidence. These findings deepen our understanding of the conditions under which children start to make similarity inferences. Implications for the acquisition of stereotypes are also discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind.

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

Am I really seeing what's around me? An ERP study on social anxiety under speech induction, uncertainty and social feedback.

Cognitive models of social anxiety propose that socially anxious individuals engage in excessive self-focusing attention when entering a social situation. In the present study, speech anxiety was induced to socially anxious and control participants. Event-related potentials were recorded while participants performed a perceptual judgement task using distinct or ambiguous stimuli, before and after social feedback. Disputed feedback led to more revisions and decreased levels of confidence, especially among socially anxious individuals. Prior feedback, greater occipital P1 amplitudes in both groups for ambiguous probes indicated heightened sensory facilitation to ambiguous information, and greater anterior N1 amplitudes for ambiguous stimuli in highly anxious participants suggested anticipation of negative feedback in this group. Post-feedback, P1, N1 and LPP amplitudes were reduced overall among socially anxious individuals indicating a reduction in sensory facilitation of visual information. These results suggest excessive self-focusing among socially anxious individuals, possibly linked to anticipation of an anxiety-provoking social situation.

The ABC of social learning: Affect, behavior, and cognition.

Debates concerning social learning in the behavioral and the developmental cognitive sciences have largely ignored the literature on social influence in the affective sciences despite having arguably the same object of study. We argue that this is a mistake and that no complete model of social learning can exclude an affective aspect. In addition, we argue that including affect can advance the somewhat stagnant debates concerning the unique characteristics of social learning in humans compared to other animals. We first review the two major bodies of literature in nonhuman animals and human development, highlighting the fact that the former has adopted a behavioral approach while the latter has adopted a cognitive approach, leading to irreconcilable differences. We then introduce a novel framework, affective social learning (ASL), that studies the way we learn about value(s). We show that all three approaches are complementary and focus, respectively, on behavior toward; cognitions concerning; and feelings about objects, events, and people in our environment. All three thus contribute to an affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) story of knowledge transmission: the ABC of social learning. In particular, ASL can provide the backbone of an integrative approach to social learning. We argue that this novel perspective on social learning can allow both evolutionary continuity and ontogenetic development by lowering the cognitive thresholds that appear often too complex for other species and nonverbal infants. Yet, it can also explain some of the major achievements only found in human cultures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Affective Social Learning serves as a quick and flexible complement to TTOM.

Although we applaud the general aims of the target article, we argue that Affective Social Learning completes TTOM by pointing out how emotions can provide another route to acquiring culture, a route which may be quicker, more flexible, and even closer to an axiological definition of culture (less about what is, and more about what should be) than TTOM itself.

Patterns of electrical brain activation in response to socially-disputed perceptual judgments.

In recent years, neuroscience has begun to investigate brain responses to social stimuli. To date, however, the effects of social feedback on attentional and perceptual processes remain unclear. In this study, participants were asked to judge the hues of distinct, or ambiguously coloured stimuli, and to indicate their confidence ratings. Alleged social feedback was then provided, either endorsing or disputing the participants' responses. Participants were then presented the stimulus a second time and given the option to reconsider their decision. Behavioural findings showed that confidence levels decreased both with task difficulty and with conflicting social feedback. Event-related potential data showed greater P2 and N2 amplitudes for ambiguous squares compared to distinct squares upon initial stimulus presentations, compatible with heightened attention. Moreover, a decreased P300 was found for ambiguous stimuli, consistent with an increase in metacognitive activity. After social feedback, an early-late positive potential between 270 and 370 ms continued to distinguish ambiguous from distinct stimuli. More importantly, after 400 ms, the late positive potential distinguished endorsed from disputed stimuli. These results reveal that social feedback, while decreasing effects linked to uncertainty, gives rise to later processes associated with enhanced motivational significance of the stimulus following divergence from social approval.

Never the Twain Introduction to the Special Issue Psychology of Religion: Dialogues Between Sociocultural and Cognitive Perspectives.

Bringing together perspectives is rarely an easy task. By assembling researchers from cognitive and cultural traditions to discuss their reciprocal research in the field of psychology of religion, we thought that we will end up with an ecumenical conclusion, everyone being convinced that the other perspective will enrich her or his approach in the future. In this introduction, our objective is to show that it was not exactly the case and, by writing a two-voices introduction, to understand why we were eventually not so sure that we were all studying the same object.

Group Membership Influences More Social Identification Than Social Learning or Overimitation in Children.

Group membership is a strong driver of everyday life in humans, influencing similarity judgments, trust choices, and learning processes. However, its ontogenetic development remains to be understood. This study investigated how group membership, age, sex, and identification with a team influenced 39- to 60-month-old children (N = 94) in a series of similarity, trust, and learning tasks. Group membership had the most influence on similarity and trust tasks, strongly biasing choices toward in-groups. In contrast, prior experience and identification with the team were the most important factors in the learning tasks. Finally, overimitation occurred most when the children's team, but not the opposite, displayed meaningless actions. Future work must investigate how these cognitive abilities combine during development to facilitate cultural processes.

Seeing is believing: Early perceptual brain processes are modified by social feedback.

Over 6 decades ago, experimental evidence from social psychology revealed that individuals could alter their responses in perceptual judgement tasks if they differed from the prevailing view emitted by a group of peers. Responses were thus modulated to agree with the opinion of the social group. An open question remains whether such changes actually reflect modified perception, or whether they are simply the result of a feigned agreement, indicating submissive acceptance. In this study, we addressed this topic by performing a perceptual task involving the assessment of ambiguous and distinct stimuli. Participants were asked to judge the colours of squares, before, and after receiving feedback for their response. In order to pinpoint the moment in time that social feedback affected neural processing, ERP components to ambiguous stimuli were compared before and after participants received supposed social feedback that agreed with, or disputed their response. The comparison revealed the presence of differences beginning already 100ms after stimulus presentation (on the P1 and N1 components) despite otherwise identical stimuli. The modulation of these early components, normally thought to be dependent on low-level visual features, demonstrate that social pressure tangibly modifies early perceptual brain processes.

Endogenous oxytocin predicts helping and conversation as a function of group membership.

Humans cooperate with unrelated individuals to an extent that far outstrips any other species. We also display extreme variation in decisions about whether to cooperate or not, and the mechanisms driving this variation remain an open question across the behavioural sciences. One candidate mechanism underlying this variation in cooperation is the evolutionary ancient neurohormone oxytocin (OT). As current research focuses on artificial administration of OT in asocial tasks, little is known about how the hormone in its naturally occurring state actually impacts behaviour in social interactions. Using a new optimal foraging paradigm, the 'egg hunt', we assessed the association of endogenous OT with helping behaviour and conversation. We manipulated players' group membership relative to each other prior to an egg hunt, during which they had repeated opportunities to spontaneously help each other. Results show that endogenous baseline OT predicted helping and conversation type, but crucially as a function of group membership. Higher baseline OT predicted increased helping but only between in-group players, as well as decreased discussion about individuals' goals between in-group players but conversely more of such discussion between out-group players. Subsequently, behaviour but not conversation during the hunt predicted change in OT, in that out-group members who did not help showed a decrease in OT from baseline levels. In sum, endogenous OT predicts helping behaviour and conversation, importantly as a function of group membership, and this effect occurs in parallel to uniquely human cognitive processes.

The language of cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership.

While we know that the degree to which humans are able to cooperate is unrivalled by other species, the variation humans actually display in their cooperative behaviour has yet to be fully explained. This may be because research based on experimental game-theoretical studies neglects fundamental aspects of human sociality and psychology, namely social interaction and language. Using a new optimal foraging game loosely modelled on the prisoner's dilemma, the egg hunt, we categorized players as either in-group or out-group to each other and studied their spontaneous language usage while they made interactive, potentially cooperative decisions. Both shared group membership and the possibility to talk led to increased cooperation and overall success in the hunt. Notably, analysis of players' conversations showed that in-group members engaged more in shared intentionality, the human ability to both mentally represent and then adopt another's goal, whereas out-group members discussed individual goals more. Females also helped more and displayed more shared intentionality in discussions than males. Crucially, we show that shared intentionality was the mechanism driving the increase in helping between in-group players over out-group players at a cost to themselves. By studying spontaneous language during social interactions and isolating shared intentionality as the mechanism underlying successful cooperation, the current results point to a probable psychological source of the variation in cooperation humans display.

Evidence for a sex effect during overimitation: boys copy irrelevant modelled actions more than girls across cultures.

Children are skilful at acquiring tool-using skills by faithfully copying relevant and irrelevant actions performed by others, but poor at innovating tools to solve problems. Five- to twelve-year-old urban French and rural Serbian children (N = 208) were exposed to a Hook task; a jar containing a reward in a bucket and a pipe cleaner as potential recovering tool material. In both countries, few children under the age of 10 made a hook from the pipe cleaner to retrieve the reward on their own. However, from five onward, the majority of unsuccessful children succeeded after seeing an adult model manufacturing a hook without completing the task. Additionally, a third of the children who observed a similar demonstration including an irrelevant action performed with a second object, a string, replicated this meaningless action. Children's difficulty with innovation and early capacity for overimitation thus do not depend on socio-economic background. Strikingly, we document a sex difference in overimitation across cultures, with boys engaging more in overimitation than girls, a finding that may result from differences regarding explorative tool-related behaviour. This male-biased sex effect sheds new light on our understanding of overimitation, and more generally, on how human tool culture evolved.

Children's allocation of resources in social dominance situations.

Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children's resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

The boss is always right: Preschoolers endorse the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate.

Recent research has shown that young children rely on social cues to evaluate testimony. For instance, they prefer to endorse testimony provided by a consensual group than by a single dissenter. Given that dominance is pervasive in children's social environment, it can be hypothesized that children also use dominance relations in their selection of testimony. To test this hypothesis, a dominance asymmetry was induced between two characters either by having one repeatedly win in physical contests (physical power; Experiment 1) or by having one repeatedly impose her goals on the other (decisional power; Experiment 2). In two subsequent testimony tasks, 3- to 5-year-old children significantly tended to endorse the testimony of the dominant over that of the subordinate. These results suggest that preschoolers take dominance into account when evaluating testimony. In conclusion, we discuss two potential explanations for these findings.

Visual access trumps gender in 3- and 4-year-old children's endorsement of testimony.

Several studies have investigated how preschoolers weigh social cues against epistemic cues when taking testimony into account. For instance, one study showed that 4- and 5-year-olds preferred to endorse the testimony of an informant who had the same gender as the children; by contrast, when the gender cue conflicted with an epistemic cue--past reliability--the latter trumped the former. None of the previous studies, however, has shown that 3-year-olds can prioritize an epistemic cue over a social cue. In Experiment 1, we offer the first demonstration that 3-year-olds favor testimony from a same-gender informant in the absence of other cues. In Experiments 2 and 3, an epistemic cue-visual access--was introduced. In those experiments, 3- and 4-year-olds endorsed the testimony of the informant with visual access regardless of whether it was a same-gender informant (Experiment 3) or a different-gender informant (Experiment 2). These results demonstrate that 3-year-olds are able to give more weight to an epistemic cue than to a social cue when evaluating testimony.

Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues.

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.

Wishful thinking in preschoolers.

The current experiment sought to demonstrate the presence of wishful thinking--when wishes influence beliefs--in young children. A sample of 77 preschoolers needed to predict, eight times in a row, which of two plastic eggs, one containing one toy and the other containing three toys, would be drawn by a blinded experimenter. On the four trials in which the children could not keep the content of the egg drawn, they were equally likely to predict that either egg would be drawn. By contrast, on the four trials in which the children got to keep the content of the egg, they were more likely to predict that the egg with three toys would be drawn. Any effort the children exerted would be the same across conditions, so that this demonstration of wishful thinking cannot be accounted for by an effort heuristic. One group of children--a subgroup of the 5-year-olds--did not engage in wishful thinking. Children from this subgroup instead used the representativeness heuristic to guide their answers. This result suggests that having an explicit representation of the outcome inhibits children from engaging in wishful thinking in the same way as explicit representations constrain the operation of motivated reasoning in adults.

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children.

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one's own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children's abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology.