Understanding how minds vary relates to skill in inferring mental states, personality, and intelligence.

Using a "theory of mind" allows us to explain and predict others' behavior in terms of their mental states, yet individual differences in the accuracy of mental state inferences are not well understood. We hypothesized that the accuracy of mental state inferences can be explained by the ability to characterize the mind giving rise to the mental state. Under this proposal, individuals differentiate between minds by representing them in "Mind-space"-a multidimensional space where dimensions reflect any characteristic of minds that allows them to be individuated. Individual differences in the representation of minds and the accuracy of mental state inferences are explained by one's model of how minds can vary (Mind-space) and ability to locate an individual mind within this space. We measured the accuracy of participants' model of the covariance between dimensions in Mind-space that represent personality traits, and we found this was associated with the accuracy of mental state inference (Experiment 1). Mind-space accuracy also predicted the ability to locate others within Mind-space on dimensions of personality and intelligence (Experiment 2). Direct evidence for the representation of minds in mental state inference was obtained by showing that the location of others in Mind-space affects the probability of particular mental states being ascribed to them (Experiment 3). This latter effect extended to mental states dependent upon representation of trait covariation (Experiment 4). Results support the claim that mental state inference varies according to location in Mind-space, and therefore that adopting the Mind-space framework can explain some of the individual differences in theory of mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states.

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation ('theory of mind'), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a 'Mind-space' framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

Submentalizing or mentalizing in a Level 1 perspective-taking task: A cloak and goggles test.

It has been proposed that humans possess an automatic system to represent mental states ('implicit mentalizing'). The existence of an implicit mentalizing system has generated considerable debate however, centered on the ability of various experimental paradigms to demonstrate unambiguously such mentalizing. Evidence for implicit mentalizing has previously been provided by the 'dot perspective task,' where participants are slower to verify the number of dots they can see when an avatar can see a different number of dots. However, recent evidence challenged a mentalizing interpretation of this effect by showing it was unaltered when the avatar was replaced with an inanimate arrow stimulus. Here we present an extension of the dot perspective task using an invisibility cloaking device to render the dots invisible on certain trials. This paradigm is capable of providing unambiguous evidence of automatic mentalizing, but no such evidence was found. Two further well-powered experiments used opaque and transparent goggles to manipulate visibility but found no evidence of automatic mentalizing, nor of individual differences in empathy or perspective-taking predicting performance, contradicting previous studies using the same design. The results cast doubt on the existence of an implicit mentalizing system, suggesting that previous effects were due to domain-general processes. (PsycINFO Database Record

Recent progress in understanding skills and impairments in social cognition.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: Social interaction is affected in many different developmental disorders; indeed, the new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has introduced social cognition as one of six core components of neurocognitive functioning. Social cognition is not one thing, but a wide range of putative processes, which may be differentially affected in different clinical groups. This review focuses on recent advances in one aspect of social cognition, 'theory of mind' (ToM, representing what people think), and one core clinical group, autism spectrum disorder (ASD). RECENT FINDINGS: It is 30 years since impaired ToM was proposed as an explanation for ASD social difficulties, and recently there has been a widening of interest to other clinical groups. ToM has been found to be distinct from emotion recognition and empathy. Recent research on ASD has focused increasingly on atypical sensory responses and commonly comorbid conditions. Interventions for social deficits, including ToM training and oxytocin, have shown mixed results to date. SUMMARY: Heterogeneity poses a major obstacle to current research. Theoretical and empirical refinements are needed to elucidate neurocognitive and aetiological underpinnings of sociocognitive processes and inform clinical advances.

Avatars and arrows in the brain.

In this Commentary article we critically assess the claims made by Schurz, Kronbichler, Weissengrubler, Surtees, Samson and Perner (2015) relating to the neural processes underlying theory of mind and visual perspective taking. They attempt to integrate research findings in these two areas of social neuroscience using a perspective taking task contrasting mentalistic agents ('avatars'), with non-mentalistic control stimuli ('arrows'), during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We support this endeavour whole-heartedly, agreeing that the integration of findings in these areas has been neglected in research on the social brain. However, we cannot find among the behavioural or neuroimaging data presented by Schurz et al. evidence supporting their claim of 'implicit mentalizing'-the automatic ascription of mental states to another representing what they can see. Indeed, we suggest that neuroimaging methods may be ill-suited to address the existence of implicit mentalizing, and suggest that approaches utilizing neurostimulation methods are likely to be more successful.