What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Uncertainty Impairs Executive Function.

Three studies demonstrated that situational uncertainty impairs executive function on subsequent unrelated tasks. Participants were randomly assigned to either uncertain situations (not knowing whether they would have to give a speech later, Studies 1-2; uncertain about how to complete a task, Study 3) or control conditions. Uncertainty caused poor performance on tasks requiring executive function that were unrelated to the uncertainty manipulation. Uncertainty impaired performance even more than certainty of negative outcomes (might vs. definitely will have to make a speech). A meta-analysis of the experimental studies in this package found that the effect is small and reliable. One potential explanation for this effect of uncertainty on executive function is that uncertainty is a cue for conserving effort.

Life is uncertain, eat dessert first: Uncertainty causes controlled and unemotional eaters to consume more sweets.

Sometimes even dieters with the best self-control overindulge. Uncertain situations may undermine the self-control of even well-controlled eaters. This study was designed to test the hypothesis that uncertainty increases unhealthy snacking. Participants were either told that they would be giving a speech, that they would be listening to a speech, or that they would find out later whether they were to give a speech or not. Among participants who typically reported good control over their eating or scored low on emotional eating, participants who were uncertain about whether they would be giving a speech ate more candy than participants who expected to not have to give a speech and even those who expected to have to give a speech. Participants who reported poor control over their eating or scored high on emotional eating did not eat significantly more when uncertain. These findings suggest that, for people who are typically able to control their eating, uncertainty increases snacking more than certainty of a negative outcome.

Personal Conflict Impairs Performance on an Unrelated Self-Control Task: Lingering Costs of Uncertainty and Conflict.

People have the ability to make important choices in their lives, but deliberating about these choices can have costs. The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that writing about conflicted personal goals and values (conflict condition) would impair self-control on an unrelated subsequent task as compared to writing about clear personal goals and values (clarity condition). Personal conflict activates the behavioral inhibition system (BIS; Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012), which may make it harder for participants to successfully execute self-control. In this large (N=337), pre-registered study participants in the conflict condition performed worse on anagrams than participants in the clarity condition, and the effect of condition on anagram performance was mediated by a subjective uncertainty measure of BIS activation. This suggests that BIS activation leads to poor self-control. Moreover, given that conflict is inherent in the exercise of self-control, results point to BIS activation as a mechanism for why initial acts of self-control impair self-control on subsequent, unrelated tasks.

Bias versus bias: harnessing hindsight to reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics.

Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics.