Feeling and deciding: Subjective experiences rather than objective factors drive the decision to invest cognitive control.

When presented with the choice to invest cognitive control in a task, several signals are monitored to reach a decision. Leading theoretical frameworks argued that the investment of cognitive control is determined by a cost-benefit computation. However, previous accounts remained silent on the potential role of subjective experience in this computation. We experience confidence when giving an answer, feel the excitement of an anticipated reward, and reflect on how much effort is required for successful task performance. Two questions are investigated in the present work: how objective task parameters give rise to subjective experience and whether these drive the decision to allocate cognitive control. To this end, we designed a task in which we manipulated three objective parameters in the same sequence of events (stimulus uncertainty, physical effort, and reward prediction error). We asked participants to report their subjective experiences associated with these manipulations: confidence, subjective physical effort, and reward satisfaction. At the end of each trial, participants indicated whether they wanted to repeat that trial on the next day. In response to the first question, we demonstrate that subjective ratings are reliable and selective. Subjective experiences closely mirrored their objective manipulations. In response to the second question, we demonstrate that subjective experiences provide a better fit for the decisions on future control investments. While objective task parameters are considered when deciding, they do not always produce the expected changes in subjective experience, and when dissociations occur, it is the subjective experience that better explains the decision to allocate cognitive control.

The relation between task-relatedness of anxiety and metacognitive performance.

It is well established that anxiety influences a range of cognitive processes such as cognitive control or decision-making. What is less known is how anxiety influences the metacognitive evaluations individuals make about their own performance. The present study explored the importance of task-relatedness in the relation between anxiety and metacognitive awareness. More specifically, we hypothesized that induced anxiety would affect metacognitive performance in opposite directions depending solely on whether the threat is perceived as related or unrelated to the performance. We conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis. In both studies, electric shocks were administered randomly, regardless of participant's performance. In experiment 1, participants were informed that the shocks would be administered randomly, unrelated to performance. In experiment 2, participants were told that their metacognitive performance would influence the administration of the electric shocks (i.e. fewer electric shocks with better metacognitive performance). Our predictions were confirmed. Threat perceived as unrelated to metacognitive performance (Experiment 1) decreased metacognitive performance. Threat believed to be related to metacognitive performance resulted in improved performance (Experiment 2). These findings confirm that induced anxiety exerts a strong influence on metacognitive awareness while sparing first-order task performance. We furthermore demonstrate that the perceived relatedness of the anxiety determines whether metacognitive performance decreases or improves performance under threat.