Cognitive effects and correlates of reading fiction: Two preregistered multilevel meta-analyses.

Despite significantly increasing research efforts, the psychological effects of reading fiction remain under debate. We present two preregistered meta-analyses synthesizing cognitive effects and correlates of reading fiction. In Meta-Analysis 1 (371 effect sizes/70 experiments), reading fiction led to significant small-sized cognitive benefits, g = 0.14, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.06, 0.21]. This effect of fiction reading was moderated by the comparison group (effects were greater when reading fiction was compared with watching fiction or reading nothing than when reading fiction was compared with reading nonfiction) and the outcome variable (significant effects emerged for empathy and mentalizing only). In Meta-Analysis 2 (559 effect sizes/114 studies reporting correlations), lifetime exposure to print fiction was linked with significant small-sized cognitive benefits, r = .16, 95% CI [0.13, 0.19]. This effect was moderated by outcome variable (effects were greatest for verbal abilities, followed by general cognitive abilities and empathy/mentalizing/outgroup judgments), fictionality of the print material (greater effects were found for fiction than nonfiction), publication status (published work exhibited greater effects than unpublished work), type of assessment measure (larger effects emerged when neither the outcome nor print exposure were assessed via self-report, than when either the outcome or print exposure were assessed via self-report), participant group (community samples showed greater effects than student samples), study design (greater effects were found for correlational than for experimental designs), and percentage of female participants (via a negative relationship with cognitive benefits). Together, these meta-analyses provide robust evidence for a small-sized positive relationship between reading fiction and cognitive benefits. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Two routes to perspective: simulation and rule-use as approaches to mentalizing.

We review evidence relating to children's ability to acknowledge false beliefs within a simulation account according to which our focus is set by default to the world as we know it: hence, our current beliefs assume salience over beliefs that do not fall into this category. The model proposes that the ease with which we imaginatively shift from this default depends on the salience of our current belief, relative to the salience of the belief that is being simulated. However, children do use a rule-based approach for mentalizing in some contexts, which has the advantage of protecting them from the salience of their own belief. Rule-based mentalizing judgements might be faster, cognitively easier and less prone to error, relative to simulation-based judgements that are much influenced by salience. We propose that although simulation is primary, rule-based approaches develop as a shortcut; we thus grow from individuals capable of using only simulation into individuals capable of both techniques.

How does narrative cue children's perspective taking?

Three experiments with a total of 120 children between 4 and 9 years of age revealed systematic errors in the recall of deictic terms from a narrative. In some cases, the terms were inconsistent with the perspective of a protagonist. The errors occurred in all age groups and were at the same level whether the protagonist was "good" or "bad" but were less common in a narrative that did not include a protagonist. The pattern of errors suggests that children adopted a perspective within the narrative. Moreover, it seems that whereas the form of the narrative is sufficient to provoke a shift in perspective, children might find it even easier to adopt a perspective when the narrative content is about a protagonist. It thus seems that the form and the content of the narrative (that it is about a person) can combine to give a strong cue to perspective.