Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles.

Two studies provide evidence for the reliability and validity of a new self-report measure of individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking based on cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST). The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) was constructed to measure the 2 independent processing modes with a modified Need for Cognition Scale (NFC, J.T. Cacioppo & R.E. Petty, 1982) and a new scale, Faith in Intuition (FI). In Study 1, a factor analysis yielded 2 orthogonal factors corresponding to NFC and FI. Although heuristic processing was determined primarily by FI, NFC also contributed to heuristic responding, in line with CEST. The relation of FI and NFC to coping ability also was examined. In Study 2, the factor structure of the REI was replicated (N = 973). NFC and FI were differentially related to measures of personality, adjustment, achievement, and interpersonal relations.

Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: when people behave against their better judgment.

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every "win" trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme results were obtained on "lose" trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life.