The role of visuomotor synchrony on virtual full-body illusions in children and adults.

The present study explored the effects of visuomotor synchrony in virtual reality during the embodiment of a full human avatar in children (aged 5-6 years) and adults. Participants viewed their virtual bodies from a first-person perspective while they moved the body during self-generated and structured movement. Embodiment was measured via questions and psychophysiological responses (skin conductance) to a virtual body-threat and during both movement conditions. Both children and adults had increased feelings of ownership and agency over a virtual body during synchronous visuomotor feedback (compared to asynchronous visuomotor feedback). Children had greater ownership compared to adults during synchronous movement but did not differ from adults on agency. There were no differences in SCRs (frequency or magnitude) between children and adults, between conditions (i.e., baseline or movement conditions) or visuomotor feedback. Collectively, the study highlights the importance of visuomotor synchrony for children's ratings of embodiment for a virtual avatar from at least 5 years old, and suggests adults and children are comparable in terms of psychophysiological arousal when moving (or receiving a threat to) a virtual body. This has important implications for our understanding of the development of embodied cognition and highlights the considerable promise of exploring visuomotor VR experiences in children.

My Virtual Self: The Role of Movement in Children's Sense of Embodiment.

There are vast potential applications for children's entertainment and education with modern virtual reality (VR) experiences, yet we know very little about how the movement or form of such a virtual body can influence children's feelings of control (agency) or the sensation that they own the virtual body (ownership). In two experiments, we gave a total of 197 children aged 4-14 years a virtual hand which moved synchronously or asynchronously with their own movements and had them interact with a VR environment. We found that movement synchrony influenced feelings of control and ownership at all ages. In Experiment 1 only, participants additionally felt haptic feedback either congruently, delayed or not at all - this did not influence feelings of control or ownership. In Experiment 2 only, participants used either a virtual hand or non-human virtual block. Participants embodied both forms to some degree, provided visuomotor signals were synchronous (as indicated by ownership, agency, and location ratings). Yet, only the hand in the synchronous movement condition was described as feeling like part of the body, rather than like a tool (e.g., a mouse or controller). Collectively, these findings highlight the overall dominance of visuomotor synchrony for children's own-body representation; that children can embody non-human forms to some degree; and that embodiment is also somewhat constrained by prior expectations of body form.

The Body-Threat Assessment Battery (BTAB): A new instrument for the quantification of threat-related autonomic affective responses induced via dynamic movie clips.

We present a new instrument for the assessment of responses to threat-related imagery directed towards a human body - the Body-Threat Assessment Battery (BTAB). The BTAB consists of a series of high-definition dynamic clips depicting body-threats and matched non-threat baseline behaviours. For body-threat stimuli a perspective manipulation was included to assess the effects of viewing threats from the point-of-view of the observer (POV) or from an external/exocentric perspective (EXO). Green-screen technology was used so that extraneous background information could be removed and standardised in post-production. Categorical normative data for psychological ratings (valence, arousal and pain), psychophysiological, phasic skin conductance responses (SCRs) and tonic skin conductance levels (SCLs) were obtained for all stimuli. Body-threat stimuli evoked significantly higher psychological ratings of arousal and pain, with more negative ratings of valence, relative to baseline stimuli. In addition, threat stimuli also had an increased efficacy at evoking SCRs, and these were significantly stronger relative to baseline stimuli. There were no effects of perspective on psychophysiological or psychological responses to threat imagery. The findings are discussed in the context of the utility and scope of the BTAB for supporting neurocognitive investigations of aversive imagery and body-threats specifically in the study of embodiment, body-processing and self-consciousness.

The depersonalized brain: New evidence supporting a distinction between depersonalization and derealization from discrete patterns of autonomic suppression observed in a non-clinical sample.

Depersonalization and Derealization are characterised by feelings of detachment from one's bodily self/surroundings and a general emotional numbness. We explored predisposition to trait-based experiences of depersonalization/derealization-type experiences and autonomic arousal toward simulated body-threats, which were delivered to the participant's own body (i.e. Self) and when observed being delivered to another individual (i.e. Other). Ninety participants took part in an "Implied Body-Threat Illusion" task (Dewe, Watson, & Braithwaite, 2016) and autonomic arousal was recorded via standardised skin conductance responses and finger temperature. Autonomic suppression in response to threats delivered to the Self correlated with increases in trait-based depersonalization-type experiences. In contrast, autonomic suppression for threats delivered to Others correlated with trait-based derealization-like experiences. Body-temperature and anticipatory arousal did not correlate reliably with predisposition to depersonalization- or derealization-type experiences. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed in terms of a fronto-limbic autonomic suppression mechanism.

Predisposition to out-of-body experience (OBE) is associated with aberrations in multisensory integration: Psychophysiological support from a "rubber hand illusion" study.

It has been argued that disorders in body-ownership and aberrant experiences in self-consciousness are due to biases in multisensory integration. Here we examine whether such biases are also associated with spontaneous out-of-body experiences (OBEs) in a nonclinical population. One-hundred and 80 participants took part in a rubber hand illusion (RHI) experiment with synchronous and asynchronous visual and tactile stimulation. A realistic threat was delivered to the rubber hand after a fixed period of stimulation. Self-report exit questionnaires measured the subjective strength of the illusion and psychophysiological measures (skin conductance responses/finger temperature) provided an objective index of fear/anxiety toward the threat. Control participants reported a stronger RHI, and revealed larger threat-related skin conductance responses during synchronous compared with asynchronous brushing. For participants predisposed to OBEs, the magnitude of the skin conductance was not influenced by brushing synchrony-fear responses were just as strong in the asynchronous condition as they were in the synchronous condition. There were also no reliable effects of finger temperature for either group. Collectively, these findings are taken as support for the presence of particular biases in multisensory integration (perhaps via predictive coding mechanisms) in which imprecise top-down tuning occurs resulting in aberrant experiences in self-consciousness even in nonclinical hallucinators. (PsycINFO Database Record

Uncomfortably numb: new evidence for suppressed emotional reactivity in response to body-threats in those predisposed to sub-clinical dissociative experiences.

INTRODUCTION: Depersonalisation and derealisation disorders refer to feelings of detachment and dissociation from one's "self" or surroundings. A reduced sense of self (or "presence") and emotional "numbness" is thought to be mediated by aberrant emotional processing due to biases in self-referent multi-sensory integration. This emotional "numbing" is often accompanied by suppressed autonomic arousal to emotionally salient stimuli. METHODS: 118 participants completed the Cambridge Depersonalisation scale [Sierra, & Berrios, 2000. The Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale: A new instrument for the measurement of depersonalisation. Psychiatry Research, 93, 153-164)] as an index of dissociative anomalous experience. Participants took part in a novel "Implied Body-Threat Illusion" task; a pantomimed injection procedure conducted directly onto their real body (hand). Objective psychophysiological data were recorded via standardised threat-related skin conductance responses and finger temperature measures. RESULTS: Individuals predisposed to depersonalisation/derealisation revealed suppressed skin conductance responses towards the pantomimed body-threat. Although the task revealed a reliable reduction in finger temperature as a fear response, this reduction was not reliably associated with measures of dissociative experience. CONCLUSIONS: The present findings significantly extend previous research by revealing emotional suppression via a more direct body-threat task, even for sub-clinical groups. The findings are discussed within probabilistic and predictive coding frameworks of multi-sensory integration underlying a coherent sense of self.

The Cortical Hyperexcitability Index (CHi): a new measure for quantifying correlates of visually driven cortical hyperexcitability.

INTRODUCTION: Aberrations of visual experience, including visual hallucinations and visual distortions, are known to be associated with increased cortical hyperexcitability. As a consequence, the presence, intensity and frequency of certain experiences may well be indicative of an underlying increase in cortical hyperexcitability. METHODS: The current study presents a new proxy measure of cortical hyperexcitability, the Cortical Hyperexcitability Index (CHi). Two hundred and fifty healthy participants completed the CHi with the results subjected to exploratory factor analysis (EFA). RESULTS: The EFA revealed a three-factor model as the most parsimonious solution. The three factors were defined as: (1) heightened visual sensitivity and discomfort; (2) negative aura-type visual aberrations; and (3) positive aura-type visual aberrations. The identification of three factors suggests that multiple mechanisms underlie the notion of cortical hyperexcitability, providing researchers with new and greater precision in delineating these underlying features. CONCLUSIONS: The factorial structure of the CHi and the increased precision could aid the interpretation of findings from neuroscientific (i.e., brain imaging/stimulation) examinations of cortical processes underlying aberrant perceptions across a host of clinical, neurological and pathological conditions. As a consequence, the CHi is a useful and comprehensive proxy measure of cortical hyperexcitability with considerable scientific and clinical utility.

Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking.

It has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric perspective (e.g., the out-of-body experience, OBE) reflect specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, we examined whether such biases in perspective-taking were present in relation to specific dissociative anomalous body experiences (ABE) - namely the OBE. Participants also completed the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000) which provided measures of additional embodied ABE (unreality of self) and measures of derealization (unreality of surroundings). There were no reliable differences in the level of ABE, emotional numbing, and anomalies in sensory recall reported between the OBE and control group as measured by the corresponding CDS subscales. In contrast, the OBE group did provide significantly elevated measures of derealization ("alienation from surroundings" CDS subscale) relative to the control group. At the same time we also found that the OBE group was significantly more efficient at completing all aspects of the perspective-taking task relative to controls. Collectively, the current findings support fractionating the typically unitary notion of dissociation by proposing a distinction between embodied dissociative experiences and disembodied dissociative experiences - with only the latter being associated with exocentric perspective-taking mechanisms. Our findings - obtained with an ecologically valid task and a homogeneous OBE group - also call for a re-evaluation of the relationship between OBEs and perspective-taking in terms of facilitated disembodied experiences.