Task-order control in dual-tasks: Only marginal interactions between conflict at lower levels and higher processes of task organization.

When simultaneously performing two tasks that share response properties, interference can occur. Besides general performance decrements, performance in the first task is worse when the second task requires a spatially incompatible response, known as the backward crosstalk effect (BCE). The size of this BCE, similar to congruency effects in conflict tasks, is subject to a sequential modulation, with a smaller BCE after incompatible compared to compatible trials. In the present study, we focus on a potential bidirectional interaction between crosstalk (and its resolution) at a lower level of task performance and higher-order processes of task organization. Two questions were of particular interest: First, do participants switch task order more frequently after a conflict-prone incompatible trial than after a compatible trial? Second, does changing task order influence the efficiency of conflict resolution, as indexed by the size of the sequential modulation of the BCE. Across four experiments, we only found marginal evidence for an influence of lower-level conflict on higher-order processes of task organization, with only one experiment revealing a tendency to repeat task order following conflict. Our results thus suggest practical independence between conflict and task-order control. When separating processes of task selection and task performance, the sequential modulation was generally diminished, suggesting that conflict resolution in dual-tasks can be disrupted by a deliberate decision about task order, or, alternatively, by a longer inter-trial interval. Finally, the study found a strong bias towards repeating the same task order across trials, suggesting that task-order sets not only impact task performance but also guide task selection.

Me or we? Action-outcome learning in synchronous joint action.

Goal-directed behaviour requires mental representations that encode instrumental relationships between actions and their outcomes. The present study investigated how people acquire representations of joint actions where co-actors perform synchronized action contributions to produce joint outcomes in the environment. Adapting an experimental procedure to assess individual action-outcome learning, we tested whether co-acting individuals link jointly produced action outcomes to individual-level features of their own action contributions or to group-level features of their joint action instead. In a learning phase, pairs of participants produced musical chords by synchronizing individual key press responses. In a subsequent test phase, the previously produced chords were presented as imperative stimuli requiring forced-choice responses by both pair members. Stimulus-response mappings were systematically manipulated to be either compatible or incompatible with the individual and joint action-outcome mappings of the preceding learning phase. Only joint but not individual compatibility was found to modulate participants' performance in the test phase. Yet, opposite to predictions of associative accounts of action-outcome learning, jointly incompatible mappings between learning and test phase resulted in better performance. We discuss a possible explanation of this finding, proposing that pairs' group-level learning experience modulated how participants encoded ambiguous task instructions in the test phase. Our findings inform current debates about mechanistic explanations of action-outcome learning effects and provide novel evidence that joint action is supported by dedicated mental representations encoding own and others' actions on a group level.

Binding of response-independent task rules.

Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations.

Task performance errors and rewards affect voluntary task choices.

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n - 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection.

Generalizability of control across cognitive and emotional conflict.

People can learn to control their thoughts and emotions. The scientific study of control has been conducted mostly independently for cognitive and emotional conflicts. However, recent theoretical proposals suggest a close link between emotional and cognitive control processes. Indeed, mounting evidence from clinical sciences, social and personality psychology, and developmental neuroscience suggests that the ability to control thoughts and behavior goes hand in hand with the ability to control emotions. Yet, the precise interface between control over cognition and emotions remains controversial. The present study investigates the question whether control is a general-purpose mechanism or rather a set of domain-specific mechanisms. Following previous research, we tested participants' control in a cognitive and an emotional Stroop task and assessed the congruency sequence effect (CSE) which has been taken as a marker of cognitive or (implicit) emotional control, respectively. Going beyond previous research, we asked how control in one domain (e.g., cognitive) interacts with control in the other domain (e.g., emotional) on a trial-by-trial basis. In four experiments (N = 259) presented participants with a task-switching design that intermixed cognitive and emotional conflicts. This procedure produced significant CSEs across cognitive-emotional domains, suggesting that control can interact across domains. However, effect sizes of within-domain CSEs were twice as large, indicating that control is also domain-specific. These results neither support the general-purpose account nor the domain-specificity hypothesis of control. Rather, a hybrid account fits the data best, which also reconciles previous behavioral and neurophysiological findings, suggesting domain-general and specific processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Memory for abstract control states does not decay with increasing retrieval delays.

Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (Ntotal = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research.

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

No temporal decay of cognitive control in the congruency sequence effect.

Cognitive control theories describe the active maintenance of goal representations over temporal delays as central for adaptive behavior. Dynamic adaptations of goal representations are often measured as the congruency sequence effect (CSE), which describes a reduced congruency effect in trials following incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. Previous studies questioned active maintenance of CSEs and instead found that CSEs decrease rapidly over time (Duthoo et al., 2014; Egner et al., 2010). However, in these studies, CSEs can be attributed to both, control adaptations following conflict and binding effects due to repetition of stimulus (S) and response (R) features. In four experiments, we demonstrate that CSEs originating solely from control adaptions were not affected by temporal delays. Additional within-subject conditions partially replicated previous research showing a decrease in CSEs in task designs allowing for S-R binding effects and controlled for task complexity as a potential moderator. Together, results support theories which predict an active maintenance or retrieval of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs.

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Binding Error-Induced Control States.

Binding and retrieval of stimulus features, response features, and their attentional weighting tune cognitive processing to situational demands. The two mechanisms promote successful actions, especially in situations in which such actions depend on controlled processing. Here we explored binding and retrieval of attentional control states that follow from erroneous actions. By definition, such errors are characterized by insufficient cognitive control but at the same time, error detection has been shown to trigger corresponding adjustments to prevent future failures. We reanalyzed existing datasets and conducted a novel experiment to investigate whether error-induced control states become bound to task-relevant stimuli. Results point towards a binding and retrieval of error-induced control states; however, the effect appears to be less reliable than for binding and retrieval of specific stimulus and response features. We discuss potential implications and alternative interpretations in terms of a mediating impact of error-induced control.

Instant disembodiment of virtual body parts.

Evidence from multisensory body illusions suggests that body representations may be malleable, for instance, by embodying external objects. However, adjusting body representations to current task demands also implies that external objects become disembodied from the body representation if they are no longer required. In the current web-based study, we induced the embodiment of a two-dimensional (2D) virtual hand that could be controlled by active movements of a computer mouse or on a touchpad. Following initial embodiment, we probed for disembodiment by comparing two conditions: Participants either continued moving the virtual hand or they stopped moving and kept the hand still. Based on theoretical accounts that conceptualize body representations as a set of multisensory bindings, we expected gradual disembodiment of the virtual hand if the body representations are no longer updated through correlated visuomotor signals. In contrast to our prediction, the virtual hand was instantly disembodied as soon as participants stopped moving it. This result was replicated in two follow-up experiments. The observed instantaneous disembodiment might suggest that humans are sensitive to the rapid changes that characterize action and body in virtual environments, and hence adjust corresponding body representations particularly swiftly.

Self-related primes reduce congruency effects in the Stroop task.

Theoretical accounts of self-representation assume a privileged role for information that is linked to the self and suggest that self-relevant stimuli capture attention in a seemingly obligatory manner. However, attention is not only biased toward self-relevant information, but self-relevant information might also tune attention more broadly, for instance, by engaging cognitive control processes that regulate allocation of attention. Indeed, research in social, clinical, and developmental sciences predicts a close link between a cognitive representation of the self and cognitive control processes. The present research is concerned with such a possible signaling function of the self to recruit cognitive control and tested predictions that follow from this view using the well-known Stroop task. Participants identified the print color of words. Self-reference was manipulated such that a prime was presented before or together with a Stroop word that comprised of either a possessive pronoun (e.g., "my green") or a definite/indefinite article as control (e.g., "the/a green"). Results of three experiments (Ntotal = 137) showed that self-reference priming reduced the congruency effect in the Stroop task relative to control conditions. This finding is incompatible with an attentional bias account assuming that self-relevant distractors always impair performance, but rather suggests that stimuli relevant to the self can facilitate cognitive control processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Performance errors influence voluntary task choices.

Humans adjust their behavior after they have committed an error, but it is unclear whether and how error commissions influence voluntary task choices. In the present article, we review different accounts on effects of errors in the previous trial (transient error effects) and overall error probabilities (sustained error effects) on behavioral adaptation. Based on this review, we derived five statistical models of how errors might influence voluntary task choices. We analyzed the data of three experiments in which participants voluntarily selected one of two tasks before each trial whereby task difficulty, and concomitantly error probability, increased successively for the selected/performed tasks. Model comparison suggested that choice behavior was best explained by a combination of error probability of the performed task, error probability of the alternative task, and whether the previous response was correct or incorrect. The results revealed that participants were most likely to switch tasks in situations where the error probability of the performed task was high, the error probability of the alternative task was low, and after an error on the previous trial. We conclude that task selection processes are influenced by transient and sustained error effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Does body posture reduce the Stroop effect? Evidence from two conceptual replications and a meta-analysis.

Standing compared to sitting, for instance at work, is associated with positive physical and mental health consequences. Indeed, studies suggest that performance in cognitive conflict tasks (e.g., Color Stroop tasks) is improved when subjects perform the task while standing compared to sitting (Rosenbaum et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019). However, a recent study failed to replicate these findings in five attempts (Caron et al., 2020). We aimed to shed light on these discrepant results by means of two conceptual replications and a meta-analysis. Replication experiments showed typical congruency effects in the Color Stroop task, but failed to find any influence of posture on the Stroop effect even when we subjected data to a more sensitive analysis that controlled for individual variances between participants. Additionally, an explorative Bayesian analysis confirmed that both replications provided strong evidence against an interaction between body posture and the Stroop effect. Meta-analytic results showed that the confidence interval of the overall effect size for a modulation of the Stroop effect by body posture includes the null. Together, our results question whether standing modulates the Stroop effect in Color Stroop tasks and points out limitations of the influence of body posture on cognitive control tasks.

Limitations of cognitive control on emotional distraction - Congruency in the Color Stroop task does not modulate the Emotional Stroop effect.

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing.

Associations do not energize behavior: on the forgotten legacy of Kurt Lewin.

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed.

Further Evidence for the Binding and Retrieval of Control-States From the Flanker Task.

In response-interference tasks, congruency effects are reduced in trials that follow an incongruent trial. This congruence sequence effect (CSE) has been taken to reflect top-down cognitive control processes that monitor for and intervene in case of conflict. In contrast, episodic-memory accounts explain CSEs with bottom-up retrieval of stimulus-response links. Reconciling these opposing views, an emerging perspective holds that memory stores instances of control - abstract control-states - creating a shortcut for effortful control processes. Support comes from a study that assessed CSEs in a prime-target task. Here, repeating an irrelevant context feature boosted CSEs, possibly by retrieving previously stored control-states. We present a conceptual replication using the Eriksen flanker task because previous research found that CSEs in the flanker task reflect different control mechanisms than CSEs in the prime-target task. We measured CSEs while controlling for stimulus-response memory effects and manipulated contextual information (vertical spatial location) independently from the stimulus information, which introduced the conflict (horizontal spatial location). Results replicate previous findings - CSEs increased for context-repetition compared to context-changes. This study shows that retrieval of control-states is not limited to a specific task or context feature and therefore generalizes the notion that abstract control parameters are stored into trial-specific event files.

Positive and negative action-effects improve task-switching performance.

Anticipation of one's own actions' effects drives goal-directed behavior. In multitasking environments, the learning of stable action-effect associations seems particularly important, because establishing reliable response-effect associations for multiple competing tasks may help to differentiate between these tasks and thereby improve task-switching performance. Action-effects not only have cognitive, but also motivational aspects and often the consequences of our actions are hedonically marked. Thus, the anticipated hedonic quality of action-effects may also become part of the task representation, and positive and negative affect may distinctly modulate task-switching performance. We report a pre-registered experiment (N = 120) designed to examine how positive, negative, and neutral valence of action-effects impact performance in a cued task-switching paradigm. Pictures from the IAPS database were used to manipulate the action-effects' valence. Affective valence determined reaction times: participants who learned positive or negative action-effects responded faster than participants in the control condition. In particular, task-switch trials were faster in both conditions than in the control condition, while task-repetition trials were comparable across valence conditions. Our results further suggest that performance improvements in the positive and negative valence conditions occurred for different reasons. Negative action-effects expedited responses specifically for the task that produced the unpleasant outcome, while positive affect more generally promoted performance of both tasks. These findings point toward distinct roles of positive and negative valence of action-effects in regulating multitasking performance.

Multiple Routes to Control in the Prime-Target Task: Congruence Sequence Effects Emerge Due to Modulation of Irrelevant Prime Activity and Utilization of Temporal Order Information.

In interference tasks, the magnitude of the congruency effect is reduced in trials that follow an incongruent trial. This congruence sequence effect (CSE) reflects cognitive control processes, yet accounts disagree when and how control is exerted. Here, we address these questions in the context of the prime-target task. In this task, control can either modulate early prime or late target information. Furthermore, control can utilize information specific to the stimulus (perceptual features) or relational information between stimuli (temporal order). Two experiments (N = 41 | N = 62) were conducted using a prime-target task with arrows (prime) and letters (target). We presented either the prime before the target or the target before the prime. For both trial-type transitions, the CSE was assessed. Regarding the first question, when is control exerted, results showed a larger CSE for prime→target relative to target→prime trials. This suggests that control in the prime-target task modulates prime activity. Regarding the second question, how is control exerted, a combined analysis of both experiments showed a larger CSE for repetition of the same prime and target order across two trials (e.g., previous trial: prime→target; current trial: prime→target) compared to changes (e.g., previous trial: prime→target; current trial: target→prime), suggesting that control in the prime-target task can employ temporal selection.

Scaling of the Parameters for Cost Balancing in Self-Organized Task Switching.

Previous studies on voluntary task switching using the self-organized task switching paradigm suggest that task performance and task selection in multitasking are related. When deciding between two tasks, the stimulus associated with a task repetition occurred with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) that continuously increased with the number of repetitions, while the stimulus associated with a task switch was immediately available. Thus, the waiting time for the repetition stimulus increased with number of consecutive task repetitions. Two main results were shown: first, switch costs and voluntary switch rates correlated negatively - the smaller the switch costs, the larger the switch rates. Second, participants switched tasks when switch costs and waiting time for the repetition stimulus were similar. In the present study, we varied the SOA that increased with number of task repetitions (SOA increment) and also varied the size of the switch costs by varying the intertrial interval. We examined which combination of SOA increment and switch costs maximizes participants' attempts to balance waiting time and switch costs in self-organized task switching. We found that small SOA increments allow for fine-grained adaptation and that participants can best balance their switch costs and waiting times in settings with medium switch costs and small SOA increments. In addition, correlational analyses indicate relations between individual switch costs and individual switch rates across participants.