Standing up the National Ignition Facility radiation protection program.

Operation of the NIF requires a large and varied number of routine and infrequent activities involving contaminated and radioactive systems, both in servicing online equipment and offline refurbishment of components. Routine radiological operations include up to several dozen entries into contaminated systems per day, multiple laboratories refurbishing radiologically impacted parts, handling of tens of curies of tritium, and (eventually) tens of workers spending most of their day working in radiation areas and handling moderately activated parts. Prior to the introduction of radioactive materials and neutron producing experiments (capable of causing activation), very few of the operating staff had any radiological qualifications or experience. To support the full NIF operating program, over 600 radiological workers needed to be trained, and a functional and large-scale radiological protection program needed to be put in place. It quickly became evident that there was a need to supplement the LLNL site radiological protection staff with additional radiological controls technicians and a radiological protection staff within NIF operations to manage day-to-day activities. This paper discusses the approach taken to stand up the radiological protection program and some lessons learned.

Implementing an operational program for determining the radiological status of material and equipment.

The National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has implemented a protocol for evaluating and releasing material and equipment that is potentially "volumetrically contaminated" as a result of neutron activation and shown not to be "distinguishable from background." This protocol is an important element of the National Ignition Facility's operational program as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, requires DOE approval of the process used to release volumetrically contaminated personal property and establishes a dose constraint of 10 µSv y(-1) (1 mrem y(-1)) for clearance of such items. The protocol uses process and historical knowledge to determine when material and equipment may be potentially impacted and field measurements to verify it has been impacted (i.e., is distinguishable from background). Material and equipment that do not meet the distinguishable-from-background criterion are considered to be non-impacted and outside the scope of the Order and may be released from radiological control. This paper provides the technical basis and methodology for determining whether or not there is radioactivity distinguishable from background in the evaluated material and equipment and documents that the measurement sensitivity exceeds the unrestricted release criteria specified in the American National Standards Institute report N13.12-1999, Surface and Volume Radioactivity Standards for Clearance. Pending DOE approval, this protocol could be used as the basis for releasing materials and equipment that exceed the distinguishable-from-background criterion and are below the specified threshold for unrestricted release.