[Differentiation of existential guilt and compassion in relation to responsibility induction: a film experiment]. / Zur Differenzierung von Existentieller Schuld und Mitleid über Verantwortlichkeitsinduktion: ein Filmexperiment.

Feelings of existential guilt are assumed to depend on the perception of a causal relationship between one's own behavior or (privileged) situation and the disadvantages of others. By contrast, pity should not depend on such perceptions. This hypothesis, which has been supported so far only by correlational studies, was tested experimentally. Eighty students were shown a film about a developing country. The film was provided with four different comments, each representing one experimental condition (between-subjects design). Experimental factors were "amount of misery of the people shown" and "subject's responsibility for these peoples' conditions of life". As expected, subjects in the condition "misery and responsibility" reported higher feelings of guilt, though no more pity than subjects in the remaining three treatment conditions (experiment 1, n = 40). This mean difference, however, was statistically significant for men only. Contrary to our theoretical expectations--and to finding from other experiments on vicarious reparation--the induction of guilt had no effect on willingness to help a third party (experiment 2, n = 40). Possible reasons for this unexpected finding are suggested.