Concepts require flexible grounding.

Research on semantic memory has a problem. On the one hand, a robust body of evidence implicates sensorimotor regions in conceptual processing. On the other hand, a different body of evidence implicates a modality independent semantic system. The standard solution to this tension is to posit a hub-and-spoke system with modality independent hubs and modality specific spokes. In this paper, I argue in support of an alternative view of grounding which remains committed to neural reenactment but emphasizes the multimodal and multilevel nature of the semantic system. This view is built upon the recognition that abstraction is a design feature of concepts. Semantic memory employs hierarchically structured representations to capture different degrees of abstraction. Grounding does not work the way that many embodied approaches have assumed.

Language is a Source of Grounding and a Mode of Action.

Kemmerer argues that grounded cognition explains how language-specific semantic structures can influence nonlinguistic cognition. In this commentary, I argue that his proposal fails to fully consider the possibility that language itself can serve as a source of grounding. Our concepts are not merely shaped by a disembodied language system; they emerge in the context of linguistic experience and action. This inclusive approach to grounded cognition offers an expanded conception of the phenomena associated with linguistic relativity. I provide empirical and theoretical reasons to adopt this theoretical perspective.

Rethinking the role of language in embodied cognition.

There has been a lot of recent interest in the way that language might enhance embodied cognition. This interest is driven in large part by a growing body of evidence implicating the language system in various aspects of semantic memory-including, but not limited to, its apparent contribution to abstract concepts. In this essay, I develop and defend a novel account of the cognitive role played by language in our concepts. This account relies on the embodied nature of the language system itself, diverges in significant ways from traditional accounts, and is part of a flexible, multimodal and multilevel view of our conceptual system. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Words have a weight: language as a source of inner grounding and flexibility in abstract concepts.

The role played by language in our cognitive lives is a topic at the centre of contemporary debates in cognitive (neuro)science. In this paper we illustrate and compare two theories that offer embodied explanations of this role: the WAT (words as social tools) and the LENS (language is an embodied neuroenhancement and scaffold) theories. WAT and LENS differ from other current proposals, because they connect the impact of the neurologically realized language system on our cognition to the ways in which language shapes our interaction with the physical and social environment. Examining these theories together, their tenets and supporting evidence, sharpens our understanding of each, but also contributes to a better understanding of the contribution that language might make to the acquisition, representation and use of abstract concepts. Here we focus on how language provides a source of inner grounding, especially metacognition and inner speech, and supports the flexibility of our thought. Overall, the paper outlines a promising research program focused on the importance of language to abstract concepts within the context of a flexible, multimodal, and multilevel conception of embodied cognition.

More than a scaffold: Language is a neuroenhancement.

What role does language play in our thoughts? A longstanding proposal that has gained traction among supporters of embodied or grounded cognition suggests that it serves as a cognitive scaffold. This idea turns on the fact that language-with its ability to capture statistical regularities, leverage culturally acquired information, and engage grounded metaphors-is an effective and readily available support for our thinking. In this essay, I argue that language should be viewed as more than this; it should be viewed as a neuroenhancement. The neurologically realized language system is an important subcomponent of a flexible, multimodal, and multilevel conceptual system. It is not merely a source for information about the world but also a computational add-on that extends our conceptual reach. This approach provides a compelling explanation of the course of development, our facility with abstract concepts, and even the scope of language-specific influences on cognition.

Language as a disruptive technology: abstract concepts, embodiment and the flexible mind.

A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical challenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multimodal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

Three symbol ungrounding problems: Abstract concepts and the future of embodied cognition.

A great deal of research has focused on the question of whether or not concepts are embodied as a rule. Supporters of embodiment have pointed to studies that implicate affective and sensorimotor systems in cognitive tasks, while critics of embodiment have offered nonembodied explanations of these results and pointed to studies that implicate amodal systems. Abstract concepts have tended to be viewed as an important test case in this polemical debate. This essay argues that we need to move beyond a pretheoretical notion of abstraction. Against the background of current research and theory, abstract concepts do not pose a single, unified problem for embodied cognition but, instead, three distinct problems: the problem of generalization, the problem of flexibility, and the problem of disembodiment. Identifying these problems provides a conceptual framework for critically evaluating, and perhaps improving upon, recent theoretical proposals.

Thinking in words: language as an embodied medium of thought.

Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in the idea that natural language enhances and extends our cognitive capabilities. Supporters of embodied cognition have been particularly interested in the way in which language may provide a solution to the problem of abstract concepts. Toward this end, some have emphasized the way in which language may act as form of cognitive scaffolding and others have emphasized the potential importance of language-based distributional information. This essay defends a version of the cognitive enhancement thesis that integrates and builds on both of these proposals. I argue that the embodied representations associated with language processing serve as a supplementary medium for conceptual processing. The acquisition of a natural language provides a means of extending our cognitive reach by giving us access to an internalized combinatorial symbol system that augments and supports the context-sensitive embodied representational systems that exist independently of language.

Intermediate representations exclude embodiment.

Given that Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) account integrates language production and comprehension, it is reasonable to ask whether it is compatible with embodied cognition. I argue that its dependence on rich intermediate representations of linguistic structure excludes embodiment. Two options are available to supporters of embodied cognition: They can adopt a more liberal notion of embodiment or they can attempt to replace these intermediate representations with robustly embodied ones. Both of these options face challenges.

An additional heterogeneity hypothesis.

In this commentary, I make three points concerning Machery's response to neo-empiricism. First, his methodological critique fails to remove the threat that neo-empiricism poses to his conceptual eliminativism. Second, evidence suggests that there are multiple semantic codes, some of which are not perceptually based. Third, this representational heterogeneity thwarts neo-empiricism but also raises questions with respect to how we should "do without concepts."

On the need for Embodied and Dis-Embodied Cognition.

This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing. Linguistic representations are "dis-embodied" in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships among linguistic representations extends our cognitive reach and provides an explanation of our ability to abstract and generalize. This theory is supported by a number of empirical considerations, including the large body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting a multiple semantic code explanation of imageability effects.

Beyond perceptual symbols: a call for representational pluralism.

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.

Linking brainwaves to the brain: an ERP primer.

This article reviews literature on the characteristics and possible interpretations of the event-related potential (ERP) peaks commonly identified in research. The description of each peak includes typical latencies, cortical distributions, and possible brain sources of observed activity as well as the evoking paradigms and underlying psychological processes. The review is intended to serve as a tutorial for general readers interested in neuropsychological research and as a reference source for researchers using ERP techniques.