When stereotype threat makes me more or less intelligent: The informative role of emotions in effort mobilization and task performance.

Studies have shown that affective states could be used as diagnostic information for the assessment of situational demands and that, as such, they can regulate resource mobilization. Accordingly, it was found that negative feelings cause overestimation of situational demands, which then leads to effort mobilization during performance on easy tasks but disengagement on difficult tasks. The present research investigated whether this emotion-motivation link could explain the usual differences in achievement on easy and difficult tasks under stereotype threat (ST). In Study 1, participants in ST, no-ST, and no-ST with fear induction conditions had to resolve a series of easy logical problems. As expected, ST and no-ST-fear groups reported higher effort investment and achieved better performance than the no-ST group. In the following two studies, the no-ST-fear condition was replaced by an ST condition in which the informative potential of threat-related feelings was prevented before the task performance. Although participants under ST reported similar elevation in anxiety, the expected increase in easy task performance (Study 2) and decrease in difficult task performance (Study 3) were observed only in the standard ST groups. Taken together, our findings suggest that threat-related feelings could govern motivational processes and account for the effect of ST.

The combination of multiple affective experiences and their impact on valuation judgments.

People's affective experiences can be influenced by multiple informational inputs. It remains unclear however how this occurs? In this paper, we investigate the construction of affective experiences dependent on the varying number of previously presented, affectively-charged, informational inputs. In addition, because affect is often used as a cue in judgment and decision-making, we probe whether the resulting affective experience is mapped onto people's valuation judgments (how much people are willing-to-pay for target rewards and experiences). In three studies, we show that people's overall affective experience is constructed by averaging the affect of the previously presented, affectively-charged inputs. Subsequently, we find that people rely on the resulting affective experience as a cue for their judgments, as willingness-to-pay valuations were predicted by the combined affective experience. We measured integral, expected, as well as momentary affect - using both self-report and physiological measures. We discuss the potential for studying further how multiple inputs change affect as well as the implications for judgment and decision making.

Does mood really influence comparative optimism? Tracking an elusive effect.

Methodological limitations call into question prior evidence that positive moods are associated with greater comparative optimism. Experiments 1-4 tested if mood affects comparative optimism using a mood manipulation that minimized experimenter demand. While the procedure was successful in inducing mood, we found no evidence for a mood effect on comparative optimism. The absence of a mood effect was not due to participants correcting their judgments in response to a presumed mood bias (Experiments 2, 3 and 4) or to participants proactively regulating their mood (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 5 compared the mood manipulation of Experiments 1-4 with an autobiographical recall procedure. Although the two methods were equally effective in inducing mood, only autobiographical recall influenced participants' comparative optimism. Study 6 provides preliminary evidence that experimenter demand may be responsible for the effects of autobiographical recall on comparative judgments.