Methodological reflections on the MOND/dark matter debate.

The paper re-examines the principal methodological questions, arising in the debate over the cosmological standard model's postulate of Dark Matter vs. rivalling proposals that modify standard (Newtonian and general-relativistic) gravitational theory, the so-called Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) and its subsequent extensions. What to make of such seemingly radical challenges of cosmological orthodoxy? In the first part of our paper, we assess MONDian theories through the lens of key ideas of major 20th century philosophers of science (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan), thereby rectifying widespread misconceptions and misapplications of these ideas common in the pertinent MOND-related literature. None of these classical methodological frameworks, which render precise and systematise the more intuitive judgements prevalent in the scientific community, yields a favourable verdict on MOND and its successors-contrary to claims in the MOND-related literature by some of these theories' advocates; the respective theory appraisals are largely damning. Drawing on these insights, the paper's second part zooms in on the most common complaint about MONDian theories, their ad-hocness. We demonstrate how the recent coherentist model of ad-hocness captures, and fleshes out, the underlying-but too often insufficiently articulated-hunches underlying this critique. MONDian theories indeed come out as severely ad hoc: they do not cohere well with either theoretical or empirical-factual background knowledge. In fact, as our complementary comparison with the cosmological standard model's Dark Matter postulate shows, with respect to ad-hocness, MONDian theories fare worse than the cosmological standard model.

Why Reichenbach wasn't entirely wrong, and Poincaré was almost right, about geometric conventionalism.

The present paper revisits conventionalism about the geometry of classical and relativistic spacetimes. By means of critically examining a recent evaluation of conventionalism, we clarify key themes of, and rectify common misunderstandings about, conventionalism. Reichenbach's variant is demarcated from conventionalism simpliciter, associated primarily with Poincaré. We carefully outline the latter's core tenets-as a selective anti-realist response to a particular form of theory underdetermination. A subsequent double defence of geometric conventionalism is proffered: one line of defence employs (and thereby, to some extent, rehabilitates) a plausible reading of Reichenbach's idea of universal forces; another consists in independent support for conventionalism, unrelated to Reichenbach. Conventionalism, we maintain, remains a live option in contemporary philosophy of spacetime physics, worthy of serious consideration.

The physics and metaphysics of Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics.

The paper takes up Bell's (1987) "Everett (?) theory" and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space - hence "Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics" (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM), without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This "rump formalism" receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The "for all practical purposes"-classical, Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist.

Theory (In-)Equivalence and conventionalism in f(R) gravity.

f(R) Gravity is the most natural extension of General Relativity within Riemannian Geometry. Due to (inter alia) its potential capacity for a unified treatment of early and late-time cosmic expansion, it has enjoyed recent attention in astrophysics and cosmology. I critically examine three inter-related claims found in the pertinent physics literature, of general interest to the philosopher of science. 1. f(R) Gravity is equivalent to a particular Brans-Dicke Theory. 2. The spacetime geometry underpinning f(R) Gravity has substantial conventional elements. 3. f(R) Gravity is an instance of a theory in which the distinction between matter and spacetime is conventional. Whilst the first claim can be vindicated in precise terms, the remaining two claims, I submit, are unwarranted - at least for the reasons usually adduced. On different grounds, though, the case for conventionalism about spacetime geometry in f(R) Gravity (as well as General Relativity) turns out to be considerably stronger.

The general-relativistic case for super-substantivalism.

Super-substantivalism (of the type we'll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier "on top of" spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism's tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics.