To each their own: a review of individual differences and metaphorical perspectives on time.

How do people talk-and potentially think-about abstract concepts? Supported by abundant linguistic evidence, Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits that people draw upon concrete concepts to structure abstract ones via metaphorical connections. Often, the source domain for a metaphor draws upon embodied physical experience, as in the time is space system, whereby representations in the domain of time are thought to arise from experiences of navigating through, orienting within, and observing motion in space. In recent years, psychological evidence has suggested that the connections between space and time are indeed conceptual; however, many gaps in our understanding of the workings of metaphor remain. Notably, until recently, the unique variations in the ways in which people experience metaphor have been largely overlooked, with much research falling prey to what Dabrowska has identified as one of the 'deadly sins' of cognitive linguistics: to ignore individual differences. By focusing on two widely studied metaphors for time, Moving Time and Moving Ego, this review article shines a spotlight on the varied ways in which people draw on their embodied and enculturated experiences, along with 'human experience' on an individual level and the contexts within which they use metaphor. In doing so, it highlights the importance for metaphoric conceptualization of variation across languages, across contexts, and across individuals, suggesting that while the use and interpretation of metaphor may begin with cross-domain connections, they are but part of the story.

Cognitive Science: Piecing Together the Puzzle.

Alongside significant gains in our understanding of the human mind, research in Cognitive Science has produced substantial evidence that the details of cognitive processes vary across cultures, contexts, and individuals. In order to arrive at a more nuanced account of the workings of the human mind, in this letter we argue that one challenge for the future of Cognitive Science is the integration of this evidence of variation with findings which can be generalized.

Can co-speech gestures alone carry the mental time line?

Time and space have been shown to be interlinked in people's minds. To what extent can co-speech gestures influence thinking about time, over and above spoken language? In this study, we use the ambiguous question "Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days, what day is it on now?" to show that people either respond "Monday" or "Friday," depending on gesture. We manipulated both language (using either the adverb "forward," or the adverb "backward") and gesture (forward and backward movement), thus creating matches and mismatches between speech and gesture. Results show that the speech manipulation exerts a stronger influence on people's temporal perspectives than gesture. Moreover, the effect of gesture disappears completely for certain hand shapes and if non-movement language is used ("changed by two days" as opposed to "moved by two days"). We additionally find that the strength of the gesture effect is moderated by likability: When people like the gesturer, they are more prone to assuming their perspective, which completely changes the meaning of forward and backward gestural movements. Altogether, our results suggest that gesture does play a role in thinking about time, but this role is auxiliary when compared with speech, and the degree to which gesture matters depends on one's social relation to the gesturer. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Moving through time: the role of personality in three real-life contexts.

In English, two deictic space-time metaphors are in common usage: the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time and the Moving Time metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward toward the ego (Clark, 1973). Although earlier research investigating the psychological reality of these metaphors has typically examined spatial influences on temporal reasoning (e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), recent lines of research have extended beyond this, providing initial evidence that personality differences and emotional experiences may also influence how people reason about events in time (Duffy & Feist, 2014; Hauser, Carter, & Meier, 2009; Richmond, Wilson, & Zinken, 2012). In this article, we investigate whether these relationships have force in real life. Building on the effects of individual differences in self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination found by Duffy and Feist (2014), we examined whether, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal perspective. We found that participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective were more likely to exhibit conscientious behaviors, while those who adopted the Moving Ego perspective were more likely to procrastinate, suggesting that the earlier effects reach beyond the laboratory.