Is purity a distinct and homogeneous domain in moral psychology?

"No" is our answer to the question in our title. In moral psychology, a purity violation (defined as an immoral act committed against one's own body or soul) was theorized to be a homogeneous moral domain qualitatively distinct from other moral domains. In contrast, we hypothesized heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, overlapping rather than distinct domains, and quantitative rather than qualitative differences from other hypothesized domains (specifically, autonomy, which is harm to others). Purity has been said to consist of norms violations of which elicit disgust and taint the soul. Here we empirically examined homogeneity: whether violations of body (e.g., eating putrid food) belong in the same moral domain as violations of the soul unrelated to bodily health (e.g., selling one's soul, desecrating sacred books). We examined distinctness: whether reactions to purity violations differ in predicted ways from those to violations of autonomy. In four studies (the last preregistered), American Internet users (in Studies 2 and 4, classified as politically conservative or liberal; Ns = 80, 96, 1,312, 376) were given stories about violations based on prior studies. Nonhealth purity violations were rated as relatively more disgusting, but less gross (the lay term for the reaction to putrid things) and more likely to taint the soul than were health-related ones. Surprisingly, both health and nonhealth purity violations were typically judged as only slightly immoral if at all. Autonomy violations were rated as more disgusting and tainting of the soul than were purity violations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

"The Fathers have eaten Sour Grapes, and the Children's Teeth are set on Edge": Differentiating the Emotional Experiences of Grima and Disgust.

The Spanish term grima refers to the aversive emotional experience typically evoked when one hears, for example, a scratch upon a chalkboard. Whereas Spanish speakers can distinguish between the concepts of grima and disgust, English and German speakers lack a specific word for this experience and typically label grima as disgust. In the present research, we tested the degree of differentiation between the two aversive experiences in Spanish speakers. Study 1 addressed whether Spanish speakers apply spontaneously the term grima rather than disgust to grima-eliciting experiences. Study 2 systematically addressed the constitutive features of both grima and disgust by mapping their internal structures. Results showed that the noise of a chulk on a blackboard and scraping fingernails on a blackboard, along with the physical manifestation of goose bumps, were the most typical features of the category. Whereas both grima and disgust were characterized as unpleasant sensations, t(193) = 1.21, ns, they differed with respect to their physiological signatures (e.g., producing shivers was characteristic of grima, as compared to disgust, t(194) = 12.02, p = .001, d = 1.72) and elicitors (e.g., a fractured bone was a characteristic elicitor of grima; t(193) = 5.78, p = .001, d = .83, whereas pederasts and pedophiles were the most characteristic elicitor of disgust, t(193) = 8.46, p = .001, d = 1.21). Thus, both grima and disgust are conceptually different experiences, whose shared features hold different degrees of typicality. The present research suggests that grima and disgust are two distinct emotion concepts.

"The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge": differentiating the emotional experiences of grima and disgust

The Spanish term grima refers to the aversive emotional experience typically evoked when one hears, for example, a scratch upon a chalkboard. Whereas Spanish speakers can distinguish between the concepts of grima and disgust, English and German speakers lack a specific word for this experience and typically label grima as disgust. In the present research, we tested the degree of differentiation between the two aversive experiences in Spanish speakers. Study 1 addressed whether Spanish speakers apply spontaneously the term grima rather than disgust to grima-eliciting experiences. Study 2 systematically addressed the constitutive features of both grima and disgust by mapping their internal structures. Results showed that the noise of a chulk on a blackboard and scraping fingernails on a blackboard, along with the physical manifestation of goose bumps, were the most typical features of the category. Whereas both grima and disgust were characterized as unpleasant sensations, t(193) = 1.21, ns, they differed with respect to their physiological signatures (e.g., producing shivers was characteristic of grima, as compared to disgust, t(194) = 12.02, p = .001, d = 1.72) and elicitors (e.g., a fractured bone was a characteristic elicitor of grima; t(193) = 5.78, p = .001, d = .83, whereas pederasts and pedophiles were the most characteristic elicitor of disgust, t(193) = 8.46, p = .001, d = 1.21). Thus, both grima and disgust are conceptually different experiences, whose shared features hold different degrees of typicality. The present research suggests that grima and disgust are two distinct emotion concepts

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