Do I know what they know? Linking metacognition, theory of mind, and selective social learning.

Young children are often dependent on learning from others and to this effect develop heuristics to help distinguish reliable sources from unreliable sources. Where younger children rely heavily on social cues such as familiarity with a source to make this distinction, older children tend to rely more on an informant's competence. Little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that help children to select the best informant; however, some evidence points toward mechanisms such as metacognition (thinking about thinking) and theory of mind (thinking about other's thoughts) being involved. The goals of the current study were to (a) explore how the monitoring and control components of metacognition may predict selective social learning in preschoolers and (b) attempt to replicate a reported link between selective social learning and theory of mind. In Experiment 1, no relationship was observed across the measures. In Experiment 2, only selective social learning and belief reasoning were found to be related as well as when both experiments' samples were combined. No links between selective social learning and metacognition were observed in the two experiments. These results suggest that theory of mind is a stronger correlate of selective learning than metacognition in young children. The implications regarding the kind of tasks used to measure metacognition are discussed.

The effect of retrieval goals on the content recalled from complex narratives.

Memories are not always accurately recalled, and one factor that influences memory is the goal of retrieval. Evidence suggests that retrieving a memory to fit a social goal affects the content that is recollected, yet the nature of this effect, and whether this effect remains stable over time, is not fully understood. To this end, we compared the effect of retrieving a complex event (i.e., a narrative) motivated by a social versus an accuracy goal both immediately and after a 24-hour consolidation period. Three groups of young adults encoded audio narratives and recalled these narratives immediately (Session 1) and again after a 24-hour delay (Session 2). One group recalled the narratives to meet a social goal across both sessions (social); another group recalled the narratives for an accuracy goal across both sessions (accuracy); and a final group initially recalled the narratives for a social goal (Session 1) and then for an accuracy goal (Session 2; mixed). We found no effect of group on the number of details that described the overall theme (central details); however, a social goal significantly reduced the number of specific (episodic) details and altered the order in which the details were described. When the goal of retrieval changed across session (i.e., mixed group), the reduction in specific details remained but not the effect on detail order. These results demonstrate that socially motivated memory retrieval selectively alters the specific episodic content contained in the memory, leaving intact the thematic knowledge and overall structure of the memory.

Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD.

Theory of mind is defined as the understanding that mental states predict and explain people's behaviors. It develops around the age of 4 but seems to remain deficient in people with ASD, whereas other forms of naïve understanding remain intact. This study compares children with ASD to neurotypical children on tasks measuring naïve psychology, physics, and biology (biological parts). Results suggest that children with ASD only underperform on an implicit false belief task. Performances in naïve biology and physics were equivalent across the two groups and uncorrelated to performance on the false belief task. This confirms that naïve physics and biological reasoning are intact in children with ASD but that tracking false beliefs is challenging for this population.

Conceptual similarity alters the impact of context shifts on temporal memory.

Past work has shown that changes in encoding contexts (context shifts) act as boundaries across encountered items and can impair temporal memory. We address two questions about this effect: whether conceptual similarity among contexts creating a boundary can alleviate temporal memory impairments and if this effect holds for different forms of contexts (spatial vs. categorical). In a between-subjects design, participants studied the order of sequentially presented faces (items), each presented with an associated context. One group was shown images of a room (spatial) and the other images of a dessert (categorical) as the context. For both, boundaries between contexts with overlapping (similar) or non-overlapping (distinct) conceptual features were introduced. At test, participants performed a recency judgment for pairs of items that crossed or did not cross a context boundary at encoding and recalled whether they were encoded within the same, similar, or distinct context. For both groups, recency judgments were more accurate for item pairs from similar than distinct contexts, but memory for the context relationship between items was more accurate for items from distinct than similar contexts. Our findings suggest that conceptual knowledge impacts how events are parsed during encoding and affects temporal associations formed in episodic memory.