Looking beyond person-specific cues indicative of credibility: Reward rules and executive function predict preschoolers' acceptance of (un)reliable assertions.

We tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 88) can deduce individuals' credibility exclusively from situational cues such as game rules that reward competitive or cooperative behavior-and whether children's inferences are predicted by their executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) skills. When presented with the game rules, children endorsed a partner's claims more often if the rules incentivized cooperation between participants and partners (e.g., by giving them prizes when trusting each other) versus when the rules incentivized deception (e.g., by giving prizes to partners who tricked the children). Notably, children's appropriate responses to partners' claims increased as their EF skills improved regardless of whether the rules supported trust or skepticism. ToM was not related to children's rule-based selectivity. Preschoolers' ability to make inferences based on cooperative versus competitive reward rules to determine whether the children's partner can be trusted is key to learning from individuals whose reputation or past behavior is completely unknown. In addition, findings of associations between EF and vigilance about others' claims contribute to the epistemological debate of whether people start in life as credulous learners.

Children's explicit assessments of reliability influence their willingness to learn novel labels.

This study examined how explicitly evaluating another person's performance influences 3.5-year-old children's willingness to learn from that person. Children interacted with a speaker who presented a series of familiar objects and labeled them either accurately or inaccurately. After establishing reliability, the speaker taught nonsense labels for two additional familiar objects. Half of the children were asked to explicitly judge whether the speaker was reliable before the novel labels were presented; half were asked to do so at the end of the experiment. Children who were given an opportunity to verbally assess the speaker's accuracy prior to label learning were more likely than those evaluating afterward to avoid learning from the previously inaccurate labeler. These findings show that explicitly evaluating their knowledge can reduce children's willingness to learn words from an unreliable source, expanding on prior research showing influences of explicit evaluations on children's problem solving.

Playing by the rules: self-interest information influences children's trust and trustworthiness in the absence of feedback.

This study documented how children's decisions to trust and help partners in a game depend on the game's incentives. Adults, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds (N=128) guessed the location of hidden prizes, assisted by a partner who observed the hiding. After each hiding event the partner shared information with participants about the prize's location. Participants earned prizes every time they guessed correctly. The partner earned prizes either from participants' correct (cooperation incentive) or incorrect (competition incentive) guesses. Children and adults trusted their partner more often when the game incentivized cooperation versus competition. A complementary pattern was observed when participants assisted their partner find prizes they observed being hidden: Participants strategically shared truthful information more often when the game rewarded cooperation.

Developmental differences in the relative weighing of informants' social attributes.

We examined whether similarity, familiarity, and reliability cues guide children's learning and whether these cues are weighed differently with age. Three- to 5-year-olds (n = 184) met 2 informant puppets, 1 of which was similar (Experiment 1) or familiar (Experiment 2) to the participants. Initially, children's preference for either informant was measured. Children selected similar and familiar informants--over dissimilar and unfamiliar ones--as information sources at above-chance levels. In Experiment 1 the similar informant later provided accurate or inaccurate information (counterbalanced). Children's initial preference for similar sources was modified by reliability cues. However, 5-year-olds continued to be influenced by similarity, being less likely to avoid inaccurate sources if similar than dissimilar. In Experiment 2 the familiar informant was later portrayed as interpersonally similar or dissimilar (counterbalanced). Only 5-year-olds were influenced by similarity, preferentially interacting with similar informants regardless of familiarity. These results suggest that similarity influences children's learning and that children's relative weighing of social cues varies with age--with younger children being especially focused on familiarity and older children being particularly attentive to similarity.

The influence of speaker reliability on first versus second label learning.

Children's confidence in their own knowledge may influence their willingness to learn novel information from others. Twenty-four-month-old children's (N = 160) willingness to learn novel labels for either familiar or novel objects from an adult speaker was tested in 1 of 5 conditions: accurate, inaccurate, knowledgeable, ignorant, or uninformative. Children were willing to learn a second label for an object from a reliable informant in the accurate, knowledgeable, and uninformative conditions; children were less willing to apply a novel label to a familiar object if the speaker previously was inaccurate or had expressed ignorance. However, when the objects were novel, children were willing to learn the label regardless of the speaker's knowledge level.

Structural priming as structure-mapping: children use analogies from previous utterances to guide sentence production.

What mechanisms underlie children's language production? Structural priming--the repetition of sentence structure across utterances--is an important measure of the developing production system. We propose its mechanism in children is the same as may underlie analogical reasoning: structure-mapping. Under this view, structural priming is the result of making an analogy between utterances, such that children map semantic and syntactic structure from previous to future utterances. Because the ability to map relationally complex structures develops with age, younger children are less successful than older children at mapping both semantic and syntactic relations. Consistent with this account, 4-year-old children showed priming only of semantic relations when surface similarity across utterances was limited, whereas 5-year-olds showed priming of both semantic and syntactic structure regardless of shared surface similarity. The priming of semantic structure without syntactic structure is uniquely predicted by the structure-mapping account because others have interpreted structural priming as a reflection of developing syntactic knowledge.

Infants' understanding of false labeling events: the referential roles of words and the speakers who use them.

The four studies reported here examine whether 16-month-old infants' responses to true and false utterances interact with their knowledge of human agents. In Study 1, infants heard repeated instances either of true or false labeling of common objects; labels came from an active human speaker seated next to the infant. In Study 2, infants experienced the same stimuli and procedure; however, we replaced the human speaker of Study 1 with an audio speaker in the same location. In Study 3, labels came from a hidden audio speaker. In Study 4, a human speaker labeled the objects while facing away from them. In Study 1, infants looked significantly longer to the human agent when she falsely labeled than when she truthfully labeled the objects. Infants did not show a similar pattern of attention for the audio speaker of Study 2, the silent human of Study 3 or the facing-backward speaker of Study 4. In fact, infants who experienced truthful labeling looked significantly longer to the facing-backward labeler of Study 4 than to true labelers of the other three contexts. Additionally, infants were more likely to correct false labels when produced by the human labeler of Study 1 than in any of the other contexts. These findings suggest, first, that infants are developing a critical conception of other human speakers as truthful communicators, and second, that infants understand that human speakers may provide uniquely useful information when a word fails to match its referent. These findings are consistent with the view that infants can recognize differences in knowledge and that such differences can be based on differences in the availability of perceptual experience.