A perceptual control theory of emotional action.

A theory is proposed that views emotional feelings as pivotal for action control. Feelings of emotions are valued interoceptive signals from the body that become multimodally integrated with perceptual contents from registered and mentally simulated events. During the simulation of a perceptual change from one event to the next, a conative feeling signal is created that codes for the wanting of a specific perceptual change. A wanted perceptual change is weighted more strongly than alternatives, increasing its activation level on the cognitive level and that of associated motor structures that produced this perceptual change in the past. As a consequence, a tendency for action is generated that is directed at the production of the wanted perception.

Conflict experience and resolution underlying obedience to authority.

Definitions of obedience require the experience of conflict in response to an authority's demands. Nevertheless, we know little about this conflict and its resolution. Two experiments tested the suitability of the 'object-destruction paradigm' for the study of conflict in obedience. An experimenter instructed participants to shred bugs (among other objects) in a manipulated coffee grinder. In contrast to the demand condition, participants in the control condition were reminded of their free choice. Both received several prods if they defied the experimenter. Results show that participants were more willing to kill bugs in the demand condition. Self-reported negative affect was increased after instructions to destroy bugs relative to other objects (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 2, compliant participants additionally showed an increase in tonic skin conductance and, crucially, self-reported more agency and responsibility after alleged bug-destruction. These findings elucidate the conflict experience and resolution underlying obedience. Implications for prominent explanations (agentic shift, engaged followership) are discussed.

Emotional arousal does not modulate stimulus-response binding and retrieval effects.

The adaptation-by-binding account and the arousal-biased competition model suggest that emotional arousal increases binding effects for transient links between stimuli and responses. Two highly-powered, pre-registered experiments tested whether transient stimulus-response bindings are stronger for high versus low arousing stimuli. Emotional words were presented in a sequential prime-probe design in which stimulus relation, response relation, and stimulus arousal were orthogonally manipulated. In Experiment 1 (N = 101), words with high and low arousal levels were presented individually in prime and probe displays. In Experiment 2 (N = 170), a high arousing affective word was presented simultaneously with a neutral word during the prime display; in the subsequent probe display, either the arousing or the neutral word repeated or a different high versus low arousal word was shown. Data from both experiments did not demonstrate a modulation of SRBR effects by stimulus arousal and SRBR effects were of equal magnitude for word stimuli of high and low arousal levels. These null results are not in line with binding accounts that hypothesise a modulatory influence of emotional arousal on perception-action binding.

Motivations underlying self-infliction of pain during thinking for pleasure.

Previous research suggested that people prefer to administer unpleasant electric shocks to themselves rather than being left alone with their thoughts because engagement in thinking is an unpleasant activity. The present research examined this negative reinforcement hypothesis by giving participants a choice of distracting themselves with the generation of electric shock causing no to intense pain. Four experiments (N = 254) replicated the result that a large proportion of participants opted to administer painful shocks to themselves during the thinking period. However, they administered strong electric shocks to themselves even when an innocuous response option generating no or a mild shock was available. Furthermore, participants inflicted pain to themselves when they were assisted in the generation of pleasant thoughts during the waiting period, with no difference between pleasant versus unpleasant thought conditions. Overall, these results question that the primary motivation for the self-administration of painful shocks is avoidance of thinking. Instead, it seems that the self-infliction of pain was attractive for many participants, because they were curious about the shocks, their intensities, and the effects they would have on them.

Self-related primes reduce congruency effects in the Stroop task.

Theoretical accounts of self-representation assume a privileged role for information that is linked to the self and suggest that self-relevant stimuli capture attention in a seemingly obligatory manner. However, attention is not only biased toward self-relevant information, but self-relevant information might also tune attention more broadly, for instance, by engaging cognitive control processes that regulate allocation of attention. Indeed, research in social, clinical, and developmental sciences predicts a close link between a cognitive representation of the self and cognitive control processes. The present research is concerned with such a possible signaling function of the self to recruit cognitive control and tested predictions that follow from this view using the well-known Stroop task. Participants identified the print color of words. Self-reference was manipulated such that a prime was presented before or together with a Stroop word that comprised of either a possessive pronoun (e.g., "my green") or a definite/indefinite article as control (e.g., "the/a green"). Results of three experiments (Ntotal = 137) showed that self-reference priming reduced the congruency effect in the Stroop task relative to control conditions. This finding is incompatible with an attentional bias account assuming that self-relevant distractors always impair performance, but rather suggests that stimuli relevant to the self can facilitate cognitive control processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Associations do not energize behavior: on the forgotten legacy of Kurt Lewin.

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed.

Self-reported mask-related worrying reduces relative avoidance bias toward unmasked faces in individuals with low Covid19 anxiety syndrome.

Facial masks have become and may remain ubiquitous. Though important for preventing infection, they may also serve as a reminder of the risks of disease. Thus, they may either act as cues for threat, priming avoidance-related behavior, or as cues for a safe interaction, priming social approach. To distinguish between these possibilities, we assessed implicit and explicit evaluations of masked individuals as well as avoidance bias toward relatively unsafe interactions with unmasked individuals in an approach-avoidance task in an online study. We further assessed Covid19 anxiety and specific attitudes toward mask-wearing, including mask effectiveness and desirability, hindrance of communication from masks, aesthetic appeal of masks, and mask-related worrying. Across one sample of younger (18-35 years, N = 147) and one of older adults (60+ years, N = 150), we found neither an average approach nor avoidance bias toward mask-wearing compared to unmasked individuals in the indirect behavior measurement task. However, across the combined sample, self-reported mask-related worrying correlated with reduced avoidance tendencies toward unmasked individuals when Covid19 anxiety was low, but not when it was high. This relationship was specific to avoidance tendencies and was not observed in respect to explicit or implicit preference for mask-wearing individuals. We conclude that unsafe interaction styles may be reduced by targeting mask-related worrying with public interventions, in particular for populations that otherwise have low generalized Covid19 anxiety.

A Multisite Preregistered Paradigmatic Test of the Ego-Depletion Effect.

We conducted a preregistered multilaboratory project (k = 36; N = 3,531) to assess the size and robustness of ego-depletion effects using a novel replication method, termed the paradigmatic replication approach. Each laboratory implemented one of two procedures that was intended to manipulate self-control and tested performance on a subsequent measure of self-control. Confirmatory tests found a nonsignificant result (d = 0.06). Confirmatory Bayesian meta-analyses using an informed-prior hypothesis (δ = 0.30, SD = 0.15) found that the data were 4 times more likely under the null than the alternative hypothesis. Hence, preregistered analyses did not find evidence for a depletion effect. Exploratory analyses on the full sample (i.e., ignoring exclusion criteria) found a statistically significant effect (d = 0.08); Bayesian analyses showed that the data were about equally likely under the null and informed-prior hypotheses. Exploratory moderator tests suggested that the depletion effect was larger for participants who reported more fatigue but was not moderated by trait self-control, willpower beliefs, or action orientation.

Facing the enemy: Spontaneous facial reactions towards suffering opponents.

The suffering of an opponent is an important social affective cue that modulates how aggressive interactions progress. To investigate the affective consequences of opponent suffering on a revenge seeking individual, two experiments (total N = 82) recorded facial muscle activity while participants observed the reaction of a provoking opponent to a (retaliatory) sound punishment in a laboratory aggression task. Opponents reacted via prerecorded videos either with facial displays of pain, sadness, or neutrality. Results indicate that participants enjoyed seeing the provocateur suffer: indexed by a coordinated muscle response featuring an increase in zygomaticus major (and orbicularis oculi muscle) activation accompanied by a decrease in corrugator supercilii activation. This positive facial reaction was only shown while a provoking opponent expressed pain. Expressions of sadness, and administration of sound blasts to nonprovoking opponents, did not modulate facial activity. Overall, the results suggest that revenge-seeking individuals enjoy observing the offender suffer, which could represent schadenfreude or satisfaction of having succeeded in the retaliation goal.

What stops revenge taking? Effects of observed emotional reactions on revenge seeking.

What reaction stops revenge taking? Four experiments (total N = 191) examined this question where the victim of an interpersonal transgression could observe the offender's reaction (anger, sadness, pain, or calm) to a retributive noise punishment. We compared the punishment intensity selected by the participant before and after seeing the offender's reaction. Seeing the opponent in pain reduced subsequent punishment most strongly, while displays of sadness and verbal indications of suffering had no appeasing effect. Expression of anger about a retributive punishment did not increase revenge seeking relative to a calm reaction, even when the anger response was disambiguated as being angry with the punisher. It is concluded that the expression of pain is the most effective emotional display for the reduction of retaliatory aggression. The findings are discussed in light of recent research on reactive aggression and retributive justice.

Conflict monitoring and the affective-signaling hypothesis-An integrative review.

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

Low numbers from a low head? Effects of observed head orientation on numerical cognition.

The present research shows effects of observed vertical head orientation of another person on numerical cognition in the observer. Participants saw portrait-like photographs of persons from a frontal view with gaze being directed at the camera and the head being tilted up or down (vs. not tilted). The photograph appeared immediately before each trial in different numerical cognition tasks. In Experiment 1, participants produced smaller numbers in a random number generation task after having viewed persons with a down-tilted head orientation relative to up-tilted and non-tilted head orientations. In Experiment 2, numerical estimates in an anchoring-like trivia question task were smaller following presentations of persons with a down-tilted head orientation relative to a non-tilted head orientation. In Experiment 3, a response key that was associated with larger numbers in a numerical magnitude task was pressed less frequently in a randomly intermixed free choice task when the photograph showed a person with a down-tilted relative to an up-tilted head orientation. These findings consistently show that social displays can influence numerical cognition across a variety of task settings.

Expected Value of Control and the Motivational Control of Habitual Action.

A hallmark of habitual actions is that, once they are established, they become insensitive to changes in the values of action outcomes. In this article, we review empirical research that examined effects of posttraining changes in outcome values in outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks. This review suggests that cue-instigated action tendencies in these tasks are not affected by weak and/or incomplete revaluation procedures (e.g., selective satiety) and substantially disrupted by a strong and complete devaluation of reinforcers. In a second part, we discuss two alternative models of a motivational control of habitual action: a default-interventionist framework and expected value of control theory. It is argued that the default-interventionist framework cannot solve the problem of an infinite regress (i.e., what controls the controller?). In contrast, expected value of control can explain control of habitual actions with local computations and feedback loops without (implicit) references to control homunculi. It is argued that insensitivity to changes in action outcomes is not an intrinsic design feature of habits but, rather, a function of the cognitive system that controls habitual action tendencies.

Operant evaluative conditioning.

Two experiments investigated an evaluative transfer from actions producing pleasant and unpleasant outcomes to novel stimuli that were assigned to those actions in a subsequent stimulus-response task. Results showed that a fictitious social group was liked more when this group was assigned to the action previously associated with pleasant outcomes relative to the other action. This evaluative transfer from operant contingencies was observed although the actions did not generate outcomes during the stimulus-action pairing. It is concluded that operant contingencies can be used for preference construction because they specify the existence of a relation between specific actions and particular valenced events. Implications for mental process theories of preference formation and motivated perception are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The influence of pre-training evaluative responses on approach-avoidance training outcomes.

Approach-avoidance training (AAT) has been shown to be effective in both clinical and laboratory research. However, some studies have failed to show the effects of AAT. Therefore, finding moderators of the AAT effect is a priority for further research. We investigate the moderating effect of pre-training evaluative responses towards familiar AAT targets. In particular, we test predictions: (a) that congruent responses (i.e. approach to positive targets and avoidance of negative targets) increase liking, whereas incongruent responses decrease liking; (b) that training is more effective when it can strengthen existing positivity or negativity; and (c) that ambivalence increases AAT effects. Two experiments (total N = 132) implemented an AAT with local soft-drink brands after measuring initial positive/negative explicit evaluative components and implicit liking towards the brands. Results show no reliable evidence for training effects on consumption or rating of drinks, but participants showed more implicit liking of approached drinks than avoided drinks. Furthermore, the magnitude of implicit liking measured pre-training was positively related to the size of the training effect. Ambivalence had no direct effect on the training outcomes. These results partially support the congruency prediction and underline the importance of implicit liking prior to AAT as a moderator for AAT effects.

No effects of explicit approach-avoidance training on immediate consumption of soft drinks.

Four experiments (n = 300) examined motivational effects of approach-avoiding training (AAT) procedures on consumption of sugary soft drinks, implicit preferences and explicit preferences. Experiments varied in the number of training trials, the implementation of approach-avoidance goals during the training, and the frequency and timing of the consumption measure. AAT had no effects on any measure, and Bayesian analyses provided substantial evidence for a null model of AAT effects. A manipulation check showed that AAT affected behavioral tendencies towards the drinks in line with the training procedure (Experiment 3). It is concluded that explicit training of approach and avoidance reactions to soft drinks is not an effective procedure to modify immediate consumption of that drinks. Possible reasons and differences to previous AAT studies are discussed.

Mechanisms underlying effects of approach-avoidance training on stimulus evaluation.

Over the past decade an increasing number of studies across a range of domains have shown that the repeated performance of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus leads to changes in the evaluation of that stimulus. The dominant (motivational-systems) account in this area claims that these effects are caused by a rewiring of mental associations between stimulus representations and AA systems that evolved to regulate distances to positive and negative stimuli. In contrast, two recently forwarded alternative accounts postulate that AA effects are caused by inferences about the valence of actions and stimuli (inferential account) or a transfer of valenced action codes to stimulus representations (common-coding account). Across four experiments we set out to test these three competing accounts against each other. Experiments 1-3 illustrate that changes in stimulus evaluations can occur when people perform valenced actions that bear no relation to a distance regulation, such as moving a manikin upward or downward. The observed evaluative effects were dependent on the evaluative implication of the instructed movement goal rather than whether the action implied a movement toward or away from the stimuli. These results could not be explained with a rewiring of associations to motivational systems. Experiment 4 showed that changes in stimulus evaluations occurred after participants passively observed approach-avoidance movements, supporting an explanation in terms of cognitive inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record