The wisdom in the story: Clarifying assumptions about radical uncertainty and reasonableness in narrative judgment.

Human lives are radically uncertain. Making sense of such uncertainties is the hallmark of wisdom. Sense-making requires narratives, putting them in the center stage of human everyday decision-making. Yet what if radical uncertainty is a narrative itself? Moreover, do laypeople always consider such narratives irrational? Here we pose these questions to enrich a theory of choice under uncertainty.

Folk standards of sound judgment: Rationality Versus Reasonableness.

Normative theories of judgment either focus on rationality (decontextualized preference maximization) or reasonableness (pragmatic balance of preferences and socially conscious norms). Despite centuries of work on these concepts, a critical question appears overlooked: How do people's intuitions and behavior align with the concepts of rationality from game theory and reasonableness from legal scholarship? We show that laypeople view rationality as abstract and preference maximizing, simultaneously viewing reasonableness as sensitive to social context, as evidenced in spontaneous descriptions, social perceptions, and linguistic analyses of cultural products (news, soap operas, legal opinions, and Google books). Further, experiments among North Americans and Pakistani bankers, street merchants, and samples engaging in exchange (versus market) economy show that rationality and reasonableness lead people to different conclusions about what constitutes good judgment in Dictator Games, Commons Dilemma, and Prisoner's Dilemma: Lay rationality is reductionist and instrumental, whereas reasonableness integrates preferences with particulars and moral concerns.

I can see myself enjoying that: Using imagery perspective to circumvent bias in self-perceptions of interest.

People experience life satisfaction when pursuing activities that genuinely interest them. Unfortunately, cultural stereotypes (e.g., "science is not for girls") and preexisting self-beliefs can bias people's memories, thereby hindering their ability to identify the domains that they actually experience as interesting. The current experiments tested a novel method for circumventing this problem by manipulating visual imagery perspective as people recalled their experiences. Four experiments measured (or manipulated) participants' actual experience of interest as they completed a task; the experiments also measured (or manipulated) participants' self-beliefs about their interest in the domain. The experiments then manipulated imagery perspective as participants recalled their interest in the task. Prior research suggests that imagery from an actor's first-person perspective facilitates a bottom-up processing style, whereas imagery from an external third-person facilitates a top-down processing style (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Consistent with this account, across all 4 experiments, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) caused people's recall to be less biased by the top-down influence of their self-beliefs and better aligned with their past experienced interest. The final experiment demonstrated downstream consequences of these effects on female undergraduates' intentions to pursue future activities in a domain (STEM) that negative stereotypes typically might dissuade them from pursuing. Thus, the present results suggest that first-person imagery can be a useful tool to reduce the influence of biased self-beliefs, while increasing sensitivity to past bottom-up experiences during recall. Further, these results hold practical implications for reducing psychological barriers that can keep underrepresented individuals from pursuing interests in counterstereotypical domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Does the future look bright? Processing style determines the impact of valence weighting biases and self-beliefs on expectations.

People regularly form expectations about their future, and whether those expectations are positive or negative can have important consequences. So, what determines the valence of people's expectations? Research seeking to answer this question by using an individual-differences approach has established that trait biases in optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs and, more recently, trait biases in behavioral tendencies to weight one's past positive versus negative experiences more heavily each predict the valence of people's typical expectations. However, these two biases do not correlate, suggesting limits on a purely individual-differences approach to predicting people's expectations. We hypothesize that, because these two biases appear to operate via distinct processes (with self-beliefs operating top-down and valence weighting bias operating bottom-up), to predict a person's expectations on a given occasion, it is also critical to consider situational factors influencing processing style. To test this hypothesis, we investigated how an integral part of future thinking that influences processing style-mental imagery-determines each bias's influence. Two experiments measured valence weighting biases and optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs, then manipulated whether participants formed expectations using their own first-person visual perspective (which facilitates bottom-up processes) or an external third-person visual perspective (which facilitates top-down processes). Expectations corresponded more with valence weighting biases from the first-person (vs. third-person) but more with self-beliefs from the third-person (vs. first-person). Two additional experiments manipulated valence weighting bias, demonstrating its causal role in shaping expectations (and behaviors) with first-person, but not third-person, imagery. These results suggest the two biases operate via distinct processes, holding implications for interventions to increase optimism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The Effects of Subjective Age and Aging Attitudes on Mid- to Late-Life Sexuality.

This study examined the effects of subjective age and attitudes about aging on frequency of sex and interest in sexual activity among middle-aged and older adults. Data were drawn from two waves of the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) study (n = 1,170 adults, mean age Time 1 = 53.70 years, SD = 9.08). Regression analyses were used to investigate the effects of subjective age and attitudes about aging on three measures of sexuality: frequency of sex, perceived quality of sexual activity, and interest in sexual activity, over 10 years. The older participants felt and the less positive their views of aging, the less they rated sexual activity as enjoyable over time. Feeling older (though not attitudes about aging) also predicted less interest in sex. Subjective age and beliefs about aging did not have an impact on frequency of sex. Although frequency of sex was not predicted by subjective aging and aging attitudes, the results suggested that subjective age and stereotypic views on aging may shape the experience of sex in later life.

Changing visual perspective changes processing style: A distinct pathway by which imagery guides cognition.

Action images can be depicted either from the actor's first-person or an observer's third-person visual perspective. This research demonstrates that visual perspective of action imagery influences the extent to which people process actions abstractly. Two experiments presented photographs of everyday actions, manipulating their visual perspective (first-person vs. third-person), holding constant the scope and objects depicted. Subsequently, participants interpreted actions unrelated to the images. Across both experiments, viewing third-person (vs. first-person) photographs caused participants to construe the unrelated actions more abstractly. This carryover effect demonstrates a shift in processing style, sheds light on an underlying mechanism of perspective effects, and suggests that imagery is a more versatile cognitive tool than traditionally assumed.

Seeking structure in social organization: compensatory control and the psychological advantages of hierarchy.

Hierarchies are a ubiquitous form of human social organization. We hypothesized that 1 reason for the prevalence of hierarchies is that they offer structure and therefore satisfy the core motivational needs for order and control relative to less structured forms of social organization. This hypothesis is rooted in compensatory control theory, which posits that (a) individuals have a basic need to perceive the world as orderly and structured, and (b) personal and external sources of control are capable of satisfying this need because both serve the comforting belief that the world operates in an orderly fashion. Our first 2 studies confirmed that hierarchies were perceived as more structured and orderly relative to egalitarian arrangements (Study 1) and that working in a hierarchical workplace promotes a feeling of self-efficacy (Study 2). We threatened participants' sense of personal control and measured perceptions of and preferences for hierarchy in 5 subsequent experiments. Participants who lacked control perceived more hierarchy occurring in ambiguous social situations (Study 3) and preferred hierarchy more strongly in workplace contexts (Studies 4-5). We also provide evidence that hierarchies are indeed appealing because of their structure: Preference for hierarchy was higher among individuals high in Personal Need for Structure and a control threat increased preference for hierarchy even among participants low in Personal Need for Structure (Study 5). Framing a hierarchy as unstructured reversed the effect of control threat on hierarchy (Study 6). Finally, hierarchy-enhancing jobs were more appealing after control threat, even when they were low in power and status (Study 7).

Using imagery perspective to access two distinct forms of self-knowledge: associative evaluations versus propositional self-beliefs.

When mentally simulating life events, people may visualize them from either an actor's 1st-person or observer's 3rd-person visual perspective. Two experiments demonstrated that visual perspective differentially determines reliance on 2 distinct forms of self-knowledge: associative evaluations of the simulated environment and propositional self-beliefs about relevant values and preferences. Implicit measures indexed associative evaluations of environmental stimuli (political candidates, outgroups); explicit measures indexed propositional self-beliefs about relevant personal values or preferences. A separate session manipulated participants' visual perspective for mentally simulating a pertinent event (voting, interracial interaction) as they forecasted their behavior or feelings if that event occurred. Forecasts corresponded more closely with associative evaluations from the 1st-person than 3rd-person perspective but more closely with propositional self-beliefs from the 3rd-person than 1st-person. Results have practical implications for channeling the power of mental simulation to desired ends and theoretical implications for understanding the pathways by which imagery and mental simulation shape cognition.

"The way I am is the way you ought to be": perceiving one's relational status as unchangeable motivates normative idealization of that status.

People often become evangelists for their own lifestyles. When it comes to relational status, people are rarely content to simply say "being single works for me" or "being in a relationship suits my disposition." Results from four studies suggested that this tendency to view one's own relational status as the universal ideal emerges in part from a desire to rationalize one's own relational status. Building on existing evidence that people are motivated to rationalize circumstances they perceive as likely to persist, we predicted that participants' perceptions of the stability of their own relational status would lead them to rationalize that status. In Studies 1 and 2, we found evidence for an association between perceptions of stability and idealizations and ruled out an alternative explanation. In Studies 3 and 4, we found evidence of the effect of stability on people's judgments of same- and different-status others in contexts in which relational status should carry little objective weight.

Internalizing the closet: concealment heightens the cognitive distinction between public and private selves.

The present studies are the first in which social psychological methods were used to test the popular claim that the experience of concealing a stigmatized social identity leads to a "divided self." For people with concealable stigmas, concealment in public settings makes the public-private dimension of self-expression particularly salient, leading them to organize self-relevant information along this dimension. The result is a strengthened cognitive distinction between public and private aspects of the self, what we have termed public-private schematization. We developed and tested a measure of the cognitive accessibility of the distinction between public and private self-schemas by measuring how quickly participants sorted trait attributes into self-in-public (e.g., self-at-work) and self-in-private (e.g., self-at-home). People with more accessible distinct public and private self-schemas should be faster at categorizing trait attributes into public- and private-self aspects than those with more integrated public and private self-schemas. Relative to people without such identities, people with concealable stigmas (Study 1a, sexual orientation; Study 1b, religiosity at a secular college), show greater public-private schematization. This schematization is linked to concealment (Study 2) and to the experimental activation of concealable versus conspicuous stigmatized identities (Study 3). Implications of distinct public and private self-schemas for psychological well-being are explored in Studies 4 and 5. Two different measures of distress-perceived social stress (Study 4) and depressive symptoms (Study 5)-provided evidence showing that the accessibility of the distinction between public and private self-schemas accounted for the association of concealment on heightened distress. Implications for research on concealment and self-structure are discussed.

Stability and change in sexual orientation identity over a 10-year period in adulthood.

We examined reports of sexual orientation identity stability and change over a 10-year period drawing on data from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS I and II) and tested for three patterns: (1) heterosexual stability, (2) female sexual fluidity, and (3) bisexual fluidity. Fifty-four percent of the 2,560 participants were female and the average age was approximately 47 years. At Wave 1, 2,494 (97.42%) reported a heterosexual identity, 32 (1.25%) a homosexual identity, and 34 (1.33%) a bisexual identity and somewhat more than 2% reported a different sexual orientation identity at Wave 2. Although some support for each hypothesis was found, initial sexual orientation identity interacted with gender to predict a more complex pattern. For the sample as a whole, heterosexuality was the most stable identity. For women, bisexuality and homosexuality were equally unstable and significantly less stable than heterosexuality, suggesting that sexual orientation identity fluidity is a pattern that applies more to sexual minority women than heterosexual women. For men, heterosexuality and homosexuality were both relatively stable compared to bisexuality, which stood out as a particularly unstable identity. This pattern of results was consistent with previous findings and helps to address methodological limitations of earlier research by showing the characteristics of a population-based sample of heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual identified men and women over time.

Seeing failure in your life: Imagery perspective determines whether self-esteem shapes reactions to recalled and imagined failure.

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.

Aging attitudes moderate the effect of subjective age on psychological well-being: evidence from a 10-year longitudinal study.

Older subjective age is often associated with lower psychological well-being among middle-aged and older adults. We hypothesize that attitudes toward aging moderate this relationship; specifically, feeling older will predict lower well-being among those with less favorable attitudes toward aging but not those with more favorable aging attitudes. We tested this with longitudinal data from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States-II assessing subjective age and psychological well-being over 10 years. As hypothesized older subjective age predicted lower life satisfaction and higher negative affect when aging attitudes were less favorable but not when aging attitudes were more favorable. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

Eyes on the prize: The longitudinal benefits of goal focus on progress toward a weight loss goal.

Past research suggests that focusing on what has not yet been accomplished (goal focus) signals a lack of progress towards one's high commitment goals and inspires greater motivation than does focusing on what has already been accomplished (accomplishment focus). The present investigation extends this research to a longitudinal, important domain by exploring the consequences of focusing on one's goals versus accomplishments when pursuing a weight loss goal. Participants were tracked over the course of a 12-week weight loss program that utilized weekly group discussions and a companion website to direct participants' focus toward their end weight loss goal or toward what they had already achieved. Goal-focused participants reported higher levels of commitment to their goal and, ultimately, lost more weight than did accomplishment-focused and no focus control participants. Accomplishment-focused participants did not differ from controls on any measure.

Self-enhancement or self-coherence? Why people shift visual perspective in mental images of the personal past and future.

It is often assumed, by laypeople and researchers alike, that people shift visual perspective in mental images of life events to maintain a positive self-concept by claiming ownership of desirable events (first-person) and disowning undesirable events (third-person). The present research suggests that people shift perspective not according to the pictured event's desirability but according to whether they focus on the experience of the event (first-person) or on the event's coherence with the self-concept (third-person). This explains why self-change promotes third-person imagery of prechange selves (Studies 1 and 2). And, the same mechanism determines perspective apart from self-change, in both memory and imagination (Studies 3 and 4). By demonstrating that people shift perspective according to whether they focus on the experience of an event or its self-concept coherence, these results suggest how perspective may function more broadly in social cognition, and specifically in the construction and maintenance of the temporally extended self.

Idealizing parenthood to rationalize parental investments.

Although raising children has largely negative effects on parents' emotional well-being, parenthood is often idealized as a uniquely emotionally rewarding role. We tested the hypothesis that belief in myths idealizing parenthood helps parents cope with the dissonance aroused by the high financial cost of raising children. In Study 1, parents endorsed the idealization of parenthood more when only the costs of parenting were made salient than when both the costs of parenting and the long-term benefits of having children were made salient. When dissonant feelings were measured before idealization of parenthood, these feelings mediated the influence of the salient information on idealization of parenthood. In Study 2, participants reported greater enjoyment of the time they spent with their children and intended to spend more leisure time with their children when only parenting costs were made salient than when the long-term benefits of having children were also made salient (or when no costs or benefits of having children were made salient). We discuss the implications of our results for parental-investment theory and for the propagation of myths idealizing parenthood.

Seeing meaning in action: a bidirectional link between visual perspective and action identification level.

Actions do not have inherent meaning but rather can be interpreted in many ways. The interpretation a person adopts has important effects on a range of higher order cognitive processes. One dimension on which interpretations can vary is the extent to which actions are identified abstractly--in relation to broader goals, personal characteristics, or consequences--versus concretely, in terms of component processes. The present research investigated how visual perspective (own 1st-person vs. observer's 3rd-person) in action imagery is related to action identification level. A series of experiments measured and manipulated visual perspective in mental and photographic images to test the connection with action identification level. Results revealed a bidirectional causal relationship linking 3rd-person images and abstract action identifications. These findings highlight the functional role of visual imagery and have implications for understanding how perspective is involved in action perception at the social, cognitive, and neural levels.

Picture yourself at the polls: visual perspective in mental imagery affects self-perception and behavior.

The present research demonstrates that the visual perspective--own first-person versus observer's third-person--people use to picture themselves engaging in a potential future action affects their self-perceptions and subsequent behavior. On the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election, registered voters in Ohio were instructed to use either the first-person or the third-person perspective to picture themselves voting in the election. Picturing voting from the third-person perspective caused subjects to adopt a stronger pro-voting mind-set correspondent with the imagined behavior. Further, this effect on self-perception carried over to behavior, causing subjects who were instructed to picture voting from the third-person perspective to be significantly more likely to vote in the election. These findings extend previous research in autobiographical memory and social judgment linking the observer's perspective with dispositional attributions, and demonstrate the causal role of imagery in determining future behavior.

Free at last? Social dominance, loss aversion, and White and Black Americans' differing assessments of racial progress.

White Americans tend to believe that there has been greater progress toward racial equality than do Black Americans. The authors explain this difference by combining insights from prospect theory and social dominance theory. According to prospect theory, changes seem greater when framed as losses rather than gains. Social dominance theory predicts that White Americans tend to view increases in equality as losses, whereas Black Americans view them as gains. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors experimentally tested whether groups judge the same change differently depending on whether it represents a loss or gain. In Studies 3-6, the authors used experimental methods to test whether White participants who frame equality-promoting changes as losses perceive greater progress toward racial equality. The authors discuss theoretical and political implications for progress toward a just society.

"Keep your eyes on the prize": reference points and racial differences in assessing progress toward equality.

White Americans tend to perceive greater progress toward racial equality than do ethnic minorities. Correlational evidence (Study 1) and two experimental manipulations of framing (Studies 2 and 3) supported the hypothesis that this perception gap is associated with different reference points the two groups spontaneously use to assess progress, with Whites anchoring on comparisons with the past and ethnic minorities anchoring on ideal standards. Consistent with the hypothesis that the groups anchor on different reference points, the gap in perceptions of progress was affected by the time participants spent deliberating about the topic (Study 4). Implications for survey methods and political conflict are discussed.