Implementation Research to Strengthen Health Care Financing Reforms Toward Universal Health Coverage in Indonesia: A Mixed-Methods Approach to Real-World Monitoring.

Universal health coverage reforms are complex and impact numerous processes, institutions, and individuals. To know whether reforms are being implemented as planned and working as envisioned, policy makers and managers need information and insights on bottlenecks. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided support to build implementation research (IR) capacity and to conduct cycles of research to help Indonesia understand how its single-payer national insurance reform, Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), was affecting primary care. Two cycles of IR in Indonesia focused on effects of JKN financing on primary care, as determined through a consultative process with stakeholders at national and district levels. This process generated questions relevant for implementers and policy makers and strengthened government interest in findings. Research was conducted in 5 diverse districts, and methods included key informant interviews, focus groups, document review, health worker surveys, and analysis of service delivery data. Cycle 1 findings showed an uneven understanding of JKN regulations, unequal implementation readiness, and limited evidence of improved productivity. JKN capitation payments did not increase health worker satisfaction or motivate additional effort. Informed by these findings, regulations were rewritten and the capitation payment formula was redesigned to include payment conditional on performance. Cycle 2 found that health workers experienced increased workloads because of increased enrollment in JKN and the requirement that people access primary care before being referred to higher levels of care. In addition, health workers indicated they did not experience the payment system to be fair. Instead of payment being conditional on performance, they indicated it was primarily determined by education and tenure, with only some districts incorporating a small payment component based on behaviors, such as attendance, and performance. The health workers said they preferred to be paid based on achieving primary care targets. Conducting IR so that questions are relevant and the process of finding and sharing answers is timely and cost-effective requires high-level skills, but support to build IR capacity has potential to make a lasting impact.

Results-Based Financing in Mozambique's Central Medical Store: A Review After 1 Year.

BACKGROUND: Public health commodity supply chains are typically weak in low-income countries, partly because they have many disparate yet interdependent functions and components. Approaches to strengthening supply chains in such settings have often fallen short-they address technical weaknesses, but not the incentives that motivate staff to perform better. METHODS: We reviewed the first year of a results-based financing (RBF) program in Mozambique, which began in January 2013. The program aimed to improve the performance of the central medical store-Central de Medicamentos e Artigos Medicos (CMAM)-by realigning incentives. We completed in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 33 key informants, including representatives from CMAM and donor agencies, and collected quantitative data on performance measures and use of funds. IMPLEMENTATION: The RBF agreement linked CMAM performance payments to quarterly results on 5 performance indicators related to supply planning, distribution planning, and warehouse management. RBF is predicated on the theory that a combination of carrot and stick-i.e., shared financial incentives, plus increased accountability for results-will spur changes in behavior. Important design elements: (1) indicators were measured against quarterly targets, and payments were made only for indicators that met those targets; (2) targets were set based on documented performance, at levels that could be reasonably attained, yet pushed for improvement; (3) payment was shared with and dependent on all staff, encouraging teamwork and collaboration; (4) results were validated by verifiable data sources; and (5) CMAM had discretion over how to use the funds. FINDINGS: We found that CMAM's performance continually improved over baseline and that CMAM achieved many of its performance targets, for example, timely submission of quarterly supply and distribution planning reports. Warehouse indicators, such as inventory management and order fulfillment, proved more challenging but were nonetheless positive. By linking payments to periodic verified results, and giving CMAM discretion over how to spend the funds, the RBF agreement motivated the workforce; focused attention on results; strengthened data collection; encouraged teamwork and innovation; and ultimately strengthened the central supply chain. CONCLUSION: Policy makers and program managers can use performance incentives to catalyze and leverage existing investments. To further strengthen the approach, such incentive programs can shift attention from quantity to quality indicators, improve verification processes, and aim to institutionalize the approach.

Financial incentives and maternal health: where do we go from here?

Health financing strategies that incorporate financial incentives are being applied in many low- and middle-income countries, and improving maternal and neonatal health is often a central goal. As yet, there have been few reviews of such programmes and their impact on maternal health. The US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives was convened on 24-25 April 2012 to address this gap. This article, the final in a series assessing the effects of financial incentives--performance-based incentives (PBIs), insurance, user fee exemption programmes, conditional cash transfers, and vouchers--summarizes the evidence and discusses issues of context, programme design and implementation, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. We suggest key areas to consider when designing and implementing financial incentive programmes for enhancing maternal health and highlight gaps in evidence that could benefit from additional research. Although the methodological rigor of studies varies, the evidence, overall, suggests that financial incentives can enhance demand for and improve the supply of maternal health services. Definitive evidence demonstrating a link between incentives and improved health outcomes is lacking; however, the evidence suggests that financial incentives can increase the quantity and quality of maternal health services and address health systems and financial barriers that prevent women from accessing and providers from delivering quality, lifesaving maternal healthcare.

Performance-based incentives to improve health status of mothers and newborns: what does the evidence show?

Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers' performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.

Performance-based incentives for health: a way to improve tuberculosis detection and treatment completion?

This paper analyzes the use of financial and material incentives for patients and healthcare providers to improve tuberculosis detection and successful completion of treatment. Incentives, which can include money, food and other material goods, directed toward patients are conditional on completing steps in the treatment process to ensure adherence to the lengthy treatment schedule. Incentives directed at providers seek to improve the quality of diagnosis, expand access to treatment, and improve teamwork.