RESUMO
Many health economists recommend that employers provide employees with a risk-adjusted choice among competing health insurance plans. However, formal risk adjustment is rarely if ever used by employers. This paper examines a range of health benefit design options available to employers, focusing attention not only on risk adjustment but also on its alternatives. We argue that while formal risk adjustment is rare, employers commonly use strategies that accomplish some of the same objectives at less cost.
Assuntos
Participação da Comunidade/economia , Planos de Assistência de Saúde para Empregados/economia , Competição em Planos de Saúde/economia , Setor Privado/economia , Risco Ajustado/estatística & dados numéricos , Análise Atuarial , Custos de Saúde para o Empregador , Honorários e Preços , Humanos , Seleção Tendenciosa de Seguro , Estados UnidosRESUMO
We explore optimal cost-sharing provisions for insurance contracts when individuals have observable, severe diseases with a discrete number of medically appropriate treatment options. Variation in preferences for alternative treatments is unobserved by the insurer and non-contractible. Interest in such situations is increasingly common, exemplified by disease carve-out programs and shared decision-making (SDM) tools. We demonstrate that optimal insurance charges a copay to patients choosing the high-cost treatment and provides consumers of the low-cost treatment a cash payment. A simulation of the effect of such a policy, based on prostate cancer, indicates a substantial reduction in moral hazard.
Assuntos
Custo Compartilhado de Seguro , Gerenciamento Clínico , Seguro Saúde/economia , Satisfação do Paciente/economia , Tomada de Decisões , Dedutíveis e Cosseguros/economia , Honorários e Preços , Humanos , Seguro Saúde/normas , Masculino , Modelos Econométricos , Princípios Morais , Neoplasias da Próstata/economia , Neoplasias da Próstata/terapiaRESUMO
The authors review the financial regulations imposed on health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that participate in the Medicare+Choice program and identify elements of the regulations that may discourage HMO participation in the program. Modifications of the regulations are proposed that could encourage the participation of HMOs without affording them excessive profit. The modifications include smoothing and bounding profit estimates and authorizing and encouraging expanded use of benefit stabilization funds.