Separation and not residency permit restores function in resignation syndrome: a retrospective cohort study.

Despite poor treatment results, a family-oriented approach and the securing of residency have been deemed essential to recovery from resignation syndrome (RS). In a retrospective cohort study, we evaluated an alternative method involving environmental therapy, with patients separated from their parents, while actively abstaining from involving the asylum process in treatment. We examined medical records, social services acts, and residential care home acts from 13 individuals treated at Solsidan residential care home between 2005 and 2020. Severity and outcome were assessed with Clinical Global Impression, Severity and Improvement subscales. Thirteen participants were included and out of these nine (69%) recovered, i.e. they very much or much improved. Out of the eight that were separated, all recovered, also, one non-separated recovered. The difference in outcome between subjects separated and not was significant (p = 0.007). Moreover, out of the five which received a residency permit during treatment, one recovered whereas four did not. The difference in outcome between subjects granted residency and not was significant (p = 0.007). The data revealed three (23%) cases of simulation where parents were suspected to have instigated symptoms. Our evaluation suggests that separation from parents and abstaining from invoking residency permit could be essential components when treating RS. Relying on a family-oriented approach, and residency could even be detrimental to recovery. The examined intervention was successful also in cases of probable malingering by proxy.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients.

BACKGROUND: Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches. MAIN BODY: We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity. CONCLUSIONS: Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

Spatiotemporal neuroscience - what is it and why we need it.

The excellent commentaries to our target paper hint upon three main issues, (i) spatiotemporal neuroscience; (ii) neuro-mental relationship; and (iii) mind, brain, and world relationship. (i) We therefore discuss briefly the history of Spatiotemporal Neuroscience. Distinguishing it from Cognitive Neuroscience and related branches (like Affective, Social, etc. Neuroscience), Spatiotemporal Neuroscience can be characterized by focus on brain activity (rather than brain function), spatiotemporal relationship (rather than input-cognition-output relationship), and structure (rather than stimuli/contents). (ii) Taken in this sense, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience allows one to conceive the neuro-mental relationship in dynamic spatiotemporal terms that complement and extend (rather than contradict) their cognitive characterization. (iii) Finally, more philosophical issues like the need to dissolve the mind-body problem (and replace it by the world-brain relation) and the question for different levels of time including their nestedness are discussed.

Towards Establishing Criteria for the Ethical Analysis of Artificial Intelligence.

Ethical reflection on Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a priority. In this article, we propose a methodological model for a comprehensive ethical analysis of some uses of AI, notably as a replacement of human actors in specific activities. We emphasize the need for conceptual clarification of relevant key terms (e.g., intelligence) in order to undertake such reflection. Against that background, we distinguish two levels of ethical analysis, one practical and one theoretical. Focusing on the state of AI at present, we suggest that regardless of the presence of intelligence, the lack of morally relevant features calls for caution when considering the role of AI in some specific human activities.

Anthropomorphism in AI.

AI research is growing rapidly raising various ethical issues related to safety, risks, and other effects widely discussed in the literature. We believe that in order to adequately address those issues and engage in a productive normative discussion it is necessary to examine key concepts and categories. One such category is anthropomorphism. It is a well-known fact that AI's functionalities and innovations are often anthropomorphized (i.e., described and conceived as characterized by human traits). The general public's anthropomorphic attitudes and some of their ethical consequences (particularly in the context of social robots and their interaction with humans) have been widely discussed in the literature. However, how anthropomorphism permeates AI research itself (i.e., in the very language of computer scientists, designers, and programmers), and what the epistemological and ethical consequences of this might be have received less attention. In this paper we explore this issue. We first set the methodological/theoretical stage, making a distinction between a normative and a conceptual approach to the issues. Next, after a brief analysis of anthropomorphism and its manifestations in the public, we explore its presence within AI research with a particular focus on brain-inspired AI. Finally, on the basis of our analysis, we identify some potential epistemological and ethical consequences of the use of anthropomorphic language and discourse within the AI research community, thus reinforcing the need of complementing the practical with a conceptual analysis.

Is temporo-spatial dynamics the "common currency" of brain and mind? In Quest of "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience".

Neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of mental phenomena like self, consciousness, and perception. However, the "common currency" shared between neuronal and mental activity, brain and mind, remains yet unclear. In this article, we propose that the dynamics of time and space provides a "common currency" that connects neuronal and mental features. Time and space are here understood in a dynamic context (as in contemporary physics): that is, in terms of the way the brain's spontaneous activity constructs its spatial and temporal relationships, for instance in terms of functional connectivity and different frequencies of fluctuations. Recruiting recent empirical evidence, we show that the different ways in which the spontaneous activity constructs its "inner time and space" are manifested in distinct mental features. Specifically, we demonstrate how spatiotemporal mechanisms like spatiotemporal repertoire, integration, and speed yield mental features like consciousness, self, and time speed perception. The focus on the brain's spatiotemporal mechanisms entails what we describe as "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience". Spatiotemporal Neuroscience conceives neuronal activity in terms of its temporo-spatial dynamics rather than its various functions (e.g., cognitive, affective, social, etc.) as in other branches of neuroscience (as distinguished from Cognitive, Affective, Cultural, Social, etc. Neuroscience). That allows Spatiotemporal Neuroscience to take into view the so-called 'spatio-temporality' of mental features including their non-causal, intrinsic and transformative relationship with neuronal features. In conclusion, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience opens the door to investigate and ultimately reveal the brain's own temporo-spatial dynamics as the hitherto missing "common currency" of neuronal and mental features.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach.

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

The Human Brain Project: Responsible Brain Research for the Benefit of Society.

Recognizing that its research may raise various ethical, social, and philosophical issues, the HBP has made the identification, examination, and management of those issues a top priority. The Ethics and Society subproject is part of the core research project.

Drug Addiction: From Neuroscience to Ethics.

In the present paper, we suggest a potential new ethical analysis of addiction focusing on the relationship between aware and unaware processing in the brain. We take the case of the opioids epidemics to argue that a consideration of both aware and unaware processing provides a more comprehensive ethical framework to discuss the ethical issues raised by addiction. Finally, our hypothesis is that in addition to identified Central Nervous System's neuronal/neurochemical factors contributing to addictive dynamics, the socio-economic status plays a causal role through epigenetic processes, originating the need for additional reward in the brain. This provides a strong base for a socio-political form of responsibility for preventing and managing addiction crisis.

Neuroethics: A Conceptual Approach.

In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific (i.e., neuroscience) and philosophical (i.e., ethics) interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

From Epigenetic Associations to Biological and Psychosocial Explanations in Mental Health.

The development of mental disorders constitutes a complex phenomenon driven by unique social, psychological and biological factors such as genetics and epigenetics, throughout an individual's life course. Both environmental and genetic factors have an impact on mental health phenotypes and act simultaneously to induce changes in brain and behavior. Here, we describe and critically evaluate the current literature on gene-environment interactions and epigenetics on mental health by highlighting recent human and animal studies. We furthermore review some of the main ethical and social implications concerning gene-environment interactions and epigenetics and provide explanations and suggestions on how to move from statistical and epigenetic associations to biological and psychological explanations within a multi-disciplinary and integrative approach of understanding mental health.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues.

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

The ethical relevance of the unconscious.

BACKGROUND: Ethical analyses of disorders of consciousness traditionally focus on residual awareness. Going one step further, this paper explores the potential ethical relevance of the unawareness retained by patients with disorders of consciousness, focusing specifically on the ethical implications of the description of the unconscious provided by recent scientific research. METHODS: A conceptual methodology is used, based on the review and analysis of relevant scientific literature on the unconscious and the logical argumentation in favour of the ethical conclusions. RESULTS: Two conditions (experiential wellbeing and having interests) that are generally considered critical components in the ethical discussion of patients with disorders of consciousness might arguably be both conscious and unconscious. CONCLUSIONS: The unconscious, as well as consciousness, should be taken into account in the ethical discussions of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Neuroscience of Childhood Poverty: Evidence of Impacts and Mechanisms as Vehicles of Dialog With Ethics.

Several studies have identified associations between poverty and development of self-regulation during childhood, which is broadly defined as those skills involved in cognitive, emotional, and stress self-regulation. These skills are influenced by different individual and contextual factors at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, family, social, and cultural). Available evidence suggests that the influences of those biological, psychosocial, and sociocultural factors on emotional and cognitive development can vary according to the type, number, accumulation of risks, and co-occurrence of adverse circumstances that are related to poverty, the time in which these factors exert their influences, and the individual susceptibility to them. Complementary, during the past three decades, several experimental interventions that were aimed at optimizing development of self-regulation of children who live in poverty have been designed, implemented, and evaluated. Their results suggest that it is possible to optimize different aspects of cognitive performance and that it would be possible to transfer some aspects of these gains to other cognitive domains and academic achievement. We suggest that it is an important task for ethics, notably but not exclusively neuroethics, to engage in this interdisciplinary research domain to contribute analyses of key concepts, arguments, and interpretations. The specific evidence that neuroscience brings to the analyses of poverty and its implications needs to be spelled out in detail and clarified conceptually, notably in terms of causes of and attitudes toward poverty, implications of poverty for brain development, and for the possibilities to reduce and reverse these effects.

Neurotechnological assessment of consciousness disorders: five ethical imperatives.

Disorders of consciousness (DOCs) cause great human suffering and material costs for society. Understanding of these disorders has advanced remarkably in recent years, but uncertainty remains with respect to the diagnostic criteria and standards of care. One of the most serious problems concerns misdiagnoses, their impact on medical decision-making, and on patients' well-being. Recent studies use neurotechnology to assess residual consciousness in DOC patients that traditional behavioral diagnostic criteria are unable to detect. The results show an urgent need to strengthen the development of new diagnostic tools and more refined diagnostic criteria. If residual consciousness may be inferred from robust and reproducible results from neurotechnological communication with DOC patients, this also raises ethical challenges. With reference to the moral notions of beneficence and fundamental rights, five ethical imperatives are here suggested in terms of diagnosis, communication, interpretation of subjective states, adaptation of living conditions, and care.

Los trastornos de conciencia (TC) provocan grandes sufrimientos humanos y costos materiales para la sociedad. La comprensión de estos trastornos ha avanzado significativamente en los últimos años, pero persiste la incertidumbre respecto a los criterios diagnósticos y estándares de atención. Uno de los problemas más serios se refiere al diagnóstico erróneo, su impacto en la toma de decisiones médicas y en el bienestar de los pacientes. Estudios recientes emplean neurotecnología para evaluar la conciencia residual en los pacientes con TC en que los criterios diagnósticos conductuales tradicionales son incapaces de detectarlos. Los resultados muestran una necesidad urgente de fortalecer el desarrollo de nuevas herramientas diagnósticas y criterios diagnósticos más refinados. Si la conciencia residual se puede inferir de resultados sólidos y reproducibles a partir de la comunicación neurotecnológica con pacientes con TC, esto también plantea desafíos éticos.En relación con las nociones morales de beneficencia y derechos fundamentales, aquí se sugieren cinco imperativos éticos en términos del diagnóstico, comunicación, interpretación de los estados subjetivos, adaptación a las condiciones de vida y atención.

Les troubles de la conscience coûtent en souffrance humaine et en matériel pour la société. Ces dernières années, la compréhension de ces troubles a beaucoup progressé, mais les critères diagnostiques et les standards de soins restent à définir. Un des problèmes les plus importants concerne les erreurs de diagnostic, leur impact sur la prise de décision médicale et sur le bien-être des patients. Des études récentes utilisent la neurotechnologie pour évaluer la conscience résiduelle chez les patients ayant des troubles de la conscience ne pouvant être détectés par les critères de diagnostic comportemental traditionnels. Les résultats montrent un besoin urgent de renforcer le développement de nouveaux outils diagnostiques et de critères diagnostiques plus affinés. Si la conscience résiduelle peut être déduite de résultats solides et reproductibles issus de la communication neurotechnologique avec les patients ayant des troubles de la conscience, cela pose toutefois des problèmes éthiques. En référence aux notions morales de bienfaisance et de droits fondamentaux, cinq impératifs éthiques sont ici proposés en termes de diagnostic, de communication, d'interprétation d'états subjectifs, d'adaptation de condition de vie et de soins.

Resignation Syndrome: Catatonia? Culture-Bound?

Resignation syndrome (RS) designates a long-standing disorder predominately affecting psychologically traumatized children and adolescents in the midst of a strenuous and lengthy migration process. Typically a depressive onset is followed by gradual withdrawal progressing via stupor into a state that prompts tube feeding and is characterized by failure to respond even to painful stimuli. The patient is seemingly unconscious. Recovery ensues within months to years and is claimed to be dependent on the restoration of hope to the family. Descriptions of disorders resembling RS can be found in the literature and the condition is unlikely novel. Nevertheless, the magnitude and geographical distribution stand out. Several hundred cases have been reported exclusively in Sweden in the past decade prompting the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare to recognize RS as a separate diagnostic entity. The currently prevailing stress hypothesis fails to account for the regional distribution and contributes little to treatment. Consequently, a re-evaluation of diagnostics and treatment is required. Psychogenic catatonia is proposed to supply the best fit with the clinical presentation. Treatment response, altered brain metabolism or preserved awareness would support this hypothesis. Epidemiological data suggests culture-bound beliefs and expectations to generate and direct symptom expression and we argue that culture-bound psychogenesis can accommodate the endemic distribution. Last, we review recent models of predictive coding indicating how expectation processes are crucially involved in the placebo and nocebo effect, delusions and conversion disorders. Building on this theoretical framework we propose a neurobiological model of RS in which the impact of overwhelming negative expectations are directly causative of the down-regulation of higher order and lower order behavioral systems in particularly vulnerable individuals.