"I pity the TB patient": a mixed methods study assessing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on TB services in two major Indonesian cities and distilling lessons for the future.

INTRODUCTION: In Indonesia, a country with around 280 million people and the second-highest tuberculosis (TB) incidence rate in the world, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on TB care needs careful assessment so that future response strategies can be strengthened. We conducted a study comparing TB testing and treatment rates before and during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, and the reasons for any disruptions to care. METHODS: We conducted retrospective secondary data analysis and qualitative interviews in Yogyakarta and Bandung, Indonesia. Routine data on TB testing and treatment were sourced from the national TB information system operated by the Indonesian Ministry of Health. TB testing and treatment outcomes were compared between two time periods: pre-COVID (2018-19); and during COVID-19 (2020-21). In-depth interviews were conducted with patients and health workers to explore their experiences in accessing and providing TB services during the pandemic. RESULTS: There was a 45% (21 937/39 962) reduction in the number of patients tested for TB during the pandemic compared with pre-COVID-19, while the proportion of TB tests returning a positive result increased from 12% (4733/39 962) to 50% (10 945/21 937). The proportion of TB patients completing treatment increased by 2.6% during the pandemic, yet the proportion cured and the number of patients successfully treated both decreased (by 7% and 4.4%, respectively). Our qualitative interviews highlighted several factors influencing TB service access and delivery, including fear of being diagnosed with COVID-19 during TB-related clinic visits, fear of COVID-19 exposure among patients and health workers, healthcare facilities prioritising COVID-19 over other services, and mandatory mobility restrictions affecting both patients and health workers. CONCLUSION: The COVID-19 pandemic impacted TB testing and treatment outcomes in Bandung and Yogyakarta. Policymakers should consider these findings in designing strategies to ensure TB services are maintained and supported during future health crises.

Understanding the municipal-level design and adaptation of pay-for-performance schemes across two states of Brazil.

The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges, and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple-case study design relying on qualitative data from twenty municipalities from two states in northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal PMAQ laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivised', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivised', and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure the choice of 'who is incentivised' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair, and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

Pay-for-performance for primary health care in Brazil: A comparison with England's Quality Outcomes Framework and lessons for the future.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.

Performance bonuses and the quality of primary health care delivered by family health teams in Brazil: A difference-in-differences analysis.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered. METHODS AND FINDINGS: For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care. CONCLUSIONS: Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

Healthcare under siege: a qualitative study of health-worker responses to targeting and besiegement in Syria.

OBJECTIVES: To explore health-worker perspectives on security, improving safety, managing constrained resources and handling mass casualties during besiegement in Syria. DESIGN: A qualitative study using semi-structured key informant interviews, conducted remotely over WhatsApp and Skype, and analysed thematically using inductive coding. SETTING: Secondary and tertiary health facilities affected by besiegement in Aleppo (from July to December 2016) and Rural Damascus (from August 2013 to February 2018). PARTICIPANTS: Twenty-one male Syrian health-workers and service-users who had experienced besiegement and targeting of their health facilities. RESULTS: Participants described four related challenges of: (i) conflict-related responses, particularly responding to mass casualties; (ii) targeted attack responses, particularly preventing/surviving facility bombings; (iii) besiegement responses, particularly mitigating severe resource constraints; and (iv) chronic risk responses, particularly maintaining emotional resilience. Mass casualty response involved triage and training to prioritise mortality reduction and available resources, for example those with greatest need and likelihood of survival. Targeting response was largely physical, including fortification, working underground, reducing visibility and services dispersal. Besiegement response required resource conservation, for example, controlling consumption, reusing consumables, low-technology equipment, finding alternative supply routes, stockpiling and strengthening available human resources through online trainings and establishing a medical school in Ghouta. Risk responses included managing safety worries, finding value in work and maintaining hope. CONCLUSION: Besieged health-workers were most affected by severe resource constraints and safety concerns while responding to overwhelming mass casualty events. Lessons for targeting/besiegement planning include training staff and preparing for: (i) mass casualties, through local/online health-worker training in triage, emergency response and resource conservation; allowing task-shifting; and providing access to low-technology equipment; (ii) attacks, through strengthened facility security, for example, protection and deterrence through fortification, working underground and reducing visibility; and (iii) besiegement, through ensuring access to internet, electricity and low-technology/reusable equipment; securely stockpiling fuel, medicines and supplies; and establishing alternative supply routes.