Rethinking fast and slow processing in autism.

Following the popularity of dual process models in social and cognitive psychology, there is major interest in the possibility that autism is associated with impaired "fast" intuitive thinking but enhanced "slow" or "rational" deliberative thinking. If correct, this has great potential to help understand various strengths and difficulties characteristic of autism. Previous empirical investigations of this phenomenon, however, are marred by concerns about the measurement of intuitive and deliberative processing, as well as broader problems in clinical psychological science (e.g., small underpowered studies, lack of replication). Making a step change, we conducted four large-scale studies to examine dual processing in autism, including a preregistered comparison of 200 autistic and nonautistic adults. Participants completed contemporary cognitive and self-report measures of intuitive and deliberative processing, as well as a psychometrically robust measure of general cognitive ability. Except for lower self-reported intuitive thinking, we found no unique contributions of autism to intuitive or deliberative thinking across all four studies, as evidenced by frequentist and Bayesian analyses. Overall, these studies indicate that intuitive and deliberative thinking is neither enhanced nor particularly impaired in relation to autism. We deliberate on the implications of these findings for theories of autism and future investigation of strengths and difficulties in autistic people. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Redevelopment of the Predict: Breast Cancer website and recommendations for developing interfaces to support decision-making.

OBJECTIVES: To develop a new interface for the widely used prognostic breast cancer tool: Predict: Breast Cancer. To facilitate decision-making around post-surgery breast cancer treatments. To derive recommendations for communicating the outputs of prognostic models to patients and their clinicians. METHOD: We employed a user-centred design process comprised of background research and iterative testing of prototypes with clinicians and patients. Methods included surveys, focus groups and usability testing. RESULTS: The updated interface now caters to the needs of a wider audience through the addition of new visualisations, instantaneous updating of results, enhanced explanatory information and the addition of new predictors and outputs. A programme of future research was identified and is now underway, including the provision of quantitative data on the adverse effects of adjuvant breast cancer treatments. Based on our user-centred design process, we identify six recommendations for communicating the outputs of prognostic models including the need to contextualise statistics, identify and address gaps in knowledge, and the critical importance of engaging with prospective users when designing communications. CONCLUSIONS: For prognostic algorithms to fulfil their potential to assist with decision-making they need carefully designed interfaces. User-centred design puts patients and clinicians needs at the forefront, allowing them to derive the maximum benefit from prognostic models.

The delay-reward heuristic: What do people expect in intertemporal choice tasks?

Recent research has shown that risk and reward are positively correlated in many environments, and that people have internalized this association as a "risk-reward heuristic": when making choices based on incomplete information, people infer probabilities from payoffs and vice-versa, and these inferences shape their decisions. We extend this work by examining people's expectations about another fundamental trade-off-that between monetary reward and delay. In 2 experiments (total N = 670), we adapted a paradigm previously used to demonstrate the risk-reward heuristic. We presented participants with intertemporal choice tasks in which either the delayed reward or the length of the delay was obscured. Participants inferred larger rewards for longer stated delays, and longer delays for larger stated rewards; these inferences also predicted people's willingness to take the delayed option. In exploratory analyses, we found that older participants inferred longer delays and smaller rewards than did younger ones. All of these results replicated in 2 large-scale pre-registered studies with participants from a different population (total N = 2138). Our results suggest that people expect intertemporal choice tasks to offer a trade-off between delay and reward, and differ in their expectations about this trade-off. This "delay-reward heuristic" offers a new perspective on existing models of intertemporal choice and provides new insights into unexplained and systematic individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification.

Recommendations for designing genetic test reports to be understood by patients and non-specialists.

Patients and non-specialist healthcare professionals are increasingly expected to understand and interpret the results of genetic or genomic testing. These results are currently reported using a variety of templates, containing different amounts, levels, and layouts of information. We set out to establish a set of recommendations for communicating genetic test results to non-expert readers. We employed a qualitative-descriptive study design with user-centred design principles, including a mixture of in-person semi-structured interviews and online questionnaires with patients, healthcare professionals and the general public. The resulting recommendations and example template include providing at-a-glance comprehension of what the test results mean for the patient; suggested next steps; and details of further information and support. Separation and inclusion of technical methodological details enhances non-specialists' understanding, while retaining important information for specialists and the patients' records. The recommendations address the high-level needs of patients and their non-specialist clinicians when receiving genetic test results. These recommendations provide a solid foundation for the major content and structure of reports, and we recommend further engagement with patients and clinicians to tailor reports to specific types of test and results.

Dividing Attention Between Tasks: Testing Whether Explicit Payoff Functions Elicit Optimal Dual-Task Performance.

We test people's ability to optimize performance across two concurrent tasks. Participants performed a number entry task while controlling a randomly moving cursor with a joystick. Participants received explicit feedback on their performance on these tasks in the form of a single combined score. This payoff function was varied between conditions to change the value of one task relative to the other. We found that participants adapted their strategy for interleaving the two tasks, by varying how long they spent on one task before switching to the other, in order to achieve the near maximum payoff available in each condition. In a second experiment, we show that this behavior is learned quickly (within 2-3 min over several discrete trials) and remained stable for as long as the payoff function did not change. The results of this work show that people are adaptive and flexible in how they prioritize and allocate attention in a dual-task setting. However, it also demonstrates some of the limits regarding people's ability to optimize payoff functions.

A re-examination of "bias" in human randomness perception.

Human randomness perception is commonly described as biased. This is because when generating random sequences humans tend to systematically under- and overrepresent certain subsequences relative to the number expected from an unbiased random process. In a purely theoretical analysis we have previously suggested that common misperceptions of randomness may actually reflect genuine aspects of the statistical environment, once cognitive constraints are taken into account which impact on how that environment is actually experienced (Hahn & Warren, Psychological Review, 2009). In the present study we undertake an empirical test of this account, comparing human-generated against unbiased process-generated binary sequences in two experiments. We suggest that comparing human and theoretically unbiased sequences using metrics reflecting the constraints imposed on human experience provides a more meaningful picture of lay people's ability to perceive randomness. Finally, we propose a simple generative model of human random sequence generation inspired by the Hahn and Warren account. Taken together our results question the notion of bias in human randomness perception. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals.

The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value-maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value-maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal.

People With Autism Spectrum Conditions Make More Consistent Decisions.

People with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) show reduced sensitivity to contextual stimuli in many perceptual and cognitive tasks. We investigated whether this also applies to decision making by examining adult participants' choices between pairs of consumer products that were presented with a third, less desirable "decoy" option. Participants' preferences between the items in a given pair frequently switched when the third item in the set was changed, but this tendency was reduced among individuals with ASC, which indicated that their choices were more consistent and conventionally rational than those of control participants. A comparison of people who were drawn from the general population and who varied in their levels of autistic traits revealed a weaker version of the same effect. The reduced context sensitivity was not due to differences in noisy responding, and although the ASC group took longer to make their decisions, this did not account for the enhanced consistency of their choices. The results extend the characterization of autistic cognition as relatively context insensitive to a new domain, and have practical implications for socioeconomic behavior.

Who "believes" in the Gambler's Fallacy and why?

Humans possess a remarkable ability to discriminate structure from randomness in the environment. However, this ability appears to be systematically biased. This is nowhere more evident than in the Gambler's Fallacy (GF)-the mistaken belief that observing an increasingly long sequence of "heads" from an unbiased coin makes the occurrence of "tails" on the next trial ever more likely. Although the GF appears to provide evidence of "cognitive bias," a recent theoretical account (Hahn & Warren, 2009) has suggested the GF might be understandable if constraints on actual experience of random sources (such as attention and short term memory) are taken into account. Here we test this experiential account by exposing participants to 200 outcomes from a genuinely random (p = .5) Bernoulli process. All participants saw the same overall sequence; however, we manipulated experience across groups such that the sequence was divided into chunks of length 100, 10, or 5. Both before and after the exposure, participants (a) generated random sequences and (b) judged the randomness of presented sequences. In contrast to other accounts in the literature, the experiential account suggests that this manipulation will lead to systematic differences in postexposure behavior. Our data were strongly in line with this prediction and provide support for a general account of randomness perception in which biases are actually apt reflections of environmental statistics under experiential constraints. This suggests that deeper insight into human cognition may be gained if, instead of dismissing apparent biases as failings, we assume humans are rational under constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record