RESUMO
Although government banks are frequently associated with political capture and resource misallocation, they may be well-positioned during times of crisis to provide countercyclical support. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazil's government banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of government banks received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes relative to localities with a low share of government banks. While increased government bank lending mitigated an economic downturn, we find that this lending was politically targeted, inefficiently allocated, and reduced productivity growth.
RESUMO
Localities in developed countries often enact regulations to deter low-income households from moving in. In developing countries, such restrictions lead to the emergence of informal housing sectors. To deter low-income migrants, localities in developing countries withhold public services to the informal housing sector. Using a large sample of Brazilian localities, we examine migration and exclusion, focusing on the public provision of water to small houses where low-income migrants are likely to live. Withholding water connections reduces the locality growth rate, particularly of low-education households. In terms of service provision, during dictatorship in Brazil, we find evidence of strategic exclusion, where localities appear to withhold services to deter in-migration. We also find evidence of strategic interactions among localities within metro areas in their setting of service levels: if one locality provides more services to migrant households, other localities respond by withholding service.