On abstract goals' perverse effects on proxies: The dynamics of unattainability.

Proxies should not be classified as failures or successes because, in most cases, they are impossible translations of abstract, polysemous goals to supposedly univocal concrete measures. The "success" or "failure" of a proxy does not depend on its actual accuracy as a valid indicator of goal attainment, but on a social system's willingness to maintain an illusion of its accomplishment.

Basic emotions do not reliably co-occur with predicted facial expressions: Reply to Witkower et al. (2023).

Replies to the comments made by Witkower, et al. (see record 2023-63008-004) on the current authors original article (see record 2022-03375-001). A core assumption of Basic Emotion Theory is that the conscious experience of a basic emotion co-occurs with a facial expression signal of that same emotion. Our analysis of available evidence found co-occurrence in only 13% of cases-thus calling into question basic and applied studies in which the emotion is inferred from the face. Our second analysis counted as a co-occurrence even when only part of the facial signal was observed. Co-occurrence was found in only 23% of cases. Witkower et al.'s rebuttal failed to undermine these important findings. They claimed that similar degrees of correlation are found in other areas of psychology, but they confuse co-occurrence of two intrinsic manifestations of the same event (expression and experience of emotion) with the correlation between one potential causal antecedent and an observed event (e.g., effects of meditation on anxiety). Our results stand as a major challenge to Basic Emotion Theory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Do emotions result in their predicted facial expressions? A meta-analysis of studies on the co-occurrence of expression and emotion.

That basic emotions produce a facial signal would-if true-provide a foundation for a science of emotion. Here, random-effects meta-analyses tested whether happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, and surprise each co-occurs with its predicted facial signal. The first meta-analysis examined only those studies that measured full expressions through Facial Actions Coding System (FACS). Average co-occurrence effect size was .13. The second meta-analysis included both full and partial expressions, as measured by FACS or another system. Average co-occurrence effect size rose to .23. A third meta-analysis estimated the Pearson correlation between intensity of the reported emotion and intensity of the predicted facial expression. Average correlation was .30. Overall, co-occurrence and correlation were greatest for disgust, least for surprise. What are commonly known as the six classic basic emotions do not reliably co-occur with their predicted facial signal. Heterogeneity between samples was found, suggesting a more complex account of facial expressions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Distinct facial expressions represent pain and pleasure across cultures.

Real-world studies show that the facial expressions produced during pain and orgasm-two different and intense affective experiences-are virtually indistinguishable. However, this finding is counterintuitive, because facial expressions are widely considered to be a powerful tool for social interaction. Consequently, debate continues as to whether the facial expressions of these extreme positive and negative affective states serve a communicative function. Here, we address this debate from a novel angle by modeling the mental representations of dynamic facial expressions of pain and orgasm in 40 observers in each of two cultures (Western, East Asian) using a data-driven method. Using a complementary approach of machine learning, an information-theoretic analysis, and a human perceptual discrimination task, we show that mental representations of pain and orgasm are physically and perceptually distinct in each culture. Cross-cultural comparisons also revealed that pain is represented by similar face movements across cultures, whereas orgasm showed distinct cultural accents. Together, our data show that mental representations of the facial expressions of pain and orgasm are distinct, which questions their nondiagnosticity and instead suggests they could be used for communicative purposes. Our results also highlight the potential role of cultural and perceptual factors in shaping the mental representation of these facial expressions. We discuss new research directions to further explore their relationship to the production of facial expressions.

"The Fathers have eaten Sour Grapes, and the Children's Teeth are set on Edge": Differentiating the Emotional Experiences of Grima and Disgust.

The Spanish term grima refers to the aversive emotional experience typically evoked when one hears, for example, a scratch upon a chalkboard. Whereas Spanish speakers can distinguish between the concepts of grima and disgust, English and German speakers lack a specific word for this experience and typically label grima as disgust. In the present research, we tested the degree of differentiation between the two aversive experiences in Spanish speakers. Study 1 addressed whether Spanish speakers apply spontaneously the term grima rather than disgust to grima-eliciting experiences. Study 2 systematically addressed the constitutive features of both grima and disgust by mapping their internal structures. Results showed that the noise of a chulk on a blackboard and scraping fingernails on a blackboard, along with the physical manifestation of goose bumps, were the most typical features of the category. Whereas both grima and disgust were characterized as unpleasant sensations, t(193) = 1.21, ns, they differed with respect to their physiological signatures (e.g., producing shivers was characteristic of grima, as compared to disgust, t(194) = 12.02, p = .001, d = 1.72) and elicitors (e.g., a fractured bone was a characteristic elicitor of grima; t(193) = 5.78, p = .001, d = .83, whereas pederasts and pedophiles were the most characteristic elicitor of disgust, t(193) = 8.46, p = .001, d = 1.21). Thus, both grima and disgust are conceptually different experiences, whose shared features hold different degrees of typicality. The present research suggests that grima and disgust are two distinct emotion concepts.

"The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge": differentiating the emotional experiences of grima and disgust

The Spanish term grima refers to the aversive emotional experience typically evoked when one hears, for example, a scratch upon a chalkboard. Whereas Spanish speakers can distinguish between the concepts of grima and disgust, English and German speakers lack a specific word for this experience and typically label grima as disgust. In the present research, we tested the degree of differentiation between the two aversive experiences in Spanish speakers. Study 1 addressed whether Spanish speakers apply spontaneously the term grima rather than disgust to grima-eliciting experiences. Study 2 systematically addressed the constitutive features of both grima and disgust by mapping their internal structures. Results showed that the noise of a chulk on a blackboard and scraping fingernails on a blackboard, along with the physical manifestation of goose bumps, were the most typical features of the category. Whereas both grima and disgust were characterized as unpleasant sensations, t(193) = 1.21, ns, they differed with respect to their physiological signatures (e.g., producing shivers was characteristic of grima, as compared to disgust, t(194) = 12.02, p = .001, d = 1.72) and elicitors (e.g., a fractured bone was a characteristic elicitor of grima; t(193) = 5.78, p = .001, d = .83, whereas pederasts and pedophiles were the most characteristic elicitor of disgust, t(193) = 8.46, p = .001, d = 1.21). Thus, both grima and disgust are conceptually different experiences, whose shared features hold different degrees of typicality. The present research suggests that grima and disgust are two distinct emotion concepts

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Grima: A Distinct Emotion Concept?

People experience an unpleasant sensation when hearing a scratch on a board or plate. The present research focuses on this aversive experience known in Spanish as 'grima' with no equivalent term in English and German. We hypothesized that this aversive experience constitutes a distinctive, separate emotional concept. In Study 1, we found that the affective meaning of 'grima' was closer to disgust than to other emotion concepts. Thus, in Study 2 we explored the features of grima and compared them with disgust. As grima was reported to be predominantly elicited by certain auditory stimuli and associated with a distinctive physiological pattern, Study 3 used direct measures of physiological arousal to test the assumption of a distinctive pattern of physiological responses elicited by auditory stimuli of grima and disgust, and found different effects on heart rate but not on skin conductance. In Study 4, we hypothesized that only participants with an implementation intention geared toward down-regulating grima would be able to successfully weaken the grima- but not disgust- experience. Importantly, this effect was specific as it held true for the grima-eliciting sounds only, but did not affect disgust-related sounds. Finally, Study 5 found that English and German speakers lack a single accessible linguistic label for the pattern of aversive reactions termed by Spanish speaking individuals as 'grima', whereas the elicitors of other emotions were accessible and accurately identified by German, English, as well as Spanish speakers.

Recognizing spontaneous facial expressions of emotion in a small-scale society of Papua New Guinea.

We report 2 studies on how residents of Papua New Guinea interpret facial expressions produced spontaneously by other residents of Papua New Guinea. Members of a small-scale indigenous society, Trobrianders (Milne Bay Province; N = 32, 14 to 17 years) were shown 5 facial expressions spontaneously produced by members of another small-scale indigenous society, Fore (Eastern Highlands Province) that Ekman had photographed, labeled, and published in The Face of Man (1980), each as an expression of a basic emotion: happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, and disgust. Trobrianders were asked to use any word they wanted to describe how each person shown felt and to provide valence and arousal ratings. Other Trobrianders (N = 24, 12 to 14 years) were shown the same photographs but asked to choose their response from a short list. In both studies, agreement with Ekman's predicted labels was low: 0% to 16% and 13% to 38% of observers, respectively. (PsycINFO Database Record

The fear gasping face as a threat display in a Melanesian society.

Theory and research show that humans attribute both emotions and intentions to others on the basis of facial behavior: A gasping face can be seen as showing "fear" and intent to submit. The assumption that such interpretations are pancultural derives largely from Western societies. Here, we report two studies conducted in an indigenous, small-scale Melanesian society with considerable cultural and visual isolation from the West: the Trobrianders of Papua New Guinea. Our multidisciplinary research team spoke the vernacular and had extensive prior fieldwork experience. In study 1, Trobriand adolescents were asked to attribute emotions, social motives, or both to a set of facial displays. Trobrianders showed a mixed and variable attribution pattern, although with much lower agreement than studies of Western samples. Remarkably, the gasping face (traditionally considered a display of fear and submission in the West) was consistently matched to two unpredicted categories: anger and threat. In study 2, adolescents were asked to select the face that was threatening; Trobrianders chose the "fear" gasping face whereas Spaniards chose an "angry" scowling face. Our findings, consistent with functional approaches to animal communication and observations made on threat displays in small-scale societies, challenge the Western assumption that "fear" gasping faces uniformly express fear or signal submission across cultures.

Reading emotions from faces in two indigenous societies.

That all humans recognize certain specific emotions from their facial expression-the Universality Thesis-is a pillar of research, theory, and application in the psychology of emotion. Its most rigorous test occurs in indigenous societies with limited contact with external cultural influences, but such tests are scarce. Here we report 2 such tests. Study 1 was of children and adolescents (N = 68; aged 6-16 years) of the Trobriand Islands (Papua New Guinea, South Pacific) with a Western control group from Spain (N = 113, of similar ages). Study 2 was of children and adolescents (N = 36; same age range) of Matemo Island (Mozambique, Africa). In both studies, participants were shown an array of prototypical facial expressions and asked to point to the person feeling a specific emotion: happiness, fear, anger, disgust, or sadness. The Spanish control group matched faces to emotions as predicted by the Universality Thesis: matching was seen on 83% to 100% of trials. For the indigenous societies, in both studies, the Universality Thesis was moderately supported for happiness: smiles were matched to happiness on 58% and 56% of trials, respectively. For other emotions, however, results were even more modest: 7% to 46% in the Trobriand Islands and 22% to 53% in Matemo Island. These results were robust across age, gender, static versus dynamic display of the facial expressions, and between- versus within-subjects design. (PsycINFO Database Record

False recognition of facial expressions of emotion: causes and implications.

This article examines the importance of semantic processes in the recognition of emotional expressions, through a series of three studies on false recognition. The first study found a high frequency of false recognition of prototypical expressions of emotion when participants viewed slides and video clips of nonprototypical fearful and happy expressions. The second study tested whether semantic processes caused false recognition. The authors found that participants made significantly higher error rates when asked to detect expressions that corresponded to semantic labels than when asked to detect visual stimuli. Finally, given that previous research reported that false memories are less prevalent in younger children, the third study tested whether false recognition of prototypical expressions increased with age. The authors found that 67% of eight- to nine-year-old children reported nonpresent prototypical expressions of fear in a fearful context, but only 40% of 6- to 7-year-old children did so. Taken together, these three studies demonstrate the importance of semantic processes in the detection and categorization of prototypical emotional expressions.

Facial and vocal expressions of emotion.

A flurry of theoretical and empirical work concerning the production of and response to facial and vocal expressions has occurred in the past decade. That emotional expressions express emotions is a tautology but may not be a fact. Debates have centered on universality, the nature of emotion, and the link between emotions and expressions. Modern evolutionary theory is informing more models, emphasizing that expressions are directed at a receiver, that the interests of sender and receiver can conflict, that there are many determinants of sending an expression in addition to emotion, that expressions influence the receiver in a variety of ways, and that the receiver's response is more than simply decoding a message.

Spontaneous facial expressions of happy bowlers and soccer fans.

Kraut and Johnston (1979) found surprisingly few smiles in large samples of bowlers and hockey fans during happy events--unless they were simultaneously engaged in social interaction. A limitation of their studies is that there was no direct test of subjects' actual emotional experience at the moments in which they were observed. This article reports two field studies in which emotions were reported by bowlers and by soccer fans. Analysing facial behaviour of those who reported happiness, we found a low probability of smiling in the absence of social interaction (.09 for bowlers and .07 for soccer fans) and a high probability of smiling during social interaction (.78 and .70). These findings question the common assumption that smiles are an indicator of happiness per se, and support the alternative hypothesis of a more complex and indirect relationship between smiling and happiness.

Are facial displays social? Situational influences in the attribution of emotion to facial expressions.

Observers are remarkably consistent in attributing particular emotions to particular facial expressions, at least in Western societies. Here, we suggest that this consistency is an instance of the fundamental attribution error. We therefore hypothesized that a small variation in the procedure of the recognition study, which emphasizes situational information, would change the participants' attributions. In two studies, participants were asked to judge whether a prototypical "emotional facial expression" was more plausibly associated with a social-communicative situation (one involving communication to another person) or with an equally emotional but nonsocial, situation. Participants were found more likely to associate each facial display with the social than with the nonsocial situation. This result was found across all emotions presented (happiness, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness) and for both Spanish and Canadian participants.