When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy.

Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer-Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants' subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer-Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems.

When Type 2 Processing Misfires: The Indiscriminate Use of Statistical Thinking about Reasoning Problems.

Research on dual-process theories of judgment makes abundant use of reasoning problems that present a conflict between Type 1 intuitive responses and Type 2 rule-based responses. However, in many of these reasoning tasks, there is no way to discriminate between the adequate and inadequate use of rules based on logical or probabilistic principles. To experimentally discriminate between the two, we developed a new set of problems: rule-inadequate versions of standard base-rate problems (where base rates are made irrelevant). Across four experiments, we observed conflict sensitivity (measured in terms of response latencies and response confidence) in responses to standard base-rate problems but also in responses to rule-inadequate versions of these problems. This failure to discriminate between real and merely apparent (or spurious) conflict suggests that participants often misuse statistical information and draw conclusions based on irrelevant base rates. We conclude that inferring the sound use of statistical rules from normatively correct responses to standard conflict problems may be unwarranted when this kind of reasoning bias is not controlled for.

Perceived Causes and Attitudes Regarding Overindebtedness and Their Effects on Public Agreement With Government Financial Aid.

In order to better understand how the problem of overindebtedness is perceived from a laypeople standpoint, Study 1 inquired both overindebted and non-overindebted consumers on the perceived causes of and attitudes toward the overindebted. Situational and dispositional factors were perceived to have similar impact as causes of overindebtedness, but non-overindebted consumers showed stronger agreement with those causes than overindebted consumers. Regarding attitudes, non-overindebted consumers tended to blame overindebted people for their situation rather than perceiving them as victims, whereas overindebted consumers showed the opposite pattern. Study 2 used a sample of (non-overindebted) consumers to assess the impact of perceived causes of overindebtedness, attitudes toward the overindebted, and political orientation on public support of government policies for aiding overindebted people. We discuss the contributions of the present findings to design public policies aimed at aiding overindebted households that are more aligned with the beliefs and attitudes of the general public.

On the Relation Between Over-Indebtedness and Well-Being: An Analysis of the Mechanisms Influencing Health, Sleep, Life Satisfaction, and Emotional Well-Being.

This paper aims to explore the association between over-indebtedness and two facets of well-being - life satisfaction and emotional well-being. Although prior research has associated over-indebtedness with lower life satisfaction, this study contributes to the extant literature by revealing its effects on emotional well-being, which is a crucial component of well-being that has received less attention. Besides subjective well-being (SWB), reported health, and sleep quality were also assessed. The findings suggest that over-indebted (compared to non-over-indebted) consumers have lower life satisfaction and emotional well-being, as well as poorer (reported) health and sleep quality. Furthermore, over-indebtedness impacts life satisfaction and emotional well-being through different mechanisms. Consumers decreased perceived control accounts for the impact of over-indebtedness on both facets of well-being (as well as on reported health and sleep). Financial well-being (a specific component of life satisfaction), partly mediates the impact of indebtedness status on overall life satisfaction. The current study contributes to research focusing on the relationship between indebtedness, well-being, health, and sleep quality, and provides relevant theoretical and practical implications.

Attitudes Toward Money and Control Strategies of Financial Behavior: A Comparison Between Overindebted and Non-overindebted Consumers.

This paper addresses whether overindebted and non-overindebted consumers differ in their attitude toward money (specifically, the degree to which consumers care about money and feel difficulties keeping track of their money) and how this attitude impacts three different financial behavior categories: record keeping (e.g., recording spending in writing), adjusting balance (e.g., trying to find ways to decrease one's expenses to match income), and monitoring balance (e.g., monitoring one's spending to see if it is in line with what is expected). Overindebted consumers were recruited via an NGO for consumer defense and were categorized (whenever possible) into two subgroups: consumers who became overindebted due to internal causes (e.g., bad financial management) and consumers who became overindebted due to external causes (e.g., unemployment). Non-overindebted consumers were a convenience sample. Non-overindebted consumers showed more positive attitudes toward money than both groups of overindebted consumers and overindebted due to external causes showed more positive attitudes than overindebted consumers due to internal causes. All groups share similar financial management behaviors except for monitoring balance, which was more frequent among non-overindebted consumers. Furthermore, a regression analysis indicates that money attitudes helped explain financial behavior differences between consumers above and beyond their indebtedness status. Consumers' attitude predicted financial behaviors, even when controlling for relevant socioeconomic variables (education, income, age, and gender). Further analyses comparing money attitudes and financial behavior for the three subgroups (non-overindebted, overindebted due to internal causes, and overindebted due to external causes) showed no differences.

A diffusion model analysis of belief bias: Different cognitive mechanisms explain how cognitive abilities and thinking styles contribute to conflict resolution in reasoning.

Recent results have challenged the widespread assumption of dual process models of belief bias that sound reasoning relies on slow, careful reflection, whereas biased reasoning is based on fast intuition. Instead, parallel process models of reasoning suggest that rule- and belief-based problem features are processed in parallel and that reasoning problems that elicit a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features may also elicit more than one Type 1 response. This has important implications for individual-differences research on reasoning, because rule-based responses by certain individuals may reflect that these individuals were either more likely to give a rule-based default response or that they successfully inhibited and overrode a belief-based default response. In two studies, we used the diffusion model to describe decision making in a transitive reasoning task. In Study 1, 41 participants were asked to evaluate conclusions based on their validity. In Study 2, 133 participants evaluated conclusions based on their validity or believability. We tested which diffusion model parameters reflected conflict resolution and related those model parameters to individual differences in cognitive abilities and thinking styles. Individual differences in need for cognition predicted successful conflict resolution under logic instruction, which suggests that a disposition to engage in reflective thinking facilitates the inhibition and override of Type 1 responses. Intelligence, however, was negatively related to successful conflict resolution under belief instruction, which suggests that individuals with high cognitive abilities quickly generated a higher-level logical response that interfered with their ability to evaluate lower-level intrinsic problem features. Taken together, this double dissociation indicates that cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect the processing of conflict information through different mechanisms and at different stages: Greater cognitive abilities facilitate the efficient creation of decoupled problem representations, whereas a greater disposition to engage in critical thinking facilitates the detection and override of Type 1 responses.

Memory illusions and category malleability: False recognition for goal-derived reorganizations of common categories.

Four studies explore semantic memory intrusions for goal-derived subcategories (e.g., "sports good for backache") embedded in taxonomic categories (e.g., "sports"). Study 1 presented hybrid lists (composed of typical items from both representations: taxonomic categories and subcategories) together with names of subcategories, names of taxonomic categories, or with no names. Subcategory names produced levels of false recognitions for critical lures from subcategories comparable with critical lures from taxonomic categories. Study 2 presented lists of exemplars either from taxonomic categories or subcategories (between participants). Lists of subcategories paired with their names produced higher levels of false recognition for subcategories lures compared with taxonomic lures. Study 3 replicated this result and showed that even though distinctiveness of taxonomic lures in a subcategory context (i.e., subcategory list with a subcategory name) may facilitate rejection of these lures, subcategory lures were still more falsely recognized than were taxonomic lures when retrieval monitoring was hindered through speeded recognition. Study 4 replicated the results with lists in which production frequency was better controlled and with a larger sample allowing for increased power of the test. Although confirming the critical role of preexistent categorical structures in the generation of false memories, results show that false memories for goal-derived subcategories can occur with the same frequency as false memories stemming from better established taxonomic categories. Such results broaden the scope of occurrence of false memories to goal-derived semantic organizations, which are often closer to categorizations used in real-world environments.

Metacognitive myopia in change detection: A collective approach to overcome a persistent anomaly.

Going beyond the origins of cognitive biases, which have been the focus of continued research, the notion of metacognitive myopia refers to the failure to monitor, control, and correct for biased inferences at the metacognitive level. Judgments often follow the given information uncritically, even when it is easy to find out or explicitly explained that information samples are misleading or invalid. The present research is concerned with metacognitive myopia in judgments of change. Participants had to decide whether pairs of binomial samples were drawn from populations with decreasing, equal, or increasing proportions p of a critical feature. Judgments of p changes were strongly affected by changes in absolute sample size n, such that only increases (decreases) in p that came along with increasing (decreasing) n were readily detected. Across 4 experiments these anomalies persisted even though the distinction of p and n was strongly emphasized through outcome feedback and full debriefing (Experiment 1-4), simultaneous presentation (Experiments 2-4), and recoding of experienced samples into descriptive percentages (Experiment 3-4). In Experiment 4, a joint attempt was made by 10 scientists working in 7 different institutions to develop an effective debiasing training, suggesting how multilab-collaboration might improve the quality of science in the early stage of operational research designing. Despite significant improvements in change judgments, debiasing treatments did not eliminate the anomalies. Possible ways of dealing with the metacognitive deficit are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Inferential Costs of Trait Centrality in Impression Formation: Organization in Memory and Misremembering.

An extension of the DRM paradigm was used to study the impact of central traits (Asch, 1946) in impression formation. Traits corresponding to the four clusters of the implicit theory of personality-intellectual, positive and negative; and social, positive and negative (Rosenberg et al., 1968)-were used to develop lists containing several traits of one cluster and one central trait prototypical of the opposite cluster. Participants engaging in impression formation relative to participants engaging in memorization not only produced higher levels of false memories corresponding to the same cluster of the list traits but, under response time pressure at retrieval, also produced more false memories of the cluster corresponding to the central trait. We argue that the importance of central traits stems from their ability to activate their corresponding semantic space within a specialized associative memory structure underlying the implicit theory of personality.

Ad hoc categories and false memories: Memory illusions for categories created on-the-spot.

Three experiments were designed to test whether experimentally created ad hoc associative networks evoke false memories. We used the DRM (Deese, Roediger, McDermott) paradigm with lists of ad hoc categories composed of exemplars aggregated toward specific goals (e.g., going for a picnic) that do not share any consistent set of features. Experiment 1 revealed considerable levels of false recognitions of critical words from ad hoc categories. False recognitions occurred even when the lists were presented without an organizing theme (i.e., the category's label). Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether (a) the ease of identifying the categories' themes, and (b) the lists' backward associative strength could be driving the effect. List identifiability did not correlate with false recognition, and the effect remained even when backward associative strength was controlled for. Experiment 3 manipulated the distractor items in the recognition task to address the hypothesis that the salience of unrelated items could be facilitating the occurrence of the phenomenon. The effect remained when controlling for this source of facilitation. These results have implications for assumptions made by theories of false memories, namely the preexistence of associations in the activation-monitoring framework and the central role of gist extraction in fuzzy-trace theory, while providing evidence of the occurrence of false memories for more dynamic and context-dependent knowledge structures. (PsycINFO Database Record

Seeing the conflict: an attentional account of reasoning errors.

In judgment and reasoning, intuition and deliberation can agree on the same responses, or they can be in conflict and suggest different responses. Incorrect responses to conflict problems have traditionally been interpreted as a sign of faulty problem-solving-an inability to solve the conflict. However, such errors might emerge earlier, from insufficient attention to the conflict. To test this attentional hypothesis, we manipulated the conflict in reasoning problems and used eye-tracking to measure attention. Across several measures, correct responders paid more attention than incorrect responders to conflict problems, and they discriminated between conflict and no-conflict problems better than incorrect responders. These results are consistent with a two-stage account of reasoning, whereby sound problem solving in the second stage can only lead to accurate responses when sufficient attention is paid in the first stage.

Motivated reasoning in the prediction of sports outcomes and the belief in the "hot hand".

The present paper explores the role of motivation to observe a certain outcome in people's predictions, causal attributions, and beliefs about a streak of binary outcomes (basketball scoring shots). In two studies we found that positive streaks (points scored by the participants' favourite team) lead participants to predict the streak's continuation (belief in the hot hand), but negative streaks lead to predictions of its end (gambler's fallacy). More importantly, these wishful predictions are supported by strategic attributions and beliefs about how and why a streak might unfold. Results suggest that the effect of motivation on predictions is mediated by a serial path via causal attributions to the teams at play and belief in the hot hand.

Analytic and heuristic processes in the detection and resolution of conflict.

Previous research with the ratio-bias task found larger response latencies for conflict trials where the heuristic- and analytic-based responses are assumed to be in opposition (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 9/100 ratios of success) when compared to no-conflict trials where both processes converge on the same response (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 11/100). This pattern is consistent with parallel dual-process models, which assume that there is effective, rather than lax, monitoring of the output of heuristic processing. It is, however, unclear why conflict resolution sometimes fails. Ratio-biased choices may increase because of a decline in analytical reasoning (leaving heuristic-based responses unopposed) or to a rise in heuristic processing (making it more difficult for analytic processes to override the heuristic preferences). Using the process-dissociation procedure, we found that instructions to respond logically and response speed affected analytic (controlled) processing (C), leaving heuristic processing (H) unchanged, whereas the intuitive preference for large nominators (as assessed by responses to equal ratio trials) affected H but not C. These findings create new challenges to the debate between dual-process and single-process accounts, which are discussed.

The role of language comprehension in reasoning: how "good-enough" representations induce biases.

Research on reasoning and judgment often uses problems where intuition and deliberation are in conflict, suggesting different solutions. In four studies, change detection was used to investigate whether biased responses to these problems are a consequence of faulty problem-solving or whether they can start earlier, from misrepresenting the information in the premises. After participants solved problems, they were presented with the same problems again in different versions, changing conflict problems to no-conflict problems and vice versa. Participants who were more sensitive to these changes showed better reasoning. These results suggest that biases can start before the problem-solving stage, from misrepresenting the conflict between deliberation and intuition.

The metacognitive advantage of deliberative thinkers: a dual-process perspective on overconfidence.

We explored whether the thinking mode--deliberative versus intuitive--that people use to solve a problem or make a judgment influences their awareness of their own and others' performance. The results of 7 studies support the hypothesis that deliberative thinkers have a metacognitive advantage over intuitive thinkers: Deliberative thinkers are aware of both the deliberative solution and the intuitive alternative; realizing that the deliberative solution is better, they are likely to feel more confident and be more accurate in how they assess their performance and that of others. Intuitive thinkers, on the other hand, are aware only of the intuitive solution; whenever this solution is incorrect, they are unaware of how poor their performance was and how they rank in comparison to others. Implications of this metacognitive advantage are discussed.

"Identify-to-reject": a specific strategy to avoid false memories in the DRM paradigm.

Previous research using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm has shown that lists of associates in which the critical words were easily identified as the themes of the lists produce lower levels of false memories in adults. In an attempt to analyze whether this effect is due to the application of a specific memory-editing process (the identify-to-reject strategy), two experiments manipulated variables that are likely to disrupt this strategy either at encoding or at retrieval. In Experiment 1, lists were presented at a very fast presentation rate to reduce the possibility of identifying the missing critical word as the theme of the list, and in Experiment 2, participants were pressed to give yes/no recognition answers within a very short time. The results showed that both of these manipulations disrupted the identifiability effect, indicating that the identify-to-reject strategy and theme identifiability play a major role in the rejection of false memories in the DRM paradigm.

Friends and Foes of Theory Construction in Psychological Science: Vague Dichotomies, Unified Theories of Cognition, and the New Experimentalism.

Newell (1973) criticized the use of vague theoretical dichotomies to account for narrowly defined empirical phenomena. Many of the problems raised by Newell persist today. We argue that these problems derive not from any peculiarity of psychological science but from the hindrances inherent to empirical theory testing. To show the contemporary relevance of these problems, we present two modern illustrations of the encumbrances faced by dichotomy-based research, we review some attempts to rely on nonempirical criteria to overcome the empirical impediments in theory testing, and we bring the question of theoretical mimicry to bear on these problems. Next, we discuss an alternative to theoretical dichotomies: the Unified Theories of Cognition (Newell, 1990). Finally, we introduce the "new experimentalism" approach in philosophy of science (Mayo, 1996), which provides a new perspective on theory construction in psychological science. We conclude with suggestions on how this new perspective can be implemented.

Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.