Obligation at zero acquaintance.

Social obligation begins far before people establish explicit cooperative relationships. Research on trust suggests that people feel obligated to trust other people even at zero acquaintance, thus trusting complete strangers even though they privately expect to be exploited. Such obligations promote mutually beneficial behavior among strangers and likely help people build goodwill needed for more long-lasting relationships.

The synergistic effect of prosociality and physical attractiveness on mate desirability.

Mate selection requires a prioritization and joint evaluation of different traits present or absent in potential mates. Herein, we focus on two such traits - physical attractiveness and prosociality - and examine how they jointly shape impressions of overall desirability. We report on two related experiments which make use of an innovative methodology combining large samples of raters and target persons (i.e., stimuli) and information on targets' behaviour in economic games representing altruistic behaviour (Experiment 1) and trustworthiness (Experiment 2), two important facets of prosociality. In accordance with predictions derived from a cognitive perspective on mate choice and sexual strategies theory, the results show that the impact of being prosocial on an individual's overall desirability was increased further by them also being physically attractive, but only in long-term mating contexts. Furthermore, we show that men's mate preferences for certain prosocial traits (i.e., trustworthiness) were more context-dependent than women's due to differential evolutionary pressures for ancestral men and women.

Trust at zero acquaintance: more a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue.

Are virtuous people happy all around the world? Civic virtue, antisocial punishment, and subjective well-being across cultures.

Psychological research postulates a positive relationship between virtue and happiness. This article investigates whether this relationship holds in cultures where virtue is not socially appreciated. We specifically focus on civic virtue, which is conceptualized as citizens' honesty in interactions with state institutions (e.g., tax compliance). Two indicators served as measures of the degree to which civic virtue is a part of a country's normative climate: These were each country's mean level of punishment directed at above-average cooperative players in public good experiments and the extent to which citizens justify fraud and free-riding. The results of two studies with data from 13 and 73 countries demonstrate that a positive relationship between civic virtue and happiness/life satisfaction is not universal: In countries where antisocial punishment is common and the level of justification of dishonest behaviors is high, virtuous individuals are no longer happier and more satisfied with life than selfish individuals.

Why are religious people happy? The effect of the social norm of religiosity across countries.

Drawing on social norms theories, we suggest that religiosity substantially increases subjective well-being if it is considered normative in a certain national context. In Study 1, we test this hypothesis using an indicator of a country's social norm of religiosity that includes both the national level of religiosity and the social desirability of religion. The results of a multilevel regression analysis suggest that religious individuals are on average happier and more satisfied with life than non-religious individuals. This effect is stronger in religious countries with dominant negative attitudes towards non-believers. In Study 2, we further examine whether the differences in social recognition of religious and non-religious individuals in countries where religiosity is normative account for this finding. The results of a moderated mediation analysis indicate that in religious countries, religious people report being treated with more respect, which partially explains their higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction.

Behavioral Influences in the Present Tense: On Expressive Versus Instrumental Action.

Seligman and colleagues importantly ask when behavior is produced by the past or the future, but in doing so forget that it can also be guided by the present. We discuss the distinction between expressive influences (i.e., those that attach to behavioral choices in the present) and instrumental ones (i.e., those attached to potential future outcomes of those choices). We argue that expressive influences play a larger role in decision-making, particularly social decisions about trust, than economists and psychologists recognize. As such, any discussion of the influence of past and future on behavior must also include a treatment of influences that exist in the immediate here and now.

Why so cynical?: asymmetric feedback underlies misguided skepticism regarding the trustworthiness of others.

People tend to grossly underestimate the trustworthiness of other people. We tested whether this cynicism grows out of an asymmetry in the feedback people receive when they decide to trust others. When people trust others, they painfully learn when other people prove to be untrustworthy; however, when people refrain from trusting others, they fail to learn of instances when the other person would have honored their trust. Participants saw short videos of other people and had to decide whether to trust each person in an economic game. Participants overall underestimated the trustworthiness of the people they viewed, regardless of whether they were given financial incentives to provide accurate estimates. However, people who received symmetric feedback about the trustworthiness of others (i.e., who received feedback regardless of their own decision to trust) exhibited reduced cynicism relative to those who received no feedback or asymmetric feedback (i.e., who received feedback only after they trusted the other person).