Environmental risks and environmental justice, or how titanic risks are not so titanic after all.

Some of the best-known social scientific theories of risks are those that have been elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Although their arguments differ greatly, they agree in seeing the technologically induced risks of today's "Risk Society" as global - so pervasive that they transcend all socioeconomic as well as geopolitical and national boundaries. Most empirical work, however, provides greater support for a theoretical tradition exemplified by Short and Erikson. In this paper, we argue that many of the technological mega-risks described by Giddens and Beck as "transcending" social boundaries are better described as "Titanic risks," referring not so much to their colossal impact as to the fact that - as was the case for the majority of the victims on the Titanic - actual risks are related to victims' socioeconomic as well as sociogeographic locations. Previous research has shown this to be the case with high-risk technologies, such as nuclear energy and weaponry, and also with localized ones, such as toxic waste disposal. This article illustrates that the same is true even for the most genuinely "global" risks of all, namely those associated with global climate disruption.

Rethinking the threats to scientific balance in contexts of litigation and regulation.

BACKGROUND: Although existing literature does discuss difficulties of doing science in contexts of litigation and regulation, work to date reflects little first-hand experience in such contexts. This gap is understandable but also potentially troubling: Concerns that seem important from afar may or may not match those that are most salient for scientists actually engaged in such work. OBJECTIVES: Drawing on experience on scientific committees and in lawsuits, and using skills developed through doing qualitative fieldwork, I reanalyze past experiences and field notes from the perspective of the 2006 Coronado Conference "Truth and Advocacy in Contexts of Litigation and Regulation." Although I initially shared the kinds of concerns generally stressed by other scientists and science-studies scholars-emphasizing overt, relatively sinister efforts to limit scientific objectivity-neither the literature nor my initial instincts provided adequate preparation for more subtle influences, which actually created stronger pressures toward bias. Particularly unexpected pressures came from consistent deference and praise for independence and credibility. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: The cases discussed in this article are by nature suggestive, not definitive; additional research is clearly needed. Future research, however, needs to focus not just on pressures toward bias that are easy to imagine, but also on those that are easy to overlook.