Alignment in social interactions.

According to the prevailing paradigm in social-cognitive neuroscience, the mental states of individuals become shared when they adapt to each other in the pursuit of a shared goal. We challenge this view by proposing an alternative approach to the cognitive foundations of social interactions. The central claim of this paper is that social cognition concerns the graded and dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal. When individuals reciprocally exchange information about each other's minds processes of alignment unfold over time and across space, creating a social interaction. Not all cases of joint action involve such reciprocal exchange of information. To understand the nature of social interactions, then, we propose that attention should be focused on the manner in which people align words and thoughts, bodily postures and movements, in order to take one another into account and to make full use of socially relevant information.

Examining belief and confidence in schizophrenia.

BACKGROUND: People with psychoses often report fixed, delusional beliefs that are sustained even in the presence of unequivocal contrary evidence. Such delusional beliefs are the result of integrating new and old evidence inappropriately in forming a cognitive model. We propose and test a cognitive model of belief formation using experimental data from an interactive 'Rock Paper Scissors' (RPS) game. METHOD: Participants (33 controls and 27 people with schizophrenia) played a competitive, time-pressured interactive two-player game (RPS). Participants' behavior was modeled by a generative computational model using leaky integrator and temporal difference methods. This model describes how new and old evidence is integrated to form a playing strategy to beat the opponent and to provide a mechanism for reporting confidence in one's playing strategy to win against the opponent. RESULTS: People with schizophrenia fail to appropriately model their opponent's play despite consistent (rather than random) patterns that can be exploited in the simulated opponent's play. This is manifest as a failure to weigh existing evidence appropriately against new evidence. Furthermore, participants with schizophrenia show a 'jumping to conclusions' (JTC) bias, reporting successful discovery of a winning strategy with insufficient evidence. CONCLUSIONS: The model presented suggests two tentative mechanisms in delusional belief formation: (i) one for modeling patterns in other's behavior, where people with schizophrenia fail to use old evidence appropriately, and (ii) a metacognitive mechanism for 'confidence' in such beliefs, where people with schizophrenia overweight recent reward history in deciding on the value of beliefs about the opponent.

From drugs to deprivation: a Bayesian framework for understanding models of psychosis.

INTRODUCTION: Various experimental manipulations, usually involving drug administration, have been used to produce symptoms of psychosis in healthy volunteers. Different drugs produce both common and distinct symptoms. A challenge is to understand how apparently different manipulations can produce overlapping symptoms. We suggest that current Bayesian formulations of information processing in the brain provide a framework that maps onto neural circuitry and gives us a context within which we can relate the symptoms of psychosis to their underlying causes. This helps us to understand the similarities and differences across the common models of psychosis. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The Bayesian approach emphasises processing of information in terms of both prior expectancies and current inputs. A mismatch between these leads us to update inferences about the world and to generate new predictions for the future. According to this model, what we experience shapes what we learn, and what we learn modifies how we experience things. DISCUSSION: This simple idea gives us a powerful and flexible way of understanding the symptoms of psychosis where perception, learning and inference are deranged. We examine the predictions of the cognitive model in light of what we understand about the neuropharmacology of psychotomimetic drugs and thereby attempt to account for the common and the distinctive effects of NMDA receptor antagonists, serotonergic hallucinogens, cannabinoids and dopamine agonists. CONCLUSION: By acknowledging the importance of perception and perceptual aberration in mediating the positive symptoms of psychosis, the model also provides a useful setting in which to consider an under-researched model of psychosis-sensory deprivation.

Delay activity and sensory-motor translation during planned eye or hand movements to visual or tactile targets.

To perform eye or hand movements toward a relevant location, the brain must translate sensory input into motor output. Recent studies revealed segregation between circuits for translating visual information into saccadic or manual movements, but less is known about translation of tactile information into such movements. Using human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a delay paradigm, we factorially crossed sensory modality (vision or touch) and motor effector (eyes or hands) for lateralized movements (gaze shifts to left or right or pressing a left or right button with the corresponding left or right hand located there). We investigated activity in the delay-period between stimulation and response, asking whether the currently relevant side (left or right) during the delay was encoded according to sensory modality, upcoming motor response, or some interactive combination of these. Delay activity mainly reflected the motor response subsequently required. Irrespective of visual or tactile input, we found sustained activity in posterior partial cortex, frontal-eye field, and contralateral visual cortex when subjects would later make an eye movement. For delays prior to manual button-press response, activity increased in contralateral precentral regions, again regardless of stimulated modality. Posterior superior temporal sulcus showed sustained delay activity, irrespective of sensory modality, side, and response type. We conclude that the delay activations reflect translation of sensory signals into effector-specific motor circuits in parietal and frontal cortex (plus an impact on contralateral visual cortex for planned saccades), regardless of cue modality, whereas posterior STS provides a representation that generalizes across both sensory modality and motor effector.

Kinematic cues in perceptual weight judgement and their origins in box lifting.

When accepting a parcel from another person, we are able to use information about that person's movement to estimate in advance the weight of the parcel, that is, to judge its weight from observed action. Perceptual weight judgment provides a powerful method to study our interpretation of other people's actions, but it is not known what sources of information are used in judging weight. We have manipulated full form videos to obtain precise control of the perceived kinematics of a box lifting action, and use this technique to explore the kinematic cues that affect weight judgment. We find that observers rely most on the duration of the lifting movement to judge weight, and make less use of the durations of the grasp phase, when the box is first gripped, or the place phase, when the box is put down. These findings can be compared to the kinematics of natural box lifting behaviour, where we find that the duration of the grasp component is the best predictor of true box weight. The lack of accord between the optimal cues predicted by the natural behaviour and the cues actually used in the perceptual task has implications for our understanding of action observation in terms of a motor simulation. The differences between perceptual and motor behaviour are evidence against a strong version of the motor simulation hypothesis.

Functional neuroanatomy of non-verbal semantic sound processing in humans.

Environmental sounds convey specific meanings and the neural circuitry for their recognition may have preceded language. To dissociate semantic mnemonic from sensory perceptual processing of non-verbal sound stimuli we systematically altered the inherent semantic properties of non-verbal sounds from natural and man-made sources while keeping their acoustic characteristics closely matched. We hypothesized that acoustic analysis of complex non-verbal sounds would be right lateralized in auditory cortex regardless of meaning content and that left hemisphere regions would be engaged when meaningful concept could be extracted. Using H(2) (15)O-PET imaging and SPM data analysis, we demonstrated that activation of the left superior temporal and left parahippocampal gyrus along with left inferior frontal regions was specifically associated with listening to meaningful sounds. In contrast, for both types of sounds, acoustic analysis was associated with activation of right auditory cortices. We conclude that left hemisphere brain regions are engaged when sounds are meaningful or intelligible.

Brain abnormalities underlying altered activation in dyslexia: a voxel based morphometry study.

Voxel-based morphometry was used to assess the consistency among functional imaging and brain morphometry data in developmental dyslexia. Subjects, from three different cultural contexts (UK, France and Italy), were the same as those described in a previous PET activation paper, which revealed a common pattern of reduced activation during reading tasks in the left temporal and occipital lobes. We provide evidence that altered activation observed within the reading system is associated with altered density of grey and white matter of specific brain regions, such as the left middle and inferior temporal gyri and the left arcuate fasciculus. This supports the view that dyslexia is associated with both local grey matter dysfunction and with altered connectivity among phonological/reading areas. The differences were replicable across samples confirming that the neurological disorder underlying dyslexia is the same across the cultures investigated in the study.

Thinking about intentions.

In this fMRI study, we investigated the convergence of underlying neural networks in thinking about a scenario involving one's own intentional action and its consequences and setting up and holding in mind an intention to act. A factorial design was employed comprising two factors: i. Causality (intentional or physical events) and ii. Prospective Memory (present or absent). In each condition, subjects answered questions about various hypothetical scenarios, which related either to the link between the subject's own intentions and consequential actions (Intentional Causality) or to the link between a natural, physical event and its consequences (Physical Causality). A prospective memory task was embedded in half the blocks. In this task, subjects were required to keep in mind an intention (to press a key on seeing a red stimulus background) whilst carrying out the ongoing Causality task. Answering questions about intentional causality versus physical causality activated a network of regions that have traditionally been associated with Theory of Mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the superior temporal sulcus and the temporal poles bilaterally. In addition, the precuneus bordering with posterior cingulate cortex, an area involved in self-awareness and self-related processing, was activated more when thinking about intentional causality. In the prospective memory task, activations were found in the right parietal cortex, frontopolar cortex (BA 10) and precuneus. Different subregions within the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex were activated in both main effects of intentional causality and prospective memory. Therefore, the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex subserves separately thinking about one's own intentions and consequent actions and bearing in mind an intention to make an action. Previous studies have shown that prospective memory, requiring the formation of an intention and the execution of a corresponding action, is associated with decreased activation in the dorsal mPFC, close to the region activated in Theory of Mind tasks. Here, we found that holding in mind an intention to act and at the same time thinking about an intentional action led to reduced activity in a dorsal section of the mPFC. This was a different region from a more anterior, inferior dorsal mPFC region that responded to intentional causality. This suggests that different regions of mPFC play different roles in thinking about intentions.

Multisensory stimulation with or without saccades: fMRI evidence for crossmodal effects on sensory-specific cortices that reflect multisensory location-congruence rather than task-relevance.

During covert attention to peripheral visual targets, presenting a concurrent tactile stimulus at the same location as a visual target can boost neural responses to it, even in sensory-specific occipital areas. Here, we examined any such crossmodal spatial-congruence effects in the context of overt spatial orienting, when saccadic eye-movements were directed to each peripheral target or central fixation maintained. In addition, we tested whether crossmodal spatial-congruence effects depend on the task-relevance of visual or tactile stimuli. On each trial, subjects received spatially congruent (same location) or incongruent (opposite hemifields) visuo-tactile stimulation. In different blocks, they made saccades either to the location of each visual stimulus, or to the location of each tactile stimulus; or else passively received the multisensory stimulation. Activity in visual extrastriate areas and in somatosensory parietal operculum was modulated by spatial congruence of the multisensory stimulation, with stronger activations when concurrent visual and tactile stimuli were both delivered at the same contralateral location. Critically, lateral occipital cortex and parietal operculum showed such crossmodal spatial effects irrespective of which modality was task relevant; and also of whether the stimuli were used to guide eye-movements or were just passively received. These results reveal crossmodal spatial-congruence effects upon visual and somatosensory sensory-specific areas that are relatively 'automatic', determined by the spatial relation of multisensory input rather than by its task-relevance.

Somatosensory activations during the observation of touch and a case of vision-touch synaesthesia.

In this study, we describe a new form of synaesthesia in which visual perception of touch elicits conscious tactile experiences in the perceiver. We describe a female subject (C) for whom the observation of another person being touched is experienced as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of C's own body. Apart from this clearly abnormal synesthetic experience, C is healthy and normal in every other way. In this study, we investigate whether C's 'mirrored touch' synesthetic experience is caused by overactivity in the neural system that responds to the observation of touch. A functional MRI experiment was designed to investigate the neural system involved in the perception of touch in a group of 12 non-synesthetic control subjects and in C. We investigated neural activity to the observation of touch to a human face or neck compared with the observation of touch to equivalent regions on an object. Furthermore, to investigate the somatosensory topography of the activations during observation of touch, we compared activations when observing a human face or neck being touched with activations when the subjects themselves were touched on their own face or neck. The results demonstrated that the somatosensory cortex was activated in the non-synesthetic subjects by the mere observation of touch and that this activation was somatotopically organized such that observation of touch to the face activated the head area of primary somatosensory cortex, whereas observation of touch to the neck did not. Moreover, in non-synesthetic subjects, the brain's mirror system-comprising premotor cortex, superior temporal sulcus and parietal cortex-was activated by the observation of touch to another human more than to an object. C's activation patterns differed in three ways from those of the non-synesthetic controls. First, activations in the somatosensory cortex were significantly higher in C when she observed touch. Secondly, an area in left premotor cortex was activated in C to a greater extent than in the non-synesthetic group. Thirdly, the anterior insula cortex bilaterally was activated in C, but there was no evidence of such activation in the non-synesthetic group. The results suggest that, in C, the mirror system for touch is overactive, above the threshold for conscious tactile perception.

On the benefits of not trying: brain activity and connectivity reflecting the interactions of explicit and implicit sequence learning.

Under certain circumstances, implicit, automatic learning may be attenuated by explicit memory processes. We explored the brain basis of this phenomenon in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of motor sequence learning. Using a factorial design that crossed subjective intention to learn (explicit versus implicit) with sequence difficulty (a standard versus a more complex alternating sequence), we show that explicit attempts to learn the difficult sequence produce a failure of implicit learning and, in a follow-up behavioural experiment, that this failure represents a suppression of learning itself rather than of the expression of learning. This suppression is associated with sustained right frontal activation and attenuation of learning-related changes in the medial temporal lobe and the thalamus. Furthermore, this condition is characterized by a reversal of the fronto-thalamic connectivity observed with unimpaired implicit learning. The findings demonstrate a neural basis for a well-known behavioural effect: the deleterious impact of an explicit search upon implicit learning.

Effect of symptoms on executive function in bipolar illness.

BACKGROUND: The relationship between cognitive function and symptomatology in bipolar disorder is unclear. This study assessed executive function during the manic, depressed and remitted stages of bipolar I disorder. METHOD: Tasks assessing phonological and semantic verbal fluency, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test, the Stroop Neuropsychological Screening Test and the Cognitive Estimates Test were administered to manic (n = 15), depressed (n = 15), and remitted (n = 15) bipolar I patients, and to healthy controls (n = 30). Multiple regression analyses and analyses of covariance were used to identify potential determinants of executive dysfunction in the three bipolar groups. RESULTS: Executive function deficits were particularly associated with the manic state. In general, manic patients performed less accurately than the remitted and depressed groups, and their performance deficit was related to the severity of positive thought disorder. The depressed and remitted bipolar groups showed a less widespread pattern of impairment. Deficits in response initiation, strategic thinking and inhibitory control were evident in all the bipolar groups. CONCLUSIONS: Executive function deficits in bipolar I disorder are most evident during mania, and are particularly associated with formal thought disorder. However, deficits in response initiation, strategic thinking and inhibitory control may be more related to the underlying disorder than a particular symptom profile.

Orienting attention to locations in perceptual versus mental representations.

Extensive clinical and imaging research has characterized the neural networks mediating the adaptive distribution of spatial attention. In everyday behavior, the distribution of attention is guided not only by extrapersonal targets but also by mental representations of their spatial layout. We used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural system involved in directing attention to locations in arrays held as mental representations, and to compare it with the system for directing spatial attention to locations in the external world. We found that these two crucial aspects of spatial cognition are subserved by extensively overlapping networks. However, we also found that a region of right parietal cortex selectively participated in orienting attention to the extrapersonal space, whereas several frontal lobe regions selectively participated in orienting attention within on-line mental representations.

Inferring false beliefs from the actions of oneself and others: an fMRI study.

The ability to make judgments about mental states is critical to social interactions. Simulation theory suggests that the observer covertly mimics the activity of the observed person, leading to shared states of mind between the observer and the person observed. We tested this hypothesis by investigating the neural networks activated while subjects watched videos of themselves and of others lifting a box, and judged the beliefs of the actors about the weight of the box. A parietal premotor circuit was recruited during action perception, and the activity started earlier when making judgments about one's own actions as opposed to those of others. This earlier activity in action-related structures can be explained by simulation theory on the basis that when one observes one's own actions, there is a closer match between the simulated and perceived action than there is when one observes the actions of others. When the observers judged the actions to reflect a false belief, there was activation in the superior temporal sulcus, orbitofrontal, paracingulate cortex and cerebellum. We suggest that this reflects a mismatch between the perceived action and the predicted action's outcomes derived from simulation.

Delusions of alien control in the normal brain.

Delusions of alien control, or passivity experiences, are symptoms associated with schizophrenia in which patients misattribute self-generated actions to an external source. In this study hypnosis was used to induce a similar misattribution of self-generated movement in normal, healthy individuals. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) was employed to investigate the neural correlates of active movements correctly attributed to the self, compared with identical active movements misattributed to an external source. Active movements attributed to an external source resulted in significantly higher activations in the parietal cortex and cerebellum than identical active movements correctly attributed to the self. We suggest that, as a result of hypnotic suggestion, the functioning of this cerebellar-parietal network is altered so that self-produced actions are experienced as being external. These results have implications for the brain mechanisms underlying delusions of control, which may be associated with overactivation of the cerebellar-parietal network.

Preparatory states in crossmodal spatial attention: spatial specificity and possible control mechanisms.

We used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the neural correlates of endogenous spatial attention for vision and touch. We examined activity associated with attention-directing cues (central auditory pure tones), symbolically instructing subjects to attend to one hemifield or the other prior to upcoming stimuli, for a visual or tactile task. In different sessions, subjects discriminated either visual or tactile stimuli at the covertly attended side, during bilateral visuotactile stimulation. To distinguish cue-related preparatory activity from any modulation of stimulus processing, unpredictably on some trials only the auditory cue was presented. The use of attend-vision and attend-touch blocks revealed whether preparatory attentional effects were modality-specific or multimodal. Unimodal effects of spatial attention were found in somatosensory cortex for attention to touch, and in occipital areas for attention to vision, both contralateral to the attended side. Multimodal spatial effects (i.e. effects of attended side irrespective of task-relevant modality) were detected in contralateral intraparietal sulcus, traditionally considered a multimodal brain region; and also in the middle occipital gyrus, an area traditionally considered purely visual. Critically, all these activations were observed even on cue-only trials, when no visual or tactile stimuli were subsequently presented. Endogenous shifts of spatial attention result in changes of brain activity prior to the presentation of target stimulation (baseline shifts). Here, we show for the first time the separable multimodal and unimodal components of such preparatory activations. Additionally, irrespective of the attended side and modality, attention-directing auditory cues activated a network of superior frontal and parietal association areas that may play a role in voluntary control of spatial attention for both vision and touch.