Does competitive winning increase subsequent cheating?

In this preregistered study, we attempted to replicate and substantially extend a frequently cited experiment by Schurr and Ritov, published in 2016, suggesting that winners of pairwise competitions are more likely than others to steal money in subsequent games of chance against different opponents, possibly because of an enhanced sense of entitlement among competition winners. A replication seemed desirable because of the relevance of the effect to dishonesty in everyday life, the apparent counterintuitivity of the effect, possible problems and anomalies in the original study, and above all the fact that the researchers investigated only one potential explanation for the effect. Our results failed to replicate Schurr and Ritov's basic finding: we found no evidence to support the hypotheses that either winning or losing is associated with subsequent cheating. A second online study also failed to replicate Schurr and Ritov's basic finding. We used structural equation modelling to test four possible explanations for cheating-sense of entitlement, self-confidence, feeling lucky and inequality aversion. Only inequality aversion turned out to be significantly associated with cheating.

Improving shared health decision making for children and adolescents with chronic illness: A narrative literature review.

OBJECTIVE: This review aims to increase understanding of health decision-making by children and adolescents with chronic illnesses and offer suggestions for improving shared decision-making with healthcare professionals. METHODS: Using cross-disciplinary publication databases, we surveyed literature on children's and adolescents' health decision-making from psychology, health sciences, and neuroscience. RESULTS: Several factors influencing health decision-making were identified. Considering neurobiological aspects, children lack functionality in the frontal lobe resulting in lesser cognitive control and higher risk-taking compared to adults. Additionally, adolescents' generally higher arousal of socioemotional systems demonstrates neurological underpinnings for reward-seeking behaviours. Psychological investigations of children's health decision-making indicate important age-dependent differences in risk-taking, locus of control, affect and cognitive biases. Furthermore, social influences, particularly from peers, have a large, often negative, effect on individual decision-making due to desire for peer acceptance. CONCLUSION: Acknowledging these factors is necessary for optimising the process of shared decision-making to support minors with chronic illnesses during healthcare consultations. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: Doctors and other healthcare professionals may need to counteract some adolescents' risk-taking behaviours which are often spurred by peer pressure. This can be achieved by highlighting the patient's control over health outcomes, emphasising short-term benefits and long-term consequences of risky behaviours, and recommending peer support networks.

Implicit theories of online trolling: Evidence that attention-seeking conceptions are associated with increased psychological resilience.

Three studies were conducted to investigate people's conceptions of online trolls, particularly conceptions associated with psychological resilience to trolling. In Study 1, a factor analysis of participants' ratings of characteristics of online trolls found a replicable bifactor model of conceptions of online trolls, with a general factor of general conceptions towards online trolls being identified, but five group factors (attention-conflict seeking, low self-confidence, viciousness, uneducated, amusement) as most salient. In Study 2, participants evaluated hypothetical profiles of online trolling messages to establish the validity of the five factors. Three constructs (attention-conflict seeking, viciousness, and uneducated) were actively employed when people considered profiles of online trolling scenarios. Study 3 introduced a 20-item 'Conceptions of Online Trolls scale' to examine the extent to which the five group factors were associated with resilience to trolling. Results indicated that viewing online trolls as seeking conflict or attention was associated with a decrease in individuals' negative affect around previous trolling incidents. Overall, the findings suggest that adopting an implicit theories approach can further our understanding and measurement of conceptions towards trolling through the identification of five salient factors, of which at least one factor may act as a resilience strategy.

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment.

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., "Which city is largest"--the "larger" question-vs. "Which city is smallest"--the "smaller" question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a and 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a 3-alternative forced-choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or a 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When participants were asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when participants were asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison, which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.

Causal conditionals and counterfactuals.

Causal counterfactuals e.g., 'if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started' and causal conditionals e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' are understood by thinking about multiple possibilities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' primed people to read quickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler occurring without the outcome, e.g., 'the ignition key was turned and the car did not start'. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when), whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experiments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling conditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.

Are causal structure and intervention judgments inextricably linked? A developmental study.

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children's causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children's causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three-component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children's causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.

Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic?

One view of causation is deterministic: A causes B means that whenever A occurs, B occurs. An alternative view is that causation is probabilistic: the assertion means that given A, the probability of B is greater than some criterion, such as the probability of B given not-A. Evidence about the induction of causal relations cannot readily decide between these alternative accounts, and so we examined how people refute causal assertions. In four experiments most participants judged that a single counterexample of A and not-B refuted assertions of the form, A causes B. And, as a deterministic theory based on mental models predicted, participants were more likely to request multiple refutations for assertions of the form, A enables B. Similarly, refutations of the form not-A and B were more frequent for enabling than causal assertions. Causation in daily life seems to be a deterministic concept.

Fast and frugal framing effects?

Using 3 experiments, we examine whether simple pairwise comparison judgments, involving the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make "larger" judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make "smaller" judgments. In Experiment 3, we demonstrate that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that when making pairwise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small.

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference.

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether - under conditions where such inferences might be expected - the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.