RESUMO
Secularism is conventionally (and somewhat misleadingly) defined as the separation of state and religion. This article offers an alternative and more refined concept of secularism as a normative political principle of social peace within the context of diversity. The argument that secularism, so understood, lies at the core of a notion of human rights, contra the critique it has been receiving in recent decades as being hostile to freedoms, is assessed conceptually and supported by an analysis of how it is (indirectly) articulated in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
RESUMO
In the classical notion of secularism, privatization of religion is an essential component of freedom and equality between citizens, so that rights are granted to individuals rather than to communities. The currently dominant objections to this notion in the literature are the multiculturalist thesis, primarily expounded by Tariq Modood, and the critique of secularism through the "genealogical" method, associated with Talal Asad and his followers. This article critically assesses these objections and defends the classical notion of secularism from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective. The argument that the classical notion perfectly addresses the questions of freedom of conscience and diversity of belief is further supported by reference to an ignored source, Thomas More's Utopia.
RESUMO
This article undertakes a defense of secularism, much maligned by postmodernists and multiculturalists. First, secularism as a normative political principle is conceptually distinguished from the discredited sociological theory of secularization and, second, it is treated as a project of free and equal citizenship. The conceptual discussion is complemented by an assessment of the Turkish case, falsely presented in the literature as a radical form of secularism. The article aims to show that a religious political movement, opposed to secularism, tends to be authoritarian and intolerant of diversity.