Too much or too little information: how unknown uncertainty fuels time inconsistency.

Under uncertainty, there is considerable heterogeneity in expectations of results, and the outcome of each choice is a reflection of those expectations. This study aims to understand the role of subjective probabilistic inference in updating information for decision-making procedures under uncertainty. We show that adding uncertainty of trade-offs in decision-making criteria induces more inconsistent present preferences. We find that subjective probabilistic inference results in different levels of information acquisition, which plays a central role in many everyday cases of forecasting. The result of forecasting exerts substantive constraints on cognitive processes and shapes a type of restriction or stimulus in decision-making procedures. As uncertainty increases, generated fear of losses turns into an obstacle to the information acquisition process, and especially participants with low probabilistic inference tend to overestimate or underestimate future unknown rewards. In addition, our experiment shows that risk preference does not play a key role in decision-making procedures under unknown uncertainty. This finding is an experimental manifestation of Knight's argument (Risk, uncertainty, and profit, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1921), which explains unknown uncertainty, and shows the relationship between cognitive ability and time inconsistency. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s43546-021-00189-9.

Temporal Discounting Is Associated with an Increased Risk of Mortality among Community-Based Older Persons without Dementia.

BACKGROUND: Temporal discounting is an important determinant of many health and financial outcomes, but we are not aware of studies that have examined the association of temporal discounting with mortality. METHODS: Participants were 406 older persons without dementia from the Rush Memory and Aging Project, a longitudinal cohort study of aging. Temporal discounting was measured using standard preference elicitation questions. Individual discount rates were estimated using a well-established hyperbolic function and used to predict the risk of mortality during up to 5 years of follow-up. RESULTS: The mean estimate of discounting was 0.45 (SD = 0.33, range: 0.08-0.90), with higher scores indicating a greater propensity to prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger but delayed ones. During up to 5 years of follow-up (mean = 3.6 years), 62 (15% of 406) persons died. In a proportional hazards model adjusted for age, sex, and education, temporal discounting was associated with an increased risk of mortality (HR = 1.103, 95% CI 1.024, 1.190, p = 0.010). Thus, a person with the highest discount rate (score = 0.90) was about twice more likely to die over the study period compared to a person with the lowest discount rate (score = 0.08). Further, the association of discounting with mortality persisted after adjustment for the level of global cognitive function, the burden of vascular risk factors and diseases, and an indicator of psychological well being (i.e., purpose in life). CONCLUSION: Temporal discounting is associated with an increased risk of mortality in old age after accounting for global cognitive function and indicators of physical and mental health.