Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Thinking About Reasons for One's Choices Increases Sensitivity to Moral Norms in Moral-Dilemma Judgments.

Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.

Truth sensitivity and partisan bias in responses to misinformation.

Misinformation represents one of the greatest challenges for the functioning of societies in the information age. Drawing on a signal-detection framework, the current research investigated two distinct aspects of misinformation susceptibility: truth sensitivity, conceptualized as accurate discrimination between true and false information, and partisan bias, conceptualized as lower acceptance threshold for ideology-congruent information compared to ideology-incongruent information. Four preregistered experiments (n = 2,423) examined (a) truth sensitivity and partisan bias in veracity judgments and decisions to share information and (b) determinants and correlates of truth sensitivity and partisan bias in responses to misinformation. Although participants were able to distinguish between true and false information to a considerable extent, sharing decisions were largely unaffected by actual information veracity. A strong partisan bias emerged for both veracity judgments and sharing decisions, with partisan bias being unrelated to the overall degree of truth sensitivity. While truth sensitivity increased as a function of cognitive reflection during encoding, partisan bias increased as a function of subjective confidence. Truth sensitivity and partisan bias were both associated with misinformation susceptibility, but partisan bias was a stronger and more reliable predictor of misinformation susceptibility than truth sensitivity. Implications and open questions for future research are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The Drunk Utilitarian Revisited: Does Alcohol Really Increase Utilitarianism in Moral Judgment?

The "drunk utilitarian" phenomenon suggests that people are more likely to accept harm for the greater good when they are under the influence of alcohol. This phenomenon conflicts with the ideas that (a) acceptance of pro-sacrificial harm requires inhibitory control of automatic emotional responses to the idea of causing harm and (b) alcohol impairs inhibitory control. This preregistered experiment aimed to provide deeper insights into the effects of alcohol on moral judgments by using a formal modeling approach to disentangle three factors in moral dilemma judgments and by distinguishing between instrumental harm and impartial beneficence as two distinct dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Despite the use of a substantially larger sample and higher doses of alcohol compared with the ones in prior studies, alcohol had no significant effect on moral judgments. The results pose a challenge to the idea that alcohol increases utilitarianism in moral judgments.

Temporal Stability of Moral Dilemma Judgments: A Longitudinal Analysis Using the CNI Model.

Although moral dilemma judgments are influenced by a variety of situational factors, there is evidence for considerable disagreement between individuals. Using the CNI model to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas, the current research examined the temporal stability of individual differences along the three dimensions. Across two time points 1 month apart, sensitivity to consequences (r = .81) and sensitivity to norms (r = .84) showed high levels of stability that were comparable to the Big Five personality traits; general preference for inaction versus action showed lower stability (r = .41). Exploratory analyses revealed reliable associations between the three dimensions of moral dilemma judgments and three of the Big Five (extraversion, agreeableness, openness). Together, these findings provide evidence for stable individual differences in moral dilemma judgments that are related to basic personality traits.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Paradoxical Effects of Cognitive Load.

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be jointly influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object's specific relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Three experiments investigated the impact of cognitive load during learning on the effects of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. Counter to the shared prediction of competing theories suggesting that effects of stimulus relations should be reduced by cognitive load during learning, effects of stimulus relations were greater (rather than smaller) under high-load compared with low-load conditions. Effects of stimulus co-occurrence were not significantly affected by cognitive load. The results are discussed in terms of theories suggesting that cognitive load can influence behavioral outcomes via strategic shifts in resource allocation in response to task-specific affordances.

A Signal Detection Approach to Understanding the Identification of Fake News.

Researchers across many disciplines seek to understand how misinformation spreads with a view toward limiting its impact. One important question in this research is how people determine whether a given piece of news is real or fake. In the current article, we discuss the value of signal detection theory (SDT) in disentangling two distinct aspects in the identification of fake news: (a) ability to accurately distinguish between real news and fake news and (b) response biases to judge news as real or fake regardless of news veracity. The value of SDT for understanding the determinants of fake-news beliefs is illustrated with reanalyses of existing data sets, providing more nuanced insights into how partisan bias, cognitive reflection, and prior exposure influence the identification of fake news. Implications of SDT for the use of source-related information in the identification of fake news, interventions to improve people's skills in detecting fake news, and the debunking of misinformation are discussed.

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model.

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-Occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Range and Limits of Intentional Control.

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be simultaneously influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object's particular relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Using a multinomial modeling approach to disentangle the two kinds of influences on choice decisions, three experiments investigated whether learners can intentionally control the relative impact of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. An integrative analysis of the data from the three experiments (N = 1,154) indicate that incentivized instructions to counteract effects of stimulus co-occurrence by focusing on stimulus relations increased the impact of stimulus relations without affecting the impact of stimulus co-occurrence. Implications for evaluative learning, intentional control, and public policy are discussed.

Contextual positivity-familiarity effects are unaffected by known moderators of misattribution.

ABSTRACTThe positivity-familiarity effect refers to the phenomenon that positive affect increases the likelihood that people judge a stimulus as familiar. Drawing on the assumption that positivity-familiarity effects result from a common misattribution mechanism that is shared with conceptually similar effects (e.g. fluency-familiarity effects), we investigated whether positivity-familiarity effects are qualified by three known moderators of other misattribution phenomena: (a) conceptual similarity between affect-eliciting prime stimuli and focal target stimuli, (b) relative salience of affect-eliciting prime stimuli, and (c) explicit warnings about the effects of affect-eliciting prime stimuli on familiarity judgments of the targets. Counter to predictions, three experiments obtained robust positivity-familiarity effects that were unaffected by the hypothesised moderators. The findings pose a challenge for misattribution accounts of positivity-familiarity effects, but they are consistent with alternative accounts in terms of affective monitoring.

Contrast effects in backward evaluative conditioning: Exploring effects of affective relief/disappointment versus instructional information.

Past studies of backward evaluative conditioning (EC) have found an assimilation effect, in that neutral conditional stimuli (conditional stimulus [CS]) were found to acquire the valence of co-occurring unconditional stimuli (US). Recent studies employing a concurrent forward and backward conditioning paradigm with instructions suggesting a contrastive relation between the US and the backward CS have resulted in contrast effects, in that backward CSs acquired valence opposite to the US. The current research investigated whether these effects were in fact due to the instructions highlighting the contrastive relation between the US and CS, or whether affective relief/disappointment experienced at US offset could account for this result. Consistent with the hypothesized role of instructions, backward CS contrast effects occurred only when instructions highlighted the valence of the US and attributed control of that US to the CSs. In contrast to the affective relief/disappointment hypothesis, no backward CS contrast effects were found without such instructions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of the Olson and Fazio (2001) Study.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when "aware" participants were excluded using the original criterion-therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about "unaware" evaluative-conditioning effects.

Illusory-Correlation Effects on Implicit and Explicit Evaluation.

Research suggests that people sometimes perceive a relationship between stimuli when no such relationship exists (i.e., illusory correlation). Illusory-correlation effects are thought to play a central role in the formation of stereotypes and evaluations of minority versus majority groups, often leading to less favorable impressions of minorities. Extant theories differ in terms of whether they attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes operating during learning (belief formation) or measurement (belief expression), and whether different evaluation measures should be differentially sensitive to illusory-correlation effects. Past research found mixed evidence for dissociative effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on measures of implicit (i.e., automatic) and explicit (i.e., controlled) evaluation. Four high-powered studies obtained illusory-correlation effects on explicit evaluations, but not implicit evaluations probed with an Implicit Association Test, Evaluative Priming Task, and Affect Misattribution Procedure. The results are consistent with theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes during belief expression.

Experiences of liking versus ideas about liking.

We leverage the notion that abstraction enables prediction to generate novel insights and hypotheses for the literatures on attitudes and mate preferences. We suggest that ideas about liking (e.g., evaluations of categories or overall traits) are more abstract than experiences of liking (e.g., evaluations of particular exemplars), and that ideas about liking may facilitate mental travel beyond the here-and-now.

Common Academic Experiences No One Talks About: Repeated Rejection, Impostor Syndrome, and Burnout.

Academic life is full of learning, excitement, and discovery. However, academics also experience professional challenges at various points in their career, including repeated rejection, impostor syndrome, and burnout. These negative experiences are rarely talked about publicly, creating a sense of loneliness and isolation for people who presume they are the only ones affected by such setbacks. However, nearly everyone has these experiences at one time or another; therefore, talking about them should be a normal part of academic life. The goal of this article is to explore and destigmatize the common experiences of rejection, impostor syndrome, and burnout by sharing a collection of short personal stories from scholars at various stages of their careers with various types of academic positions. Josh Ackerman, Kate Sweeny, and Ludwin Molina discuss how they have dealt with repeated rejection. Linda Tropp, Nick Rule, and Brooke Vick share experiences with impostor syndrome. Finally, Bertram Gawronski, Lisa Jaremka, Molly Metz, and Will Ryan discuss how they have experienced burnout.

Using the CNI Model to Investigate Individual Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments.

Typical moral dilemmas pitting the consequences of a given action against the action's consistency with moral norms confound several determinants of moral judgments. Dissociating these determinants, the CNI model allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preference for inaction over action regardless of consequences and norms. However, with the currently available set of dilemmas for research using the CNI model, the model is not suitable for studies with individual-difference designs. To overcome this limitation, the current research investigated the suitability of an extended dilemma battery to make the CNI model amenable for individual-difference research, examining relations of its parameters with psychopathy, empathic concern, need for cognition, self-reported utilitarianism, behavioral activation/inhibition, moral identity, and religiosity. The results support the suitability of the CNI model for individual-difference research with the extended dilemma battery, providing more nuanced insights into the underpinnings of individual differences in moral dilemma judgments.

The Bidirectional Causal Relation Between Implicit Stereotypes and Implicit Prejudice.

Although stereotypes and prejudice are commonly regarded as conceptually distinct but related constructs, previous research remains silent on the processes underlying their relation. Applying the balance-congruity principle to the concepts (a) group, (b) valence, and (c) attribute, we argue that the valence of attributes contained in a group-stereotype shapes evaluations of the group, while prejudice toward a group influences which attributes are stereotypically associated with the group. Using fictitious (Experiments 1 and 3) and real (Experiments 2 and 4) groups, the current studies demonstrate that (a) experimentally induced changes in the valence of semantic attributes associated with a group (stereotypes) influence implicit prejudice toward that group (Experiments 1 and 2), and (b) experimentally induced changes in the valence of a group (prejudice) influence implicit stereotyping of that group (Experiments 3 and 4). These findings demonstrate a bidirectional causal relation between prejudice and stereotypes.

Co-occurrence and relational information in evaluative learning: A multinomial modeling approach.

Dual-process theories of evaluative learning suggest that evaluative representations can be formed via two functionally distinct mechanisms: automatic formation of associative links between co-occurring events (associative learning) and nonautomatic generation and truth assessment of mental propositions about the relation between stimuli (propositional learning). Single-process propositional theories reject the idea of automatic association formation, attributing all instances of evaluative learning to propositional processes. A central question in the debate between the two theories concerns the mechanisms underlying unqualified effects of stimulus co-occurrence when the relation between the co-occurring stimuli suggests an evaluation that is opposite to the one implied by the observed co-occurrence (e.g., sunscreen prevents skin cancer). Addressing interpretational ambiguities in previous research on the differential impact of co-occurrence and relational information on implicit and explicit measures, the current research used a multinomial modeling approach to investigate the functional properties of the effects of co-occurrence and relational information on a single measure of evaluative responses. Although the moderating effects obtained for relational information are consistent with the predictions of the two theories, the obtained properties of co-occurrence effects pose an explanatory challenge to both dual-process and single-process propositional theories. The findings demonstrate the value of multinomial modeling in providing deeper insights into the functional properties of the effects of co-occurrence and relational information, which impose stronger empirical constraints on extant theories of evaluative learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).