Triage of Scarce Critical Care Resources in COVID-19 An Implementation Guide for Regional Allocation: An Expert Panel Report of the Task Force for Mass Critical Care and the American College of Chest Physicians.

Public health emergencies have the potential to place enormous strain on health systems. The current pandemic of the novel 2019 coronavirus disease has required hospitals in numerous countries to expand their surge capacity to meet the needs of patients with critical illness. When even surge capacity is exceeded, however, principles of critical care triage may be needed as a means to allocate scarce resources, such as mechanical ventilators or key medications. The goal of a triage system is to direct limited resources towards patients most likely to benefit from them. Implementing a triage system requires careful coordination between clinicians, health systems, local and regional governments, and the public, with a goal of transparency to maintain trust. We discuss the principles of tertiary triage and methods for implementing such a system, emphasizing that these systems should serve only as a last resort. Even under triage, we must uphold our obligation to care for all patients as best possible under difficult circumstances.

The view from the trenches: part 1-emergency medical response plans and the need for EPR screening.

Few natural disasters or intentional acts of war or terrorism have the potential for such severe impact upon a population and infrastructure as the intentional detonation of a nuclear device within a major U.S. city. In stark contrast to other disasters or even a "dirty bomb," hundreds of thousands will be affected and potentially exposed to a clinically significant dose of ionizing radiation. This will result in immediate deaths and injuries and subsequently the development of Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS). Additionally, millions more who are unlikely to develop ARS will seek medical evaluation and treatment, overwhelming the capacity of an already compromised medical system. In this paper, the authors propose that in vivo electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) dosimetry be utilized to screen large numbers of potentially exposed victims, and that this screening process be incorporated into the medical-surge framework that is currently being implemented across the nation for other catastrophic public health emergencies. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), the Target Capabilities List (TCL), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), as well as additional guidance from multiple federal agencies provide a solid framework for this response. The effective screening of potentially-exposed victims directly following a nuclear attack could decrease the number of patients seeking immediate medical care by greater than 90%.

Proposed triage categories for large-scale radiation incidents using high-accuracy biodosimetry methods.

A catastrophic event such as a nuclear device detonation in a major U.S. city would cause a mass casualty with millions affected. Such a disaster would require screening to accurately and effectively identify patients likely to develop acute radiation syndrome (ARS). A primary function of such screening is to sort the unaffected, or worried-well, from those patients who will truly become symptomatic. This paper reviews the current capability of high-accuracy biodosimetry methods as screening tools for populations and reviews the current triage and medical guidelines for diagnosing and managing ARS. This paper proposes that current triage categories, which broadly categorize patients by likelihood of survival based on current symptoms, be replaced with new triage categories that use high-accuracy biodosimetry methods. Using accurate whole-body exposure dose assessment to predict ARS symptoms and subsyndromes, clinical decision-makers can designate the appropriate care setting, initiate treatment and therapies, and best allocate limited clinical resources, facilitating mass-casualty care following a nuclear disaster.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: current capabilities and limitations: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL.

In the twentieth century, rarely have mass casualty events yielded hundreds or thousands of critically ill patients requiring definitive critical care. However, future catastrophic natural disasters, epidemics or pandemics, nuclear device detonations, or large chemical exposures may change usual disaster epidemiology and require a large critical care response. This article reviews the existing state of emergency preparedness for mass critical illness and presents an analysis of limitations to support the suggestions of the Task Force on Mass Casualty Critical Care, which are presented in subsequent articles. Baseline shortages of specialized resources such as critical care staff, medical supplies, and treatment spaces are likely to limit the number of critically ill victims who can receive life-sustaining interventions. The deficiency in critical care surge capacity is exacerbated by lack of a sufficient framework to integrate critical care within the overall institutional response and coordination of critical care across local institutions and broader geographic areas.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: a framework for optimizing critical care surge capacity: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL.

BACKGROUND: Plausible disasters may yield hundreds or thousands of critically ill victims. However, most countries, including those with widely available critical care services, lack sufficient specialized staff, medical equipment, and ICU space to provide timely, usual critical care for a large influx of additional patients. Shifting critical care disaster preparedness efforts to augment limited, essential critical care (emergency mass critical care [EMCC]), rather than to marginally increase unrestricted, individual-focused critical care may provide many additional people with access to life-sustaining interventions. In 2007, in response to the increasing concern over a severe influenza pandemic, the Task Force on Mass Critical Care (hereafter called the Task Force) convened to suggest the essential critical care therapeutics and interventions for EMCC. TASK FORCE SUGGESTIONS: EMCC should include the following: (1) mechanical ventilation, (2) IV fluid resuscitation, (3) vasopressor administration, (4) medication administration for specific disease states (eg, antimicrobials and antidotes), (5) sedation and analgesia, and (6) select practices to reduce adverse consequences of critical illness and critical care delivery. Also, all hospitals with ICUs should prepare to deliver EMCC for a daily critical care census at three times their usual ICU capacity for up to 10 days. DISCUSSION: By using the Task Force suggestions for EMCC, communities may better prepare to deliver augmented critical care in response to disasters. In light of current mass critical care data limitations, the Task Force suggestions were developed to guide preparedness but are not intended as strict policy mandates. Additional research is required to evaluate EMCC and revise the strategy as warranted.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: medical resources for surge capacity: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL.

BACKGROUND: Mass numbers of critically ill disaster victims will stress the abilities of health-care systems to maintain usual critical care services for all in need. To enhance the number of patients who can receive life-sustaining interventions, the Task Force on Mass Critical Care (hereafter termed the Task Force) has suggested a framework for providing limited, essential critical care, termed emergency mass critical care (EMCC). This article suggests medical equipment, concepts to expand treatment spaces, and staffing models for EMCC. METHODS: Consensus suggestions for EMCC were derived from published clinical practice guidelines and medical resource utilization data for the everyday critical care conditions that are anticipated to predominate during mass critical care events. When necessary, expert opinion was used. TASK FORCE MAJOR SUGGESTIONS: The Task Force makes the following suggestions: (1) one mechanical ventilator that meets specific characteristics, as well as a set of consumable and durable medical equipment, should be provided for each EMCC patient; (2) EMCC should be provided in hospitals or similarly equipped structures; after ICUs, postanesthesia care units, and emergency departments all reach capacity, hospital locations should be repurposed for EMCC in the following order: (A) step-down units and large procedure suites, (B) telemetry units, and (C) hospital wards; and (3) hospitals can extend the provision of critical care using non-critical care personnel via a deliberate model of delegation to match staff competencies with patient needs. DISCUSSION: By using the Task Force suggestions for adequate supplies of medical equipment, appropriate treatment space, and trained staff, communities may better prepare to deliver augmented essential critical care in response to disasters.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: a framework for allocation of scarce resources in mass critical care: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL.

BACKGROUND: Anticipated circumstances during the next severe influenza pandemic highlight the insufficiency of staff and equipment to meet the needs of all critically ill victims. It is plausible that an entire country could face simultaneous limitations, resulting in severe shortages of critical care resources to the point where patients could no longer receive all of the care that would usually be required and expected. There may even be such resource shortfalls that some patients would not be able to access even the most basic of life-sustaining interventions. Rationing of critical care in this circumstance would be difficult, yet may be unavoidable. Without planning, the provision of care would assuredly be chaotic, inequitable, and unfair. The Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group met in Chicago in January 2007 to proactively suggest guidance for allocating scarce critical care resources. TASK FORCE SUGGESTIONS: In order to allocate critical care resources when systems are overwhelmed, the Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group suggests the following: (1) an equitable triage process utilizing the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring system; (2) the concept of triage by a senior clinician(s) without direct clinical obligation, and a support system to implement and manage the triage process; (3) legal and ethical constructs underpinning the allocation of scarce resources; and (4) a mechanism for rapid revision of the triage process as further disaster experiences, research, planning, and modeling come to light.

HazBot: Development of a telemanipulator robot with haptics for emergency response.

OBJECTIVES: To design a remotely operated robot, "HazBot," for bioevent disaster response; specifically, to improve existing commercial robots' capabilities in handling fixed-facility hazmat incidents via a unique robot controller that allows the human operator to easily manipulate HazBot in disaster situations. DESIGN: The HazBot's design objectives were for a robot to approach a building, open doors, enter, and navigate the building. The robot's controlling device was designed to provide features not available in current robots: dexterous manipulation and enhanced sensory (touch) feedback via "haptic" technology. The design included a companion simulator to train operators on HazBot. RESULTS: The HazBot met its design goals to do several hazmat-related tasks in place of a human operator: to enter and navigate a building, passing debris and doors as necessary. HazBot's controller reduced the time for inexperienced users of manipulator robots to complete a door-opening task by 55 percent. HazBot overcame previous problems in operator control of robots, via its dexterous manipulation feature, its partially implemented haptic touch feedback, and via its companion simulator. CONCLUSIONS: The HazBot system demonstrates superior capability over existing robots: it is technically sophisticated, yet moderately priced; it has dexterous manipulation to make operator tasks easier, haptic feedback, and an excellent companion simulator. HazBot is optimized for hazmat cleanups; is mobile and scaleable; can serve in multiple environments and uncontrolled conditions; and is optimal for disaster situations. It could potentially be used in other disaster situations to deliver medicine to isolated patients, evaluate such patients, assess a downed fire fighter, etc.

Role of the pulmonary provider in a terrorist attack: resources and command and control issues.

Hospital-based pulmonologists, intensivists, respiratory therapists, and others are trained in the triage of limited ICU assets and function well in the chaos this environment often entails. Additionally, many intensivists and other providers often participate in hospital disaster planning and drills. Their education, training, and utility outside this setting are often limited,however. Managing the turbulence surrounding a disaster outside an ICU requires special training and skills to optimize safety, security, and effectiveness of the response effort. Failure to orchestrate the many parties that arrive at the scene risks having various types of providers independently seeking to do good but failing to cooperate or share limited resources of people and equipment. The result may be endangerment of personnel and the in-completion of critical tasks. Health care providers who normally work in a health care facility must participate in disaster planning activities to prepare themselves and the irinstitutions better for disasters that may occur. Critical to that preparation is an understanding of the organizational framework of disaster management, both inside and outside the hospital. This preparation ensures safety if the individual leaves the hospital to support the disaster scene (an action that is not recommended, as discussed previously) and quality care. Understanding whom to ask for resources and the constraints surrounding multidisciplinary disaster response can only improve the care ultimately provided at the bedside.

Overview of command and control issues: setting the stage.

Sudden-impact disasters typically result in mass casualty incidents that strain local medical resources. However, whether in the United States where local emergency medical systems and ambulance services are typically robust or overseas where they may not be so mature, these disasters tend to produce relatively standard and predictable consequences. The timeline for the response and the physical and psychiatric injuries they produce have been well described in the literature, can be modeled, and can prove to be invaluable to medical planners and operators. This article will review selected aspects on how this information helped prepare and oversee medical responders to the plane crash at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, highlighting the command and control aspects of the disaster response. Understanding the setting better facilitates the lessons learned in providing mental health support to this horrific event.