Increasing Kidney-Exchange Options Within the Existing Living Donor Pool With CIAT: A Pilot Implementation Study.

Computerized integration of alternative transplantation programs (CIAT) is a kidney-exchange program that allows AB0- and/or HLA-incompatible allocation to difficult-to-match patients, thereby increasing their chances. Altruistic donors make this available for waiting list patients as well. Strict criteria were defined for selected highly-immunized (sHI) and long waiting (LW) candidates. For LW patients AB0i allocation was allowed. sHI patients were given priority and AB0i and/or CDC cross-match negative HLAi allocations were allowed. A local pilot was established between 2017 and 2022. CIAT results were assessed against all other transplant programs available. In the period studied there were 131 incompatible couples; CIAT transplanted the highest number of couples (35%), compared to the other programs. There were 55 sHI patients; CIAT transplanted as many sHI patients as the Acceptable Mismatch program (18%); Other programs contributed less. There were 69 LW patients; 53% received deceased donor transplantations, 20% were transplanted via CIAT. In total, 72 CIAT transplants were performed: 66 compatible, 5 AB0i and 1 both AB0i and HLAi. CIAT increased opportunities for difficult-to-match patients, not by increasing pool size, but through prioritization and allowing AB0i and "low risk" HLAi allocation. CIAT is a powerful addition to the limited number of programs available for difficult-to-match patients.

The Health Value of Kidney Exchange and Altruistic Donation.

OBJECTIVES: Living donor kidney transplantation (LTx) is the preferred treatment for patients with end-stage renal disease. Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) promote LTx by facilitating exchange of donors among patients who are not compatible with their donors. We analyze and maximize the efficacy and effectiveness of KEPS from a health value perspective and the health value of altruistic donation in KEPs. METHODS: We developed a Markov model for the health outcomes of patients, which was embedded in a discrete event simulation model to assess the effectiveness of allocation policies in KEPs. A new allocation policy to maximize health value was developed on the basis of integer programing techniques. The evidence-based transition probabilities in the Markov model were based on data from the Dutch KEP using a variety of econometric models. Scenarios analysis was presented to improve robustness. RESULTS: The efficacy of the Dutch KEP without altruistic donation is reflected by the increase in expected discounted quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) by 3.23 from 6.42 to 9.65. The present Dutch policy and the policy to maximize the number of transplants achieve 63% of the potential efficacy gain (2.11 discounted QALYs). The new policy achieves 69% of this gain (2.33 discounted QALYs). When systematically enrolling altruistic donors in the KEP, the new policy increased expected discounted QALYs by 4.05 to 10.27 and reduced inequities for patients with blood type O. CONCLUSIONS: The Dutch KEP can increase health value for patients by more than half. An allocation policy that maximizes health outcomes and maximally allows altruistic donation can yield significant further improvements.

Creating Options for Difficult-to-match Kidney Transplant Candidates.

BACKGROUND: Most transplantation centers recognize a small patient population that unsuccessfully participates in all available, both living and deceased donor, transplantation programs for many years: the difficult-to-match patients. This population consists of highly immunized and/or ABO blood group O or B patients. METHODS: To improve their chances, Computerized Integration of Alternative Transplantation programs (CIAT) were developed to integrate kidney paired donation, altruistic/unspecified donation, and ABO and HLA desensitization. To compare CIAT with reality, a simulation was performed, including all patients, donors, and pairs who participated in our programs in 2015-2016. Criteria for inclusion as difficult-to-match, selected-highly immunized (sHI) patient were as follows: virtual panel reactive antibody >85% and participating for 2 years in Eurotransplant Acceptable Mismatch program. sHI patients were given priority, and ABO blood group incompatible (ABOi) and/or HLA incompatible (HLAi) matching with donor-specific antigen-mean fluorescence intensity (MFI) <8000 were allowed. For long-waiting blood group O or B patients, ABOi matches were allowed. RESULTS: In reality, 90 alternative program transplantations were carried out: 73 compatible, 16 ABOi, and 1 both ABOi and HLAi combination. Simulation with CIAT resulted in 95 hypothetical transplantations: 83 compatible (including 1 sHI) and 5 ABOi combinations. Eight sHI patients were matched: 1 compatible, 6 HLAi with donor-specific antigen-MFI <8000 (1 also ABOi), and 1 ABOi match. Six/eight combinations for sHI patients were complement-dependent cytotoxicity cross-match negative. CONCLUSIONS: CIAT led to 8 times more matches for difficult-to-match sHI patients. This offers them better chances because of a more favorable MFI profile against the new donor. Besides, more ABO compatible matches were found for ABOi couples, while total number of transplantations was not hampered. Prioritizing difficult-to-match patients improves their chances without affecting the chances of regular patients.

Allocation and matching in kidney exchange programs.

Living donor kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients suffering from end-stage renal disease. To alleviate the shortage of kidney donors, many advances have been made to improve the utilization of living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipient. The most prominent of these advances is kidney paired donation (KPD), which matches incompatible patient-donor pairs to facilitate a kidney exchange. This review discusses the various approaches to matching and allocation in KPD. In particular, it focuses on the underlying principles of matching and allocation approaches, the combination of KPD with other strategies such as ABO incompatible transplantation, the organization of KPD, and important future challenges. As the transplant community strives to balance quantity and equity of transplants to achieve the best possible outcomes, determining the right long-term allocation strategy becomes increasingly important. In this light, challenges include making full use of the various modalities that are now available through integrated and optimized matching software, encouragement of transplant centers to fully participate, improving transplant rates by focusing on the expected long-run number of transplants, and selecting uniform allocation criteria to facilitate international pools.

Coordinating unspecified living kidney donation and transplantation across the blood-type barrier in kidney exchange.

BACKGROUND: This article studies multicenter coordination of unspecified living kidney donation and transplantation across the blood-type barrier in kidney exchange. Important questions are whether such coordination should use domino paired donation or non simultaneous extended altruistic donor chains, what the length of the segments in such chains should be, when they should be terminated, and how much time should be allowed between matching rounds. Furthermore, it is controversial whether the different modalities should be coordinated centrally or locally and independently. METHODS: Kidney exchange policies are simulated using actual data from the Dutch national kidney exchange program. Sensitivity analysis is performed on the composition of the population, the time unspecified and bridge donors wait before donating to the wait list, the time between matching rounds, and donor renege rates. RESULTS: Central coordination of unspecified donation and transplantation across the blood-type barrier can increase transplants by 10% (PG0.001). Especially highly sensitized and blood type O patients benefit. Sufficient time between matching rounds is essential: three-monthly exchanges result in 31% more transplants than weekly exchanges. Benefits of non simultaneous extended altruistic donor chains are limited in case of low numbers of highly sensitized patients and sufficient unspecified donors. Chains are best terminated when no further segment is part of an optimal exchange within 3 months. CONCLUSIONS: There is clear synergy in the central coordination of both unspecified donation and transplantation across the blood-type barrier in kidney exchange. The best configuration of a national program depends on the composition of the patient Y donor population.