Feature accessibility in conceptual combination: effects of context-induced relevance.

In conceptual combinations such as peeled apples, two kinds of features are potentially accessible: phrase features and noun features. Phrase features are true only of the phrase (e.g., "white"), whereas noun features are true of both the phrase and the head noun (e.g., "round"). When people comprehend such combinations, phrase features are verified more quickly and more accurately than noun features. We examine relevance as an explanation for this phrase feature superiority. If relevance is the critical factor, then contexts that explicitly make noun features relevant and phrase features irrelevant should reverse the phrase feature superiority (i.e., they should make noun features easier to verify than phrase features). Consistent with the relevance hypothesis, brief contexts that made noun features relevant also made those noun features more accessible than phrase features, and vice versa. We conclude that the phrase feature superiority effect is attributable to the discourse strategy of assigning relevance to modifiers in combinations, unless a context indicates otherwise.

Interactive property attribution in concept combination.

We address the question of how people understand attributive noun-noun compounds. Alignment-and-comparison models suggest that the similarity of the constituent concepts guides interpretation. We propose, as an alternative, an interactive property attribution model wherein the modifier and head concepts have different functions: The head provides relevant dimensions, whereas the modifier provides candidate features for attribution. According to our model, the interaction of dimensions and features, rather than constituent similarity, guides interpretation. In this study, we empirically contrasted the two models by holding constituent similarity of compounds constant while varying the interaction of modifier feature salience and head dimension relevance. Compounds consisting of a head concept with a relevant dimension for attribution and a modifier with a salient property on that dimension were interpreted by means of property attribution. Other compounds with equivalent constituent similarity, but lacking the high salience-relevance interaction, were not interpreted by means of attribution. The interactive property attribution model more accurately predicted interpretation of noun-noun compounds.

How about another piece of pie: the allusional pretense theory of discourse irony.

The allusional pretense theory claims that ironic remarks have their effects by alluding to a failed expectation. In normal conversation, this is accomplished by violating pragmatic rules of discourse, usually the maxim of sincerity. Such violations simultaneously draw a listener's attention to the failed expectation and express the speaker's attitude (normally but not necessarily negative) toward the failed expectation. Using a variety of utterance types, 3 experiments tested the theory. The first experiment, using 4 speech act types, showed that both insincerity and allusion were perceived far more frequently in ironically intended utterances than in literally intended ones. The second experiment demonstrated that the negative attitudes frequently expressed with ironic utterances are a function of the relative frequency of positive versus negative expectations and not an intrinsic characteristic of discourse irony per se. The third experiment found that over-polite requests are more likely to be used ironically than under-polite ones, presumably because the former can serve a speaker's politeness considerations while simultaneously conveying both an intended request and the speaker's attitude. It was concluded that irony is used primarily to express a speaker's attitude toward the referent of the ironic utterance, while simultaneously fulfilling other goals as well, such as to be humorous, to make a situation less face threatening, and to serve politeness considerations.

Conceptual metaphors are not automatically accessed during idiom comprehension.

Do conceptual analogies motivate idiom use and comprehension in discourse? For example, a story in which a person is described as fuming would be analogically consistent with an idiom such as blew her top, but inconsistent with an idiom such as bite his head off. Earlier work by Nayak and Gibbs (1990) had suggested that people use such analogical information during idiom comprehension. We replicated their findings in an idiom choice task, suggesting that people can indeed make use of such knowledge. However, when reading times were used to assess idiom comprehensibility, no effects of analogical consistency were found. We conclude that conceptual analogies play little, if any, role in idiom comprehension unless people have the time (and motivation) to make considered judgments.

Motivated forgetting mediated by implicit verbal chaining: a laboratory analog of repression.

After learning an A-B paired-associates list, college students read a list of D words, several of which were consistently accompanied by unavoidable electric shock. The D words were members of implicit B-C, C-D chains, inferred from published word-association norms. In a subsequent recall test of the original A-B list, the B words that were implicitly associated with the shocked D words were forgotten significantly more often than control words.