Normative evidence weighting and accumulation in correlated environments.

The brain forms certain deliberative decisions following normative principles related to how sensory observations are weighed and accumulated over time. Previously we showed that these principles can account for how people adapt their decisions to the temporal dynamics of the observations (Glaze et al., 2015). Here we show that this adaptability extends to accounting for correlations in the observations, which can have a dramatic impact on the weight of evidence provided by those observations. We tested online human participants on a novel visual-discrimination task with pairwise-correlated observations. With minimal training, the participants adapted to uncued, trial-by-trial changes in the correlations and produced decisions based on an approximately normative weighting and accumulation of evidence. The results highlight the robustness of our brain's ability to process sensory observations with respect to not just their physical features but also the weight of evidence they provide for a given decision.

The subthalamic nucleus contributes causally to perceptual decision-making in monkeys.

The subthalamic nucleus (STN) plays critical roles in the motor and cognitive function of the basal ganglia (BG), but the exact nature of these roles is not fully understood, especially in the context of decision-making based on uncertain evidence. Guided by theoretical predictions of specific STN contributions, we used single-unit recording and electrical microstimulation in the STN of healthy monkeys to assess its causal, computational roles in visual-saccadic decisions based on noisy evidence. The recordings identified subpopulations of STN neurons with distinct task-related activity patterns that related to different theoretically predicted functions. Microstimulation caused changes in behavioral choices and response times that reflected multiple contributions to an "accumulate-to-bound"-like decision process, including modulation of decision bounds and evidence accumulation, and to non-perceptual processes. These results provide new insights into the multiple ways that the STN can support higher brain function.

Webcam-based eye tracking to detect mind wandering and comprehension errors.

Recent advances in computer vision have opened the door for scalable eye tracking using only a webcam. Such solutions are particularly useful for online educational technologies, in which a goal is to respond adaptively to students' ongoing experiences. We used WebGazer, a webcam-based eye-tracker, to automatically detect covert cognitive states during an online reading-comprehension task related to task-unrelated thought and comprehension. We present data from two studies using different populations: (1) a relatively homogenous sample of university students (N = 105), and (2) a more diverse sample from Prolific (N = 173, with < 20% White participants). Across both studies, the webcam-based eye-tracker provided sufficiently accurate and precise gaze measurements to predict both task-unrelated thought and reading comprehension from a single calibration. We also present initial evidence of predictive validity, including a positive correlation between predicted rates of task-unrelated thought and comprehension scores. Finally, we present slicing analyses to determine how performance changed under certain conditions (lighting, glasses, etc.) and generalizability of the results across the two datasets (e.g., training on the data Study 1 and testing on data from Study 2, and vice versa). We conclude by discussing results in the context of remote research and learning technologies.

Neural Representations of Post-Decision Accuracy and Reward Expectation in the Caudate Nucleus and Frontal Eye Field.

Performance monitoring that supports ongoing behavioral adjustments is often examined in the context of either choice confidence for perceptual decisions (i.e., "did I get it right?") or reward expectation for reward-based decisions (i.e., "what reward will I receive?"). However, our understanding of how the brain encodes these distinct evaluative signals remains limited because they are easily conflated, particularly in commonly used two-alternative tasks with symmetric rewards for correct choices. Previously we used a motion-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards to identify neural substrates of forming reward-biased perceptual decisions in the caudate nucleus (part of the striatum in the basal ganglia) and the frontal eye field (FEF, in prefrontal cortex). Here we leveraged this task design to partially decouple estimates of accuracy and reward expectation and examine their impacts on subsequent decisions and their representations in those two brain areas. We identified distinguishable representations of these two evaluative signals in individual caudate and FEF neurons, with regional differences in their distribution patterns and time courses. We observed that well-trained monkeys (both sexes) used both evaluative signals, infrequently but consistently, to adjust their subsequent decisions. We found further that these behavioral adjustments had reliable relationships with the neural representations of both evaluative signals in caudate, but not FEF. These results suggest that the cortico-striatal decision network may use diverse evaluative signals to monitor and adjust decision-making behaviors, adding to our understanding of the different roles that the FEF and caudate nucleus play in a diversity of decision-related computations.

Accumbens connectivity during deep-brain stimulation differentiates loss of control from physiologic behavioral states.

BACKGROUND: Loss of control (LOC) eating, the subjective sense that one cannot control what or how much one eats, characterizes binge-eating behaviors pervasive in obesity and related eating disorders. Closed-loop deep-brain stimulation (DBS) for binge eating should predict LOC and trigger an appropriately timed intervention. OBJECTIVE/HYPOTHESIS: This study aimed to identify a sensitive and specific biomarker to detect LOC onset for DBS. We hypothesized that changes in phase-locking value (PLV) predict the onset of LOC-associated cravings and distinguish them from potential confounding states. METHODS: Using DBS data recorded from the nucleus accumbens (NAc) of two patients with binge eating disorder (BED) and severe obesity, we compared PLV between inter- and intra-hemispheric NAc subregions for three behavioral conditions: craving (associated with LOC eating), hunger (not associated with LOC), and sleep. RESULTS: In both patients, PLV in the high gamma frequency band was significantly higher for craving compared to sleep and significantly higher for hunger compared to craving. Maximum likelihood classifiers achieved accuracies above 88% when differentiating between the three conditions. CONCLUSIONS: High-frequency inter- and intra-hemispheric PLV in the NAc is a promising biomarker for closed-loop DBS that differentiates LOC-associated cravings from physiologic states such as hunger and sleep. Future trials should assess PLV as a LOC biomarker across a larger cohort and a wider patient population transdiagnostically.

How Occam's razor guides human decision-making.

Occam's razor is the principle that, all else being equal, simpler explanations should be preferred over more complex ones. This principle is thought to play a role in human perception and decision-making, but the nature of our presumed preference for simplicity is not understood. Here we use preregistered behavioral experiments informed by formal theories of statistical model selection to show that, when faced with uncertain evidence, human subjects exhibit preferences for particular, theoretically grounded forms of simplicity of the alternative explanations. These forms of simplicity can be understood in terms of geometrical features of statistical models treated as manifolds in the space of the probability distributions, in particular their dimensionality, boundaries, volume, and curvature. The simplicity preferences driven by these features, which are also exhibited by artificial neural networks trained to optimize performance on comparable tasks, generally improve decision accuracy, because they minimize over-sensitivity to noisy observations (i.e., overfitting). However, unlike for artificial networks, for human subjects these preferences persist even when they are maladaptive with respect to the task training and instructions. Thus, these preferences are not simply transient optimizations for particular task conditions but rather a more general feature of human decision-making. Taken together, our results imply that principled notions of statistical model complexity have direct, quantitative relevance to human and machine decision-making and establish a new understanding of the computational foundations, and behavioral benefits, of our predilection for inferring simplicity in the latent properties of our complex world.

Normative decision rules in changing environments.

Models based on normative principles have played a major role in our understanding of how the brain forms decisions. However, these models have typically been derived for simple, stable conditions, and their relevance to decisions formed under more naturalistic, dynamic conditions is unclear. We previously derived a normative decision model in which evidence accumulation is adapted to fluctuations in the evidence-generating process that occur during a single decision (Glaze et al., 2015), but the evolution of commitment rules (e.g. thresholds on the accumulated evidence) under dynamic conditions is not fully understood. Here, we derive a normative model for decisions based on changing contexts, which we define as changes in evidence quality or reward, over the course of a single decision. In these cases, performance (reward rate) is maximized using decision thresholds that respond to and even anticipate these changes, in contrast to the static thresholds used in many decision models. We show that these adaptive thresholds exhibit several distinct temporal motifs that depend on the specific predicted and experienced context changes and that adaptive models perform robustly even when implemented imperfectly (noisily). We further show that decision models with adaptive thresholds outperform those with constant or urgency-gated thresholds in accounting for human response times on a task with time-varying evidence quality and average reward. These results further link normative and neural decision-making while expanding our view of both as dynamic, adaptive processes that update and use expectations to govern both deliberation and commitment.

How do we make good choices? Should I have cake or yoghurt for breakfast? The strategies we use to make decisions are important not just for our daily lives, but also for learning more about how the brain works. Decision-making strategies have two components: first, a deliberation period (when we gather information to determine which choice is 'best'); and second, a decision 'rule' (which tells us when to stop deliberating and commit to a choice). Although deliberation is relatively well-understood, less is known about the decision rules people use, or how those rules produce different outcomes. Another issue is that even the simplest decisions must sometimes adapt to a changing world. For example, if it starts raining while you are deciding which route to walk into town, you would probably choose the driest route ­ even if it did not initially look the best. However, most studies of decision strategies have assumed that the decision-maker's environment does not change during the decision process. In other words, we know much less about the decision rules used in real-life situations, where the environment changes. Barendregt et al. therefore wanted to extend the approaches previously used to study decisions in static environments, to determine which decision rules might be best suited to more realistic environments that change over time. First, Barendregt et al. constructed a computer simulation of decision-making with environmental changes built in. These changes were either alterations in the quality of evidence for or against a particular choice, or the 'reward' from a choice, i.e., feedback on how good the decision was. They then used the computer simulation to model single decisions where these changes took place. These virtual experiments showed that the best performance ­ for example, the most accurate decisions ­ resulted when the threshold for moving from deliberation (i.e., considering the evidence) to selecting an option could respond to, or even anticipate, the changing situations. Importantly, the simulations' results also predicted real-world choices made by human participants when given a decision-making task with similar variations in evidence and reward over time. In other words, the virtual decision-making rules could explain real behavior. This study sheds new light on how we make decisions in a changing environment. In the future, Barendregt et al. hope that this will contribute to a broader understanding of decision-making and behavior in a wide range of contexts, from psychology to economics and even ecology.

Rule-based and stimulus-based cues bias auditory decisions via different computational and physiological mechanisms.

Expectations, such as those arising from either learned rules or recent stimulus regularities, can bias subsequent auditory perception in diverse ways. However, it is not well understood if and how these diverse effects depend on the source of the expectations. Further, it is unknown whether different sources of bias use the same or different computational and physiological mechanisms. We examined how rule-based and stimulus-based expectations influenced behavior and pupil-linked arousal, a marker of certain forms of expectation-based processing, of human subjects performing an auditory frequency-discrimination task. Rule-based cues consistently biased choices and response times (RTs) toward the more-probable stimulus. In contrast, stimulus-based cues had a complex combination of effects, including choice and RT biases toward and away from the frequency of recently presented stimuli. These different behavioral patterns also had: 1) distinct computational signatures, including different modulations of key components of a novel form of a drift-diffusion decision model and 2) distinct physiological signatures, including substantial bias-dependent modulations of pupil size in response to rule-based but not stimulus-based cues. These results imply that different sources of expectations can modulate auditory processing via distinct mechanisms: one that uses arousal-linked, rule-based information and another that uses arousal-independent, stimulus-based information to bias the speed and accuracy of auditory perceptual decisions.

Reinforcement learning with associative or discriminative generalization across states and actions: fMRI at 3 T and 7 T.

The model-free algorithms of "reinforcement learning" (RL) have gained clout across disciplines, but so too have model-based alternatives. The present study emphasizes other dimensions of this model space in consideration of associative or discriminative generalization across states and actions. This "generalized reinforcement learning" (GRL) model, a frugal extension of RL, parsimoniously retains the single reward-prediction error (RPE), but the scope of learning goes beyond the experienced state and action. Instead, the generalized RPE is efficiently relayed for bidirectional counterfactual updating of value estimates for other representations. Aided by structural information but as an implicit rather than explicit cognitive map, GRL provided the most precise account of human behavior and individual differences in a reversal-learning task with hierarchical structure that encouraged inverse generalization across both states and actions. Reflecting inference that could be true, false (i.e., overgeneralization), or absent (i.e., undergeneralization), state generalization distinguished those who learned well more so than action generalization. With high-resolution high-field fMRI targeting the dopaminergic midbrain, the GRL model's RPE signals (alongside value and decision signals) were localized within not only the striatum but also the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area, including specific effects of generalization that also extend to the hippocampus. Factoring in generalization as a multidimensional process in value-based learning, these findings shed light on complexities that, while challenging classic RL, can still be resolved within the bounds of its core computations.

Suboptimal human inference can invert the bias-variance trade-off for decisions with asymmetric evidence.

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between: 1) bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies, and 2) variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to forms of inference based on suboptimal strategies. We examined inference problems applied to rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that varied in form and complexity. In general, subjects using more complex strategies tended to have lower bias and variance, but with a dependence on the form of strategy that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but higher bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but lower, near-normative bias. Our results help define new principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that can be sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality, of the inference process.

Human inference reflects a normative balance of complexity and accuracy.

We must often infer latent properties of the world from noisy and changing observations. Complex, probabilistic approaches to this challenge such as Bayesian inference are accurate but cognitively demanding, relying on extensive working memory and adaptive processing. Simple heuristics are easy to implement but may be less accurate. What is the appropriate balance between complexity and accuracy? Here we model a hierarchy of strategies of variable complexity and find a power law of diminishing returns: increasing complexity gives progressively smaller gains in accuracy. The rate of diminishing returns depends systematically on the statistical uncertainty in the world, such that complex strategies do not provide substantial benefits over simple ones when uncertainty is either too high or too low. In between, there is a complexity dividend. In two psychophysical experiments, we confirm specific model predictions about how working memory and adaptivity should be modulated by uncertainty.

Strategy-dependent effects of working-memory limitations on human perceptual decision-making.

Deliberative decisions based on an accumulation of evidence over time depend on working memory, and working memory has limitations, but how these limitations affect deliberative decision-making is not understood. We used human psychophysics to assess the impact of working-memory limitations on the fidelity of a continuous decision variable. Participants decided the average location of multiple visual targets. This computed, continuous decision variable degraded with time and capacity in a manner that depended critically on the strategy used to form the decision variable. This dependence reflected whether the decision variable was computed either: (1) immediately upon observing the evidence, and thus stored as a single value in memory; or (2) at the time of the report, and thus stored as multiple values in memory. These results provide important constraints on how the brain computes and maintains temporally dynamic decision variables.

Working memory, the brain's ability to temporarily store and recall information, is a critical part of decision making ­ but it has its limits. The brain can only store so much information, for so long. Since decisions are not often acted on immediately, information held in working memory 'degrades' over time. However, it is unknown whether or not this degradation of information over time affects the accuracy of later decisions. The tactics that people use, knowingly or otherwise, to store information in working memory also remain unclear. Do people store pieces of information such as numbers, objects and particular details? Or do they tend to compute that information, make some preliminary judgement and recall their verdict later? Does the strategy chosen impact people's decision-making? To investigate, Schapiro et al. devised a series of experiments to test whether the limitations of working memory, and how people store information, affect the accuracy of decisions they make. First, participants were shown an array of colored discs on a screen. Then, either immediately after seeing the disks or a few seconds later, the participants were asked to recall the position of one of the disks they had seen, or the average position of all the disks. This measured how much information degraded for a decision based on multiple items, and how much for a decision based on a single item. From this, the method of information storage used to make a decision could be inferred. Schapiro et al. found that the accuracy of people's responses worsened over time, whether they remembered the position of each individual disk, or computed their average location before responding. The greater the delay between seeing the disks and reporting their location, the less accurate people's responses tended to be. Similarly, the more disks a participant saw, the less accurate their response became. This suggests that however people store information, if working memory reaches capacity, decision-making suffers and that, over time, stored information decays. Schapiro et al. also noticed that participants remembered location information in different ways depending on the task and how many disks they were shown at once. This suggests people adopt different strategies to retain information momentarily. In summary, these findings help to explain how people process and store information to make decisions and how the limitations of working memory impact their decision-making ability. A better understanding of how people use working memory to make decisions may also shed light on situations or brain conditions where decision-making is impaired.

Context-dependent relationships between locus coeruleus firing patterns and coordinated neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex.

Ascending neuromodulatory projections from the locus coeruleus (LC) affect cortical neural networks via the release of norepinephrine (NE). However, the exact nature of these neuromodulatory effects on neural activity patterns in vivo is not well understood. Here, we show that in awake monkeys, LC activation is associated with changes in coordinated activity patterns in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These relationships, which are largely independent of changes in firing rates of individual ACC neurons, depend on the type of LC activation: ACC pairwise correlations tend to be reduced when ongoing (baseline) LC activity increases but enhanced when external events evoke transient LC responses. Both relationships covary with pupil changes that reflect LC activation and arousal. These results suggest that modulations of information processing that reflect changes in coordinated activity patterns in cortical networks can result partly from ongoing, context-dependent, arousal-related changes in activation of the LC-NE system.

Ethical Issues in Intraoperative Neuroscience Research: Assessing Subjects' Recall of Informed Consent and Motivations for Participation.

BackgroundAn increasing number of studies utilize intracranial electrophysiology in human subjects to advance basic neuroscience knowledge. However, the use of neurosurgical patients as human research subjects raises important ethical considerations, particularly regarding informed consent and undue influence, as well as subjects' motivations for participation. Yet a thorough empirical examination of these issues in a participant population has been lacking. The present study therefore aimed to empirically investigate ethical concerns regarding informed consent and voluntariness in Parkinson's disease patients undergoing deep brain stimulator (DBS) placement who participated in an intraoperative neuroscience study.MethodsTwo semi-structured 30-minute interviews were conducted preoperatively and postoperatively via telephone. Interviews assessed participants' motivations for participation in the parent intraoperative study, recall of information presented during the informed consent process, and participants' postoperative reflections on the research study.ResultsTwenty-two participants (mean age = 60.9) completed preoperative interviews at a mean of 7.8 days following informed consent and a mean of 5.2 days prior to DBS surgery. Twenty participants completed postoperative interviews at a mean of 5 weeks following surgery. All participants cited altruism or advancing medical science as "very important" or "important" in their decision to participate in the study. Only 22.7% (n = 5) correctly recalled one of the two risks of the study. Correct recall of other aspects of the informed consent was poor (36.4% for study purpose; 50.0% for study protocol; 36.4% for study benefits). All correctly understood that the study would not confer a direct therapeutic benefit to them.ConclusionEven though research coordinators were properly trained and the informed consent was administered according to protocol, participants demonstrated poor retention of study information. While intraoperative studies that aim to advance neuroscience knowledge represent a unique opportunity to gain fundamental scientific knowledge, improved standards for the informed consent process can help facilitate their ethical implementation.

Theta Synchrony Is Increased near Neural Populations That Are Active When Initiating Instructed Movement.

Theta oscillations (3-8 Hz) in the human brain have been linked to perception, cognitive control, and spatial memory, but their relation to the motor system is less clear. We tested the hypothesis that theta oscillations coordinate distributed behaviorally relevant neural representations during movement using intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) recordings from nine patients (n = 490 electrodes) as they performed a simple instructed movement task. Using high frequency activity (HFA; 70-200 Hz) as a marker of local spiking activity, we identified electrodes that were positioned near neural populations that showed increased activity during instruction and movement. We found that theta synchrony was widespread throughout the brain but was increased near regions that showed movement-related increases in neural activity. These results support the view that theta oscillations represent a general property of brain activity that may also play a specific role in coordinating widespread neural activity when initiating voluntary movement.

Embo: a Python package for empirical data analysis using the Information Bottleneck.

We present embo, a Python package to analyze empirical data using the Information Bottleneck (IB) method and its variants, such as the Deterministic Information Bottleneck (DIB). Given two random variables X and Y, the IB finds the stochastic mapping M of X that encodes the most information about Y, subject to a constraint on the information that M is allowed to retain about X. Despite the popularity of the IB, an accessible implementation of the reference algorithm oriented towards ease of use on empirical data was missing. Embo is optimized for the common case of discrete, low-dimensional data. Embo is fast, provides a standard data-processing pipeline, offers a parallel implementation of key computational steps, and includes reasonable defaults for the method parameters. Embo is broadly applicable to different problem domains, as it can be employed with any dataset consisting in joint observations of two discrete variables. It is available from the Python Package Index (PyPI), Zenodo and GitLab.

Frontal eye field and caudate neurons make different contributions to reward-biased perceptual decisions.

Many decisions require trade-offs between sensory evidence and internal preferences. Potential neural substrates include the frontal eye field (FEF) and caudate nucleus, but their distinct roles are not understood. Previously we showed that monkeys' decisions on a direction-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards reflected a biased accumulate-to-bound decision process (Fan et al., 2018) that was affected by caudate microstimulation (Doi et al., 2020). Here we compared single-neuron activity in FEF and caudate to each other and to accumulate-to-bound model predictions derived from behavior. Task-dependent neural modulations were similar in both regions. However, choice-selective neurons in FEF, but not caudate, encoded behaviorally derived biases in the accumulation process. Baseline activity in both regions was sensitive to reward context, but this sensitivity was not reliably associated with behavioral biases. These results imply distinct contributions of FEF and caudate neurons to reward-biased decision-making and put experimental constraints on the neural implementation of accumulation-to-bound-like computations.

Neural encoding of task-dependent errors during adaptive learning.

Effective learning requires using errors in a task-dependent manner, for example adjusting to errors that result from unpredicted environmental changes but ignoring errors that result from environmental stochasticity. Where and how the brain represents errors in a task-dependent manner and uses them to guide behavior are not well understood. We imaged the brains of human participants performing a predictive-inference task with two conditions that had different sources of errors. Their performance was sensitive to this difference, including more choice switches after fundamental changes versus stochastic fluctuations in reward contingencies. Using multi-voxel pattern classification, we identified task-dependent representations of error magnitude and past errors in posterior parietal cortex. These representations were distinct from representations of the resulting behavioral adjustments in dorsomedial frontal, anterior cingulate, and orbitofrontal cortex. The results provide new insights into how the human brain represents errors in a task-dependent manner and guides subsequent adaptive behavior.

The caudate nucleus contributes causally to decisions that balance reward and uncertain visual information.

Our decisions often balance what we observe and what we desire. A prime candidate for implementing this complex balancing act is the basal ganglia pathway, but its roles have not yet been examined experimentally in detail. Here, we show that a major input station of the basal ganglia, the caudate nucleus, plays a causal role in integrating uncertain visual evidence and reward context to guide adaptive decision-making. In monkeys making saccadic decisions based on motion cues and asymmetric reward-choice associations, single caudate neurons encoded both sources of information. Electrical microstimulation at caudate sites during motion viewing affected the monkeys' decisions. These microstimulation effects included coordinated changes in multiple computational components of the decision process that mimicked the monkeys' similarly coordinated voluntary strategies for balancing visual and reward information. These results imply that the caudate nucleus plays causal roles in coordinating decision processes that balance external evidence and internal preferences.