The Pat Jasan drug eradication social movement in Northern Myanmar, part one: Origins & reactions.

This commentary provides an introduction to the origins and emergence of Pat Jasan, a social movement that emerged amongst the Kachin population of northern Myanmar in response to a perceived crisis of illicit drug production and consumption. Although frequently presented as a case of drug vigilantism, we seek move beyond this stereotype by providing a granular account of the historical, political, and cultural conditions that lay the ground for the movement's emergence. Pat Jasan arose in the context of intersecting crises linked to protracted armed violence, extractive development and the 'slow violence' associated with widespread drug use. It was a response to a perceived vacuum of policing and the limitations of internationally supported harmed reduction measures to recognize or address the magnitude of the problem. Taking seriously the socially embedded foundations of the Pat Jasan movement provides an entry point for exploring how notions of harm reduction are constructed and understood locally and how movements like Pat Jasan emerge in response to societal concerns surrounding drugs.

Critical policy frontiers: The drugs-development-peacebuilding trilemma.

Recent years have seen the emergence of a policy consensus around the need for fundamental reforms of global drug policies. This is reflected in the call for 'development-oriented drug policies' that align and integrate drug policies with development and peacebuilding objectives, as captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These calls have been important in acknowledging the damage caused by the war on drugs and in drawing attention to how drugs are inextricably linked to wider development and peacebuilding challenges. Yet there is surprisingly limited academic research that looks critically at the drugs-development-peace nexus and which asks whether the goals of a 'drug-free world', 'sustainable development' and 'the promotion of peace' are commensurate with one another, can be pursued simultaneously, or are indeed achievable. This articles studies these policy fields and policy-making processes from the geographical margins of the state - frontiers and borderland regions - because they offer a privileged vantage point for studying the contested nature of policymaking in relation to the drugs-development-peace nexus. We set out a historical political economy framework to critically assess the assumptions underlying the integrationist agenda, as well as the evidence base to support it. By developing the notion of a policy trilemma we are critical of the dominant policy narrative that 'all good things come together', showing instead the fundamental tensions and trade-offs between these policy fields. In exploring the interactions between these policy fields, we aim to advance discussion and debate on how to engage with the tensions and trade-offs that this integrationist agenda reveals, but which have to date been largely ignored.

Beyond the narco frontier; rethinking an imaginary of the margins.

The 'narco-frontier' is frequently invoked in policy and popular narratives about drugs and armed conflict. The frontier is represented as an unruly, marginal and 'ungoverned' space, a magnate for drug traffickers, rebels and migrants. These 'non state' or 'anti state' spaces are believed to have a comparative advantage in illegality, with borderlands and frontiers becoming centres for the production, consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs. Linked to this representation is a policy narrative and set of assumptions that statebuilding, peacebuilding, development and counter narcotics policies are mutually reinforcing, and involve the extension of a state presence into these frontier zones, along with effective drug eradication, substitution and development activities. In spite of the evident inaccuracy of this portrayal of the 'narco-frontier' the imaginary is extremely resilient and continues to be reflected and reinforced in policy texts and narratives. This paper asks why has this been the case. What ideological work does the imaginary perform and for whom? And what are the implications of an alternative imaginary of the margins?

Stabilising a victor's peace? Humanitarian action and reconstruction in eastern Sri Lanka.

This paper focuses on the 'Sri Lankan model' of counter-insurgency and stabilisation and its implications for humanitarian and development actors. The Sri Lanka case shows that discourses, policies and practices associated with 'stabilisation' are not confined to 'fragile state' contexts in which there is heavy (and often militarised) international engagement--even though exemplars such as Afghanistan and Iraq have tended to dominate debates on this issue. Rather than being a single template, the 'stabilisation agenda' takes on very different guises in different contexts, presenting quite specific challenges to humanitarian and development actors. This is particularly true in settings like Sri Lanka, where there is a strong state, which seeks to make aid 'coherent' with its own vision of a militarily imposed political settlement. Working in such environments involves navigating a highly-charged domestic political arena, shaped by concerns about sovereignty, nationalism and struggles for legitimacy.

Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan.

It is unclear how international donors' stated commitment to ownership and partnership 'translates' in fragile state or 'post-conflict' settings. The very notion of ownership is violently contested in Afghanistan and donors have to negotiate with, and choose between, multiple state and non-state interlocutors. The developmentalist principles outlined in the 2005 Paris Declaration may carry little meaning in such contexts and their application can have paradoxical effects that impede the emergence of broad-based ownership. The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored here with reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan, focusing on the period following the 2001 Bonn Agreement. This paper examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-to-peace transition in Afghanistan.