Formal comment on "Assessing the impact of the 'one-child policy' in China: A synthetic control approach".

For nearly half a century, parents in China have faced compulsory quotas allowing them to have no more than one or two children. A great debate in recent years over the impact of this program on China's population continues in PLOS ONE with the publication of Gietel-Basten et al. (2019). The core question concerns how much higher China's birth rates might have been had birth quotas not been enacted and enforced. Gietel-Basten et al. argue that the selection of such comparators in recent studies may reflect subjective choices. They profess to avoid such subjectivities by using what they present to be a more scientific, objective, and transparent statistical approach that calculates a weighted average of birth rates of countries with other characteristics similar to China's. Yet the authors make subjective choices regarding the non-fertility characteristics used to form their comparators which leads to an underestimation of the impact of birth planning. Moreover, their visual presentation, which focuses on the two key sub-phases of the birth program, underrepresents its overall impact. Their comparators suggest that China's population today would be just 15 million more had it not enacted any birth restrictions since 1970 (one percent above its current population) and that in the absence of one-child limits, which began in 1979, China's population would be 70 million less. At the same time, the authors acknowledge that the one-child program has had numerous negative consequences. It seems fair to ask how such consequences could result if the program had no significant impact on childbearing decisions.

The demographic impact and development benefits of meeting demand for family planning with modern contraceptive methods.

BACKGROUND: Meeting demand for family planning can facilitate progress towards all major themes of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership. Many policymakers have embraced a benchmark goal that at least 75% of the demand for family planning in all countries be satisfied with modern contraceptive methods by the year 2030. OBJECTIVE: This study examines the demographic impact (and development implications) of achieving the 75% benchmark in 13 developing countries that are expected to be the furthest from achieving that benchmark. METHODS: Estimation of the demographic impact of achieving the 75% benchmark requires three steps in each country: 1) translate contraceptive prevalence assumptions (with and without intervention) into future fertility levels based on biometric models, 2) incorporate each pair of fertility assumptions into separate population projections, and 3) compare the demographic differences between the two population projections. Data are drawn from the United Nations, the US Census Bureau, and Demographic and Health Surveys. RESULTS: The demographic impact of meeting the 75% benchmark is examined via projected differences in fertility rates (average expected births per woman's reproductive lifetime), total population, growth rates, age structure, and youth dependency. On average, meeting the benchmark would imply a 16 percentage point increase in modern contraceptive prevalence by 2030 and a 20% decline in youth dependency, which portends a potential demographic dividend to spur economic growth. CONCLUSIONS: Improvements in meeting the demand for family planning with modern contraceptive methods can bring substantial benefits to developing countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show formally how such improvements can alter population size and age structure. Declines in youth dependency portend a demographic dividend, an added bonus to the already well-known benefits of meeting existing demands for family planning.

The Astonishing Population Averted by China's Birth Restrictions: Estimates, Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions.

China launched an unprecedented program to control its population in 1971. Experts have dismissed the official estimate of 400 million births averted by this program as greatly exaggerated yet neglect to provide their own estimates. Counterfactual projections based on fertility declines in other countries suggest that China's program-averted population numbered 360-520 million as of 2015. The low end of this range is based on Vietnam-China's best national comparator, with a two-child program of its own-and the high end is based on a 16-country comparator selected, ironically, by critics of the official estimate. The latter comparator further implies that China's one-child program itself averted a population of 400 million by 2015, three-quarters of the total averted population. All such estimates are projected to double by 2060, due mostly to counterfactual population momentum. These and other findings presented herein affirm the astonishing impact of China's draconian policy choices and challenge the current consensus that rapid socioeconomic progress drove China's fertility well below two children per family. International comparisons of fertility and income suggest instead that China's very low fertility arrived two or three decades too soon. If China had not harshly enforced a norm of 1.5-children during the last quarter century, most mothers would have had two children, one-half birth higher than observed.

The claim that China's fertility restrictions contributed to the use of prenatal sex selection: A sceptical reappraisal.

Most observers assume that China's fertility restrictions contribute to the use of prenatal sex selection. I question the logic and evidence underlying that assumption. Experts often stress that China's low fertility is largely voluntary, and that fertility restrictions are an unneeded safety valve. Others claim that China's '1.5-child' loophole, common throughout rural areas, reinforces son preference or intensifies prenatal sex discrimination by hardening fertility constraints. These claims defy logic upon closer examination. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the exceptional distortion of the sex ratio in 1.5-child areas results from excess underreporting of daughters and enforced sex-specific stopping. Prenatal sex selection may explain the remaining third but probably reflects the stronger rural son preference that led to the 1.5-child loophole itself. The recent surge in sex selection of first births that has perpetuated the distortions also seems unrelated to policy. Some son-preferring parents who formerly wanted two children may now genuinely want only one.

Child underreporting, fertility, and sex ratio imbalance in China.

Child underreporting is often neglected in studies of fertility and sex ratio imbalance in China. To improve estimates of these measures, I use intercensal comparisons to identify a rise in underreporting, which followed the increased enforcement and penalization under the birth planning system in 1991. A new triangulation of evidence indicates that about 19% of children at ages 0-4 were unreported in the 2000 census, more than double that of the 1990 census. This evidence contradicts assumptions underlying the fertility estimates of most recent studies. Yet, the analysis also suggests that China's fertility in the late 1990s (and perhaps beyond) was below officially adjusted levels. I then conduct a similar intercensal analysis of sex ratios of births and children, which are the world's highest primarily because of prenatal sex selection. However, given excess underreporting of young daughters, especially pronounced just after 1990, estimated ratios are lower than reported ratios. Sex ratios in areas with a "1.5-child" policy are especially distorted because of excess daughter underreporting, as well as sex-linked stopping rules and other factors, although it is unclear whether such policies increase use of prenatal sex selection. China's sex ratio at birth, once it is standardized by birth order, fell between 2000 and 2005 and showed a continuing excess in urban China, not rural China.

China's missing children: the 2000 census underreporting surprise.

We compare the age and sex structure of China's 2000 population census to an estimate of that structure derived from a projection from the 1990 census. Based on China's own official estimates of demographic change, our intercensal analysis indicates a shortfall in enumeration of more than a quarter of all children under age 5 and an eighth of those between 5 and 9, a total of nearly 37 million children missing in the 2000 census. We show that the shortfall is primarily due to underreporting of children in the census. Sex differences in child underreporting were fairly minor. Child underreporting in China is not unprecedented, but child underreporting rates in 2000 were about triple those of previous censuses. We attribute the increase primarily to policy changes beginning in the early 1990s that held officials at all jurisdictional levels personally responsible for enforcing birth quotas.