'A certain magic' - autistic adults' experiences of interacting with other autistic people and its relation to Quality of Life: A systematic review and thematic meta-synthesis.

LAY ABSTRACT: Research has suggested that autistic people enjoy spending time with other autistic people and find them easier to talk to. We wanted to find out what autistic people say about spending time with other autistic people and whether this makes their life better. We found 52 papers which described this and reviewed what they found. We found that many autistic people had positive experiences of spending time with other autistic people and these experiences had positive impact on their lives in a range of different ways. The papers did not tell us whether this also happens for autistic people with a learning disability. More research is needed to find out more about why spending time with other autistic people helps some autistic people.

Limited evidence for executive function load impairing selective copying in a win-stay lose-shift task.

The use of 'explicitly metacognitive' learning strategies has been proposed as an explanation for uniquely human capacities for cumulative culture. Such strategies are proposed to rely on explicit, system-2 cognitive processes, to enable advantageous selective copying. To investigate the plausibility of this theory, we investigated participants' ability to make flexible learning decisions, and their metacognitive monitoring efficiency, under executive function (EF) load. Adult participants completed a simple win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) paradigm task, intended to model a situation where presented information can be used to inform response choice, by copying rewarded responses and avoiding those that are unrewarded. This was completed alongside a concurrent switching task. Participants were split into three conditions: those that needed to use a selective copying, WSLS strategy, those that should always copy observed information, and those that should always do the opposite (Expt 1). Participants also completed a metacognitive monitoring task alongside the concurrent switching task (Expt 2). Conditions demanding selective strategies were more challenging than those requiring the use of one rule consistently. In addition, consistently copying was less challenging than consistently avoiding observed stimuli. Differences between selectively copying and always copying were hypothesised to stem from working memory requirements rather than the concurrent EF load. No impact of EF load was found on participants' metacognitive monitoring ability. These results suggest that copying decisions are underpinned by the use of executive functions even at a very basic level, and that selective copying strategies are more challenging than a combination of their component parts. We found minimal evidence that selective copying strategies relied on executive functions any more than consistent copying or deviation. However, task experience effects suggested that ceiling effects could have been masking differences between conditions which might be apparent in other contexts, such as when observed information must be retained in memory.

Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations.

Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and mindreading rely on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In Experiment 1, children/adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) showed significantly lower accuracy on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly metacognitive implicit one. In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task condition or a dual-task condition that required concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped mindreading. Metacognitive accuracy was significantly diminished by the dual-mindreading-task on the explicit task but not the implicit task. In Experiment 3, we included additional dual-tasks to rule out the possibility that any secondary task (regardless of whether it required mindreading) would diminish metacognitive accuracy. Finally, in both Experiments 1 and 2, metacognitive accuracy on the explicit task, but not the implicit task, was associated significantly with performance on a measure of mindreading ability. These results suggest that explicit metacognitive tasks (used frequently to measure metacognition in humans) share metarepresentational processing resources with mindreading, whereas implicit tasks (which are claimed by some comparative psychologists to measure metacognition in nonhuman animals) do not. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The self-reference effect on memory is not diminished in autism: Three studies of incidental and explicit self-referential recognition memory in autistic and neurotypical adults and adolescents.

Three experiments investigated the extent to which (a) individuals with autism show a self-reference effect (i.e., better memory for self-relevant information), and (b) the size of the self-reference effect is associated with autism traits. Participants studied trait adjectives in relation to their own name (self-referent) or a celebrity's name (other-referent) under explicit and incidental/implicit encoding conditions. Explicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives applied to self or other (denoted by proper names). Implicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives were presented to the right or left of one's own or a celebrity's name. Recognition memory for the adjectives was tested using a yes/no procedure. Experiment 1 (individual differences; N = 257 neurotypical adults) employed the Autism-spectrum Quotient as a measure of autistic traits. Experiments 2 (n = 60) and 3 (n = 52) involved case-control designs with closely matched groups of autistic and neurotypical adults and children/adolescents, respectively. Autistic traits were measured using the Autism-spectrum Quotient and Social Responsiveness Scale, respectively. In all experiments, a significant self-reference effect was observed in both explicit and implicit encoding conditions. Most importantly, however, there was (a) no significant relation between size of the self-reference effect and number of autistic traits (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and (b) no significant difference in the size of the self-reference effect between autistic and neurotypical participants (Experiments 2 and 3). In these respects, Bayesian analyses consistently suggested that the data supported the null hypothesis. These results challenge the notion that subjective or objective self-awareness are impaired in autism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder.

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.

Interoceptive impairments do not lie at the heart of autism or alexithymia.

Quattrocki and Friston (2014) argued that abnormalities in interoception-the process of representing one's internal physiological states-could lie at the heart of autism, because of the critical role interoception plays in the ontogeny of social-affective processes. This proposal drew criticism from proponents of the alexithymia hypothesis, who argue that social-affective and underlying interoceptive impairments are not a feature of autism per se, but of alexithymia (a condition characterized by difficulties describing and identifying one's own emotions), which commonly co-occurs with autism. Despite the importance of this debate for our understanding of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and of the role of interoceptive impairments in psychopathology, more generally, direct empirical evidence is scarce and inconsistent. Experiment 1 examined in a sample of 137 neurotypical (NT) individuals the association among autistic traits, alexithymia, and interoceptive accuracy (IA) on a standard heartbeat-tracking measure of IA. In Experiment 2, IA was assessed in 46 adults with ASD (27 of whom had clinically significant alexithymia) and 48 NT adults. Experiment 1 confirmed strong associations between autistic traits and alexithymia, but yielded no evidence to suggest that either was associated with interoceptive difficulties. Similarly, Experiment 2 provided no evidence for interoceptive impairments in autistic adults, irrespective of any co-occurring alexithymia. Bayesian analyses consistently supported the null hypothesis. The observations pose a significant challenge to notions that interoceptive impairments constitute a core feature of either ASD or alexithymia, at least as far as the direct perception of interoceptive signals is concerned. (PsycINFO Database Record

Metacognitive monitoring and the hypercorrection effect in autism and the general population: Relation to autism(-like) traits and mindreading.

Among neurotypical adults, errors made with high confidence (i.e. errors a person strongly believed they would not make) are corrected more reliably than errors made with low confidence. This 'hypercorrection effect' is thought to result from enhanced attention to information that reflects a 'metacognitive mismatch' between one's beliefs and reality. In Experiment 1, we employed a standard measure of this effect. Participants answered general knowledge questions and provided confidence judgements about how likely each answer was to be correct, after which feedback was given. Finally, participants were retested on all questions answered incorrectly during the initial phase. Mindreading ability and autism spectrum disorder-like traits were measured. We found that a representative sample of ( n = 83) neurotypical participants made accurate confidence judgements (reflecting good metacognition) and showed the hypercorrection effect. Mindreading ability was associated with autism spectrum disorder-like traits and metacognition. However, the hypercorrection effect was non-significantly associated with mindreading or autism spectrum disorder-like traits. In Experiment 2, 11 children with autism spectrum disorder and 11 matched comparison participants completed the hypercorrection task. Although autism spectrum disorder children showed significantly diminished metacognitive ability, they showed an undiminished hypercorrection effect. The evidence in favour of an undiminished hypercorrection effect (null result) was moderate, according to Bayesian analysis (Bayes factor = 0.21).

Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder.

Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life and might require "mindreading" (the ability to represent others' mental states). People with diminished mindreading, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. In Experiment 1, performance among 216 neurotypical adults on a realistic lie detection paradigm was significantly negatively associated with number of ASD traits, but not with mindreading ability. Bayesian analyses complemented null hypothesis significance testing and suggested the data supported the alternative hypothesis in this key respect. Cross validation of results was achieved by randomly splitting the full sample into two subsamples of 108 and rerunning analyses. The association between lie detection and ASD traits held in both subsamples, showing the reliability of findings. In Experiment 2, lie detection was significantly impaired in 27 adults with a diagnosis of ASD relative to 27 matched comparison participants. Results suggest that people with ASD (or ASD traits) may be particularly vulnerable to manipulation and may benefit from lie detection training. Autism Res 2018, 11: 1129-1137. © 2018 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life. People with diminished understanding of other minds, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. We found that lie detection ability was related to how many ASD traits neurotypical people manifested and also was significantly diminished among adults with a full diagnosis of ASD.

The Self-Reference Effect on Perception: Undiminished in Adults with Autism and No Relation to Autism Traits.

Memory for (and perception of) information about the self is superior to memory for (and perception of) other kinds of information. This self-reference effect (SRE) in memory appears diminished in ASD and related to the number of ASD traits manifested by neurotypical individuals (fewer traits = larger SRE). Here, we report the first experiments exploring the relation between ASD and the SRE in perception. Using a "Shapes" Task (Sui et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105, 2012), participants learned to associate three different shapes (triangle, circle, square) with three different labels representing self, a familiar other, or an unfamiliar other (e.g., "you", "mother", "stranger"). Participants then completed trials during which they were presented with one shape and one label for 100 ms, and made judgments about whether the shape and label was a match. In Experiment 1, neurotypical participants (n = 124) showed the expected SRE, detecting self-related matches more reliably and quickly than matches involving familiar or unfamiliar other. Most important, number of ASD traits was unrelated to the size of the SRE for either accuracy or RT. Bayesian association analyses strongly supported the null hypothesis. In Experiment 2, there were no differences between 22 adults with ASD and 21 matched comparison adults in performance on the Shapes Task. Despite showing large and significant theory of mind impairments, participants with ASD showed the typical SRE and there were no associations with ASD traits in either group. In every case, Bayesian analyses favored the null hypothesis. These findings challenge theories about self-representation in ASD, as discussed in the article. Autism Res 2018, 11: 331-341. © 2017 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: Neurotypical people tend to find it easier to perceive and remember information that relates to themselves than information that relates to others. Research suggests that people with ASD show a diminished (or absent) self-bias in memory and that severity of ASD predicts the extent of this diminution (more severe ASD = smaller self-bias in memory). However, the current research suggests strongly that people with ASD do show a self-bias in their perception. This research informs our understanding of psychological functioning in ASD and challenges theories regarding self-awareness in this disorder.

Recognition memory and source memory in autism spectrum disorder: A study of the intention superiority and enactment effects.

It is well established that neurotypical individuals generally show better memory for actions they have performed than actions they have observed others perform or merely read about, a so-called 'enactment effect'. Strikingly, research has also shown that neurotypical individuals demonstrate superior memory for actions they intend to perform in the future (but have not yet performed), an effect commonly known as the 'intention superiority effect'. Although the enactment effect has been studied among people with autism spectrum disorder, this study is the first to investigate the intention superiority effect in this disorder. This is surprising given the potential importance this issue has for general theory development, as well as for clinical practice. As such, this study aimed to assess the intention superiority and enactment effects in 22 children with autism spectrum disorder, and 20 intelligence quotient/age-matched neurotypical children. The results showed that children with autism spectrum disorder demonstrated not only undiminished enactment effects in recognition and source memory, but also (surprisingly for some theories) typical intention superiority effects. The implications of these results for theory, as well as clinical practice, are discussed.

Judgment of Learning Accuracy in High-functioning Adolescents and Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

This study explored whether adults and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate difficulties making metacognitive judgments, specifically judgments of learning. Across two experiments, the study examined whether individuals with ASD could accurately judge whether they had learnt a piece of information (in this case word pairs). In Experiment 1, adults with ASD demonstrated typical accuracy on a standard 'cue-alone' judgment of learning (JOL) task, compared to age- and IQ-matched neurotypical adults. Additionally, in Experiment 2, adolescents with ASD demonstrated typical accuracy on both a standard 'cue-alone' JOL task, and a 'cue-target' JOL task. These results suggest that JOL accuracy is unimpaired in ASD. These results have important implications for both theories of metacognition in ASD and educational practise.

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes in children with autism spectrum disorder: Diminished judgement of confidence accuracy.

Metacognition consists of monitoring processes (the ability to accurately represent one's own mental states) and control processes (the ability to control one's cognitive processes effectively). Both processes play vital roles in self-regulated learning. However, currently it is unclear whether these processes are impaired in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). This study aimed to assess metacognition in thirty-two children with ASD, and 30 IQ-/age-matched neurotypical children, using a judgment of confidence task. It was found that children with ASD showed diminished accuracy in their judgments of confidence, indicating metacognitive monitoring impairments in ASD. Children with ASD also used monitoring to influence control processes significantly less than neurotypical children, despite little evidence of impairments in overall control ability.

Metacognition, metamemory, and mindreading in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder.

Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition and encompasses both knowledge of cognitive processes and the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitions. The current study aimed to establish whether metacognition is impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). According to some theories, the ability to represent one's own mental states (an aspect of metacognition) relies on the same mechanism as the ability to represent others' mental states ("mindreading"). Given numerous studies have shown mindreading is impaired in ASD, there is good reason to predict concurrent impairments in metacognition. Metacognition is most commonly explored in the context of memory, often by assessing people's ability to monitor their memory processes. The current study addressed the question of whether people with ASD have difficulty monitoring the contents of their memory (alongside impaired mindreading). Eighteen intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD and 18 IQ- and age-matched neurotypical adults participated. Metamemory monitoring ability and mindreading ability were assessed by using a feeling-of-knowing task and the "animations" task, respectively. Participants also completed a self-report measure of metacognitive ability. In addition to showing impaired mindreading, participants with ASD made significantly less accurate feeling-of-knowing judgments than neurotypical adults, suggesting that metamemory monitoring (an aspect of metacognition) was impaired. Conversely, participants with ASD self-reported superior metacognitive abilities compared with those reported by neurotypical participants. This study provides evidence that individuals with ASD have metamemory monitoring impairments. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for our current understanding of metacognition in ASD and typical development are discussed.

Online action monitoring and memory for self-performed actions in autism spectrum disorder.

This study explored whether individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience difficulties with action monitoring. Two experimental tasks examined whether adults with ASD are able to monitor their own actions online, and whether they also show a typical enactment effects in memory (enhanced memory for actions they have performed compared to actions they have observed being performed). Individuals with ASD and comparison participants showed a similar pattern of performance on both tasks. In a task which required individuals to distinguish person-caused from computer-caused changes in phenomenology both groups found it easier to monitor their own actions compared to those of an experimenter. Both groups also showed typical enactment effects. Despite recent suggestions to the contrary, these results support suggestions that action monitoring is unimpaired in ASD.

Diminished time-based, but undiminished event-based, prospective memory among intellectually high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder: relation to working memory ability.

OBJECTIVE: Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to carry out an intended action. Working memory is the ability to store information in mind while processing potentially distracting information. The few previous studies of PM in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have yielded inconsistent findings. Studies of working memory ability in ASD have suggested a selective impairment of "visual working memory." However, it remains unclear whether any such impairment is the result of diminished (domain-specific; visual/verbal) storage capacity or diminished (domain-general) processing capacity. We aim to clarify these issues and explore the relation between PM and working memory in ASD. METHOD: Seventeen adults with ASD and 17 age- and IQ-matched comparison participants completed experimental measures of both event-based (perform action x when event y occurs) and time-based (perform action a at time b) PM, plus a self-report measure of PM skills. Participants also completed a working memory test battery. RESULTS: Participants with ASD self-reported diminished PM skill, and showed diminished performance on the time-based, but not event-based, PM task. On the working memory test battery, visual but not verbal storage capacity was diminished among participants with ASD, as was processing ability. Whereas visual storage was associated with event-based PM task performance among comparison participants, verbal storage was associated among ASD participants. CONCLUSIONS: ASD appears to involve a selective deficit in time-based PM and a selective difficulty with aspects of working memory that depend on the storage of visual information. However, event-based PM may be achieved through compensatory strategies in ASD.