Storying the world: a posthumanist critique of phenomenological-humanist representational practices in mental health nurse qualitative inquiry.

The purpose of this study was to build on my previously published critique of phenomenological-humanist representational practices in mental health nursing qualitative inquiry. I will unpack and trouble these practices from an explicitly posthumanist philosophical position on the basis of seminal posthumanist texts and my own single- and co-authored work. My argument will be that researchers in mental health nurse qualitative inquiry, who display a phenomenological-humanist narrative bent in their writing, continually endorse the validity of the institutional psychiatric assumptions, practices, and ways of representing human psychological distress. These are all explicitly rejected in more critical forms of qualitative inquiry in mental health, including in my own work. I will conclude that the use of phenomenological-humanist representational practices, in mental health nursing and by implication and extension other healthcare disciplines, is unethical, un-empathic, and morally compromised. This is because such practices present accounts of the worlds of mental health service users, survivors, and carers that lack necessary and sufficient levels of criticality and context.

Living my narrative: storying dishonesty and deception in mental health nursing.

This article proceeds from MacIntyre's moral philosophical perspective of individual human lives constituting unified narratives, in the context of co-evolving framing and guiding master narratives. This perspective accords specific episodes in people's lives the status of significant component parts of their developing, storied and enacted individual histories. From this philosophical base, autoethnographic principles will be employed in providing accounts from my own professional life narrative strand as a mental health nurse educator that speak to the issue of institutionalized dishonesty and deception in mental health nursing education and practice. On the basis of my pre-existing experience of publishing in nursing journals and scholarly identity, my argument will proceed from contesting the idea of an imagined stable foundational professional ethos underpinning mental health nursing practice, against which to judge professional dishonesty and deception. Using illustrative, relatively recent short stories, drawn from my lived-experience base as a mental health nurse educator, I will argue throughout at implicit and explicit levels that dishonesty and deception are always an inevitable part of the lives of mental health nurses and their educators. This is because of a constant gap between the nursing rhetoric and ideology that both groups espouse and how they actually behave on a day-to-day, mundane level, in and out of work and classroom practice. This gap shows up the public front of what mental health nursing is supposed to be about as dishonest and deceitful window dressing. I will assert that the many first-person, lived-experience accounts in mental health nursing teaching and publication are important educational resources in reducing this gap at professional practice, academic, and informal levels. Such storied accounts may also be useful in moving nurses and their educators towards more morally and ethically sensitive and reflexively attuned positions around what they talk and write into existence.

Queer challenges to evidence-based practice.

This paper aims to queer evidence-based practice by troubling the concepts of evidence, knowledge and mental illness. The evidence-based narrative that emerged within biomedicine has dominated health care. The biomedical notion of 'evidence' has been critiqued extensively and is seen as exclusive and limiting, and even though the social constructionist paradigm attempts to challenge the authority of biomedicine to legitimate what constitutes acceptable evidence or knowledge for those experiencing mental illness, biomedical notions of evidence appear to remain relatively intact. Queer theory offers theoretical tools to disrupt biomedical norms and challenges biomedical normativity to indicate how marginalisation occurs when normative truths about mental health classify those who differ from the norm as 'ill' or 'disordered'. Queer theory's emphasis on normativity serves the political aim to subvert marginalisation and bring about radical social and material change. Reference will be made to mental health subjects within each discourse by indicating how the body acts as a vehicle for knowing. Deleuzian notions of the rhizome are used as metaphor to suggest a relational approach to knowledge that does away with either/or positions in either biomedical, or queer knowledge to arrive at a both/and position where the biomedical, constructionist and queer are interrelated and entangled in needing the other for their own evolution. However, queer does not ask for assimilation but celebrates difference by remaining outside to disrupt that which is easily overlooked, assumed to be natural or represented as the norm. The task of queer knowledge is to do justice to the lives lived in the name of evidence-based practice and demands that we consider the relations of power where knowledge is produced. This pursuit creates different knowledge spaces where we identify new intersections that allow for socially just understandings of knowing or evidence to emerge.

Clinical implications of attentional bias in anxiety disorders: An integrative literature review.

Research on information processing biases has been motivated by the hope that it would lead to new and more efficient psychotherapeutic interventions. The literature is abundant with empirical data of attentional biases toward threat stimuli in anxiety disorders. This article aims to review the existing literature on the topic of attentional bias in anxiety disorders and discuss important implications for clinical practice. We adopted an integrative approach to link research data on attentional bias, information processing, and cognitive accounts (automaticity and controllability) with clinical practice in cognitive-behavioral therapy. It is important to develop and apply therapeutic interventions that can effectively reduce negative attentional biases while treating the main problems associated with anxiety disorders. However, it remains to be seen whether cognitive therapy interventions targeting more voluntary, strategic information processing can have a positive impact on automatic, involuntary processing involved in attentional biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).