RESUMO
We investigate quality provision and the occurrence of strategic behaviour in competitive hospital markets where providers are assumed to be semi-altruistic towards patients. For this, we employ a laboratory experiment with a hospital market framing. Subjects decide on the quality levels for one of three competing hospitals respectively. We vary the organizational aspect of whether quality decisions within hospitals are made by individuals or teams. Realized monetary patient benefits go to real patients outside the lab. In both settings, we find that degrees of cooperation quickly converge towards negative values, implying absence of collusion and patient centred or competitive quality choices. Moreover, hospitals treat quality as a strategic complement and adjust their quality choice in the same direction as their competitors. The response magnitude for team markets is weaker; this is driven by non-cooperative or altruistic teams, which tend to set levels of quality that are strategically independent.
RESUMO
On the basis of a Salop model with regulated prices, we investigate quality provision behaviour of competing hospitals before and after a merger. For this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects decided on the level of treatment quality as head of a hospital. We find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality. However, for merger insiders and outsiders, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals. This upward deviation is potentially driven by altruistic behaviour towards patients. Furthermore, we find that in the case where sufficient cost synergies are realised by the merged hospitals, there is a significant increase in average quality choices compared to the scenario without synergies. Finally, we find that our results do not change when comparing individual decisions to team decisions.
