Illusory intuitions: Challenging the claim of non-exclusivity.

A person who arrives at correct solutions via false premises is right and wrong simultaneously. Similarly, a person who generates "logical intuitions" through superficial heuristics can likewise be right and wrong at the same time. However, heuristics aren't guaranteed to deliver the logical solution, so the claim that system 1 can routinely produce the alleged system 2 response is unfounded.

Eye Movements, Pupil Dilation, and Conflict Detection in Reasoning: Exploring the Evidence for Intuitive Logic.

A controversial claim in recent dual process accounts of reasoning is that intuitive processes not only lead to bias but are also sensitive to the logical status of an argument. The intuitive logic hypothesis draws upon evidence that reasoners take longer and are less confident on belief-logic conflict problems, irrespective of whether they give the correct logical response. In this paper, we examine conflict detection under conditions in which participants are asked to either judge the logical validity or believability of a presented conclusion, accompanied by measures of eye movement and pupil dilation. The findings show an effect of conflict, under both types of instruction, on accuracy, latency, gaze shifts, and pupil dilation. Importantly, these effects extend to conflict trials in which participants give a belief-based response (incorrectly under logic instructions or correctly under belief instructions) demonstrating both behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the logical intuition hypothesis.

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions.

The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conflict arguments, arguably because logic is intuitive and automatic enough to interfere with belief judgments. However, recent studies have challenged this interpretation by finding the same conflict effects when a matching heuristic cues the same response as logic, even on arguments with no logically valid structures. In this study, we test the matching heuristic hypothesis across 4 experiments (total N = 409) by manipulating the arguments propositions so that matching cues a response that is either (1) aligned or (2) misaligned with logic, or (3) cues no response at all. Consistent with the predictions of the matching heuristic, standard, reversed, and no conflict effects were found in those conditions, respectively. These results indicate that intuitively correct inferences which are assumed as evidence of logical intuitions are actually driven by a matching heuristic that cues responses aligned with logic. Alleged intuitive logic effects are reversed when the matching heuristic cues an opposing logical response or disappears when there are no matching cues. Therefore, it appears as though the operation of a matching heuristic, rather than an intuitive access to logic, drives logical intuitions.

The design stance, intentional stance, and teleological beliefs about biological and nonbiological natural entities.

Teleology involves an appeal to function to explain why things are the way they are. Among scientists and philosophers, teleological explanations are widely accepted for human-made artifacts and biological traits, yet controversial for biological and nonbiological natural entities. Prior research shows a positive relationship between religiosity and acceptance of such controversial teleological explanations. Across three large online studies, we show that the relationship between religiosity and teleological acceptance cannot be explained by acceptance of objectively false explanations. Furthermore, we show that anthropomorphism and a belief in supernatural agents each independently predict teleological acceptance. In contrast, the tendency to inhibit intuitively appealing, yet incorrect responses to simple reasoning problems was associated with lower teleological acceptance. These results provide strong support for an intention-based account of teleology, and further contribute to the existing literature which situates teleological reasoning within a dual-process framework. Several avenues of future research are discussed, including the need to dissociate implicit and explicit measures of teleological belief, and the need for a greater focus on cross-cultural variation in teleological beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.

Logic brightens my day: Evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity.

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record

The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict.

According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment 3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings.

The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking.

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this 'excess choice effect' (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a 'good' flavour, half a 'bad' flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the 'bad' drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well-being are discussed.

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3-5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.

Reasoning and dyslexia: is visual memory a compensatory resource?

Effective reasoning is fundamental to problem solving and achievement in education and employment. Protocol studies have previously suggested that people with dyslexia use reasoning strategies based on visual mental representations, whereas non-dyslexics use abstract verbal strategies. This research presents converging evidence from experimental and individual differences perspectives. In Experiment 1, dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants were similarly accurate on reasoning problems, but scores on a measure of visual memory ability only predicted reasoning accuracy for dyslexics. In Experiment 2, a secondary task loaded visual memory resources during concurrent reasoning. Dyslexics were significantly less accurate when reasoning under conditions of high memory load and showed reduced ability to subsequently recall the visual stimuli, suggesting that the memory and reasoning tasks were competing for the same visual cognitive resource. The results are consistent with an explanation based on limitations in the verbal and executive components of working memory in dyslexia and the use of compensatory visual strategies for reasoning. There are implications for cognitive activities that do not readily support visual thinking, whether in education, employment or less formal everyday settings.

Fluency and belief bias in deductive reasoning: new indices for old effects.

Models based on signal detection theory (SDT) have occupied a prominent role in domains such as perception, categorization, and memory. Recent work by Dube et al. (2010) suggests that the framework may also offer important insights in the domain of deductive reasoning. Belief bias in reasoning has traditionally been examined using indices based on raw endorsement rates-indices that critics have claimed are highly problematic. We discuss a new set of SDT indices fit for the investigation belief bias and apply them to new data examining the effect of perceptual disfluency on belief bias in syllogisms. In contrast to the traditional approach, the SDT indices do not violate important statistical assumptions, resulting in a decreased Type 1 error rate. Based on analyses using these novel indices we demonstrate that perceptual disfluency leads to decreased reasoning accuracy, contrary to predictions. Disfluency also appears to eliminate the typical link found between cognitive ability and the effect of beliefs on accuracy. Finally, replicating previous work, we demonstrate that cognitive ability leads to an increase in reasoning accuracy and a decrease in the response bias component of belief bias.

Base rates: both neglected and intuitive.

Base-rate neglect refers to the tendency for people to underweight base-rate probabilities in favor of diagnostic information. It is commonly held that base-rate neglect occurs because effortful (Type 2) reasoning is required to process base-rate information, whereas diagnostic information is accessible to fast, intuitive (Type 1) processing (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). To test this account, we instructed participants to respond to base-rate problems on the basis of "beliefs" or "statistics," both in free time (Experiments 1 and 3) and under a time limit (Experiment 2). Participants were given problems with salient stereotypes (e.g., "Jake lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb") that either conflicted or coincided with base-rate probabilities (e.g., "Jake was randomly selected from a sample of 5 doctors and 995 nurses for conflict; 995 doctors and 5 nurses for nonconflict"). If utilizing base-rates requires Type 2 processing, they should not interfere with the processing of the presumably faster belief-based judgments, whereas belief-based judgments should always interfere with statistics judgments. However, base-rates interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as the stereotypes interfered with statistical judgments, as indexed by increased response time and decreased confidence for conflict problems relative to nonconflict. These data suggest that base-rates, while typically underweighted or neglected, do not require Type 2 processing and may, in fact, be accessible to Type 1 processing.

Making heads or tails of probability: an experiment with random generators.

BACKGROUND: The equiprobability bias is a tendency for individuals to think of probabilistic events as 'equiprobable' by nature, and to judge outcomes that occur with different probabilities as equally likely. The equiprobability bias has been repeatedly found to be related to formal education in statistics, and it is claimed to be based on a misunderstanding of the concept of randomness. AIMS: The aim of the present study was to examine whether experimenting with random generators would decrease the equiprobability bias. SAMPLE: The participants were 108 psychology students whose performance was measured either immediately after taking part in a training session (n= 55), or without doing any training exercises (n= 53). METHOD: The training session consisted of four activities. These included generating random sequences of events, and learning about the law of large numbers. Subsequently, the participants were tested on a series of equiprobability problems, and a number of other problems with similar structure and content. RESULTS: The results indicated that the training successfully decreased the equiprobability bias. However, this effect was moderated by participants' cognitive ability (i.e., higher ability participants benefitted from the training more than participants with lower cognitive ability). Finally, the training session had the unexpected side effect of increasing students' susceptibility to the representativeness heuristic. CONCLUSIONS: Experimenting with random generators has a positive effect on students' general understanding of probability, but the same time it might increase their susceptibility to certain biases (especially, to the representativeness heuristic). These findings have important implications for using training methods to improve probabilistic reasoning performance.

The SDT model of belief bias: complexity, time, and cognitive ability mediate the effects of believability.

When people evaluate conclusions, they are often influenced by prior beliefs. Prevalent theories claim that belief bias affects the quality of syllogistic reasoning. However, recent work by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) has suggested that belief bias may be a simple response bias. In Experiment 1, receiver operating characteristic analysis revealed that believability affected accuracy for complex but not for simple syllogisms. In Experiment 2, the effect of believability on accuracy disappeared when judgments were made under time pressure and with participants low in cognitive capacity. The observed effects on reasoning accuracy indicate that beliefs influence more than response bias when conditions are conducive to the use of certain reasoning strategies. The findings also underscore the need to consider individual differences in reasoning.

Are systemizing and autistic traits related to talent and interest in mathematics and engineering? Testing some of the central claims of the empathizing-systemizing theory.

In two experiments, we tested some of the central claims of the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory. Experiment 1 showed that the systemizing quotient (SQ) was unrelated to performance on a mathematics test, although it was correlated with statistics-related attitudes, self-efficacy, and anxiety. In Experiment 2, systemizing skills, and gender differences in these skills, were more strongly related to spatial thinking styles than to SQ. In fact, when we partialled the effect of spatial thinking styles, SQ was no longer related to systemizing skills. Additionally, there was no relationship between the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the SQ, or skills and interest in mathematics and mechanical reasoning. We discuss the implications of our findings for the E-S theory, and for understanding the autistic cognitive profile.

Reasoning on the basis of fantasy content: two studies with high-functioning autistic adolescents.

Reasoning about problems with empirically false content can be hard, as the inferences that people draw are heavily influenced by their background knowledge. However, presenting empirically false premises in a fantasy context helps children and adolescents to disregard their beliefs, and to reason on the basis of the premises. The aim of the present experiments was to see if high-functioning adolescents with autism are able to utilize fantasy context to the same extent as typically developing adolescents when they reason about empirically false premises. The results indicate that problems with engaging in pretence in autism persist into adolescence, and this hinders the ability of autistic individuals to disregard their beliefs when empirical knowledge is irrelevant.

Logic feels so good-I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning.

When people evaluate syllogisms, their judgments of validity are often biased by the believability of the conclusions of the problems. Thus, it has been suggested that syllogistic reasoning performance is based on an interplay between a conscious and effortful evaluation of logicality and an intuitive appreciation of the believability of the conclusions (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). However, logic effects in syllogistic reasoning emerge even when participants are unlikely to carry out a full logical analysis of the problems (e.g., Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). There is also evidence that people can implicitly detect the conflict between their beliefs and the validity of the problems, even if they are unable to consciously produce a logical response (e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010). In 4 experiments we demonstrate that people intuitively detect the logicality of syllogisms, and this effect emerges independently of participants' conscious mindset and their cognitive capacity. This logic effect is also unrelated to the superficial structure of the problems. Additionally, we provide evidence that the logicality of the syllogisms is detected through slight changes in participants' affective states. In fact, subliminal affective priming had an effect on participants' subjective evaluations of the problems. Finally, when participants misattributed their emotional reactions to background music, this significantly reduced the logic effect.