Like a bridge over troubled water--Opening pathways for integrating social sciences and humanities into nuclear research.

Research on nuclear technologies has been largely driven by a detachment of the 'technical content' from the 'social context'. However, social studies of science and technology--also for the nuclear domain--emphasize that 'the social' and 'the technical' dimensions of technology development are inter-related and co-produced. In an effort to create links between nuclear research and innovation and society in mutually beneficial ways, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre started fifteen years ago a 'Programme of Integration of Social Aspects into nuclear research' (PISA). In line with broader science-policy agendas (responsible research and innovation and technology assessment), this paper argues that the importance of such programmes is threefold. First, their multi-disciplinary basis and participatory character contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between science, technology and society, in general, and the complexity of nuclear technology assessment in particular. Second, their functioning as (self -)critical policy supportive research with outreach to society is an essential prerequisite for policies aiming at generating societal trust in the context of controversial issues related to nuclear technologies and exposure to ionising radiation. Third, such programmes create an enriching dynamic in the organisation itself, stimulating collective learning and transdisciplinarity. The paper illustrates with concrete examples these claims and concludes by discussing some key challenges that researchers face while engaging in work of this kind.

Radiological dispersion devices: are we prepared?

Already before the events of September 11th 2001 concern was raised about the spread of orphan sources and their potential use in Radiological Dispersion Devices by terrorist groups. Although most of the simulated scenarios foresee a rather limited direct health impact on the population, the affected region would suffer from the indirect consequences such as social disruption, cleanup requirements and economic costs. The nature of such a radiological attack would anyway be different compared to conventional radiological accidents, basically because it can happen anywhere at any time. Part of the response resides in a general preparedness scheme incorporating attacks with Radiological Dispersion Devices. Training of different potential intervention teams is essential. The response would consist of a prioritised list of actions adapted to the circumstances. As the psychosocial dimension of the crisis could be worse than the purely radiological one, an adapted communication strategy with the public aspect would be a key issue.

Better use of European (regional) resources.

In case of an accidental release of radioactivity and subsequent contamination of the food chain, many samples need to be collected and analysed, and this is far from being a simple issue. The determination of contamination levels requires accredited laboratories, approved and certified procedures and methods, transparency and above all prompt results, as stakeholders in general cannot afford waiting. Adequate decisions require fixed norms, stable in time, and accepted internationally. Moreover, an effective policy relies on traceability of products as well. There are huge requirements of harmonisation of procedures, traceability of data, database management, priority settings etc. Accredited laboratories tend to make use of reliable techniques but these have been optimised for low radiation levels and high accuracy for routine analyses, often in the framework of radiological surveillance of the territory, drinking waters or the food chain. It is obvious that such procedures, although very accurate and sensitive, are not suited for urgent decisions in crisis situations. Similarly, accredited analysis methodologies may start from large quantities of product in order to decrease limits of detection; however, this involves sometimes long times for drying or chemical treatment, introducing important delays. Furthermore, large quantities of samples would simply result in the saturation of the analytical capabilities of one country. Adequate actions and informed decisions during a nuclear accident will require an analytical infrastructure that individual countries do not have; hence there is a clear need to establish regional collaboration and co-operation. This paper includes an example of such collaborative work and mutual assistance, and also touches on how sharing tools for decision making, analytical resources, sample collection procedures and analysis would promote trust, reliablity in the results, a common approach toward minimizing the effects of a radiological disaster and above all unity. Last but not least, this paper also poses a challenge: Nuclear accident management implies that all responsible parties have to guarantee that decision support systems have access to data and information in the best available and consistent manner. This will not be achieved in an independent and isolated manner.

An inquiry of the opinions of the French and Belgian populations as regards risk.

IRSN (France) and SCK-CEN (Belgium), two institutes of research and expertise in radiation protection and nuclear safety, simultaneously organised a very similar public opinion survey in their respective countries in November 2002. The study explores subjects such as: major people's concerns, perception of environmental risks, perception of risks in general, the role of experts in decision making, opinions on nuclear matters and aspects of nuclear emergency preparedness. In each country, more than 1000 citizens representing the general public have been consulted in face-to-face interviews. The field work has been performed by professional companies (BVA in France and Research International in Belgium). The paper shows that industrial and technological risks are not perceived as one of the major public concerns, although many other risks, of different nature are considered to be high. The actions of the authorities to provide protection against the consequences of many risks or disasters are not considered to be sufficient, and many respondents claim not to believe the information they receive. There exists a large difference between the opinion of French and Belgian public, and within the different language groups in Belgium, with regard to who should be in charge of the control of the hazardous industries. Many of the "actors" within the nuclear industry are not known by the respondents. The perception of the technical competence or the truth being told shows large variations between the main actors (such as members of the nuclear industry, the government or the media). Majorities within the population believe that a disaster as serious as the Chernobyl one can happen in their country and that in case of a nuclear accident, the authorities would not be capable to protect the population adequately.